Results
Displaying 71 - 80 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross | 598 U.S. 356, 143 S. Ct. 1142, 215 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2023) | Following the adoption of California’s Proposition 12, two organizations – the National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (Petitioners) – filed this lawsuit on behalf of the members of these organizations that are in the business of raising and processing pigs for the sale of pork meat. Petitioners allege that Proposition 12, which forbids the sale of whole pork meat in California that is made from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are confined in a cruel manner, violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by placing an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Under Proposition 12, confinement of pigs is cruel if it prevents a pig from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. Petitioners allege that the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will increase production costs, but concede that those costs will fall on both California and out-of-state pork producers. Petitioners also allege that, because California imports most of the pork it consumes, the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will be dealt to mostly out-of-state producers. The district court concluded that petitioners’ complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law and dismissed the case, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, rejecting petitioners’ arguments that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court found no violation of the dormant Commerce Clause because: (1) petitioners concede that Proposition 12 did not implicate the antidiscrimination principle, because it imposes the same burdens on in-state pork producers that it imposes on out-of-state pork producers, and (2) petitioners’ reliance on the Pike line of cases to prevent a state from regulating the sale of a consumer good within its borders on nondiscriminatory terms was rejected, as that line of cases had never yielded such a result. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed. | Case | ||||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 9 Núm 1 |
|
Policy | |||||||||
| US - Endangered - Petition to List the Northwest Atlantic DPS of the Thorny Skate | Submitted by the Animal Welfare Institute (AWI) | The Animal Welfare Institute and Defenders of Wildlife (Petitioners) hereby petition the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Assistant Administrator for Fisheries of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to list the Northwest Atlantic population of thorny skate (Amblyraja radiata) as an endangered or threatened Distinct Population Segment (DPS), pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA) (16 U.S.C. § 1531–44). In the alternative, Petitioners request NMFS to list a U.S. DPS of the thorny skate as a threatened or endangered species. In addition, Petitioners seek the designation of critical habitat concurrently with any listing of the thorny skate, as authorized by statute. | Administrative | ||||||||
| NC - Dangerous Dog - Chapter 67. Dogs. Article 1A. Dangerous Dogs. | N.C.G.S.A. § 67-1 to 18; N.C.G.S.A. § 130A-196, 130A-200 | NC ST § 67-1 to 18; NC ST § 130A-196, 130A-200 | These North Carolina statutes comprise the state's dangerous dog and dog bite laws. Among the provisions include misdemeanor penalties for an owner if a dangerous dog attacks a person and causes physical injuries requiring medical treatment in excess of one hundred dollars ($100.00) and strict liability in civil damages for any injuries or property damage the dog inflicts upon a person, his property, or another animal. Another statute provides that any person brought to receive medical treatment for a dog bite must report it to the local health director and the animal must be confined for a ten day observation period. | Statute | |||||||
| Faraci v. Urban | 101 A.D.3d 1753 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.) | 2012 WL 6720938 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.); 957 N.Y.S.2d 792 |
In this New York case, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries his son sustained after the child was bitten by a dog in a house owned by defendant Urban, but occupied by Defendant Buil (the dog's owner). Defendant Urban appeals an order denying her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant Urban failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that the dog did not have vicious tendencies because defendant's own submissions showed that the dog had previously growled at people coming to the door. However, summary judgment was appropriate here because the evidence failed to show that defendant knew or should have known of the dog's alleged vicious propensities. |
Case | |||||||
| IN - Animal Testing - THE BREEDING OF AND EXPERIMENTS ON ANIMALS (CONTROL AND SUPERVISION) RULES, 1998 | 1843. G.S.R. 1074(E), dated 15th December, 1998 | The Rules, drafted under the powers conferred by section (1)(1-A) and (2) of Section 17 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, regulate the breeding and testing of animals in laboratories. It sets up an 'Institutional Animal Ethics Committee' that ensures the performance of experiments of animals in an establishment in a humane manner. The Rules specify the conditions that breeders are allowed to raise these animals in for testing, and the manner in which these animals must be treated in establishments where they are used for testing. | Statute | ||||||||
| MI - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | M.C.L. 287.261 - 395; 317.63; 324.73101 - 73110; 324.42101 - 42106 | MI ST 287.261 - 395; 317.63; 324.73101 - 73110; 324.42101 - 42106 | The regulation of dogs and cats in Michigan implicates three major issues: licensing and registration of dogs; the regulation of animal control facilities and pet shops; and the ever-present concern of dog bites. The primary statutory vehicle that regulates the licensing requirements for dogs is the The Dog Law of 1919. Under the dog law, it is unlawful for any person to own a dog six months or older unless the dog is licensed. MCL Sec. 287.262. It is also unlawful for a person to own a dog six months or older that does not wear a collar and tag at all times, except when engaged in hunting activities accompanied by his or her owner. MCL Sec. 287.262. A female dog that is in heat may not go beyond her owner's premises unless properly held on a leash under this section. | Statute | |||||||
| Commonwealth v. Kneller | 999 A.2d 608 (Pa., 2010) | 2010 PA Super 122, 2010 WL 2765402 (Pa.) |
Kneller appealed from a conviction of criminal conspiracy to commit cruelty to animals after she gave an acquaintance a gun and asked him to shoot a dog. The Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that “The Animal Destruction Method Authorization Law” (ADMA) and the “Dog Law” are not ambiguous. In addition, the deadly weapon enhancement applies to an owner who is convicted of cruelty to animals and used a firearm to kill it. |
Case | |||||||
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Vaught | 8 F.4th 714 (8th Cir. 2021) | Several animal advocacy organizations filed a complaint against the Vaughts and Peco Foods, Inc. seeking an order that would prevent defendants from bringing a civil suit under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-113 (colloquially known as Arkansas' "ag gag" law). The statute at issue provides a civil cause of action for unauthorized access to protected properties described under the law. Plaintiffs claim that the statute violates their right to free speech under the First Amendment by chilling them from engaging in activities protected under the First Amendment. In particular, the plaintiffs have "specific and definite plans" to investigate the defendants' chicken slaughterhouses and pig farms by sending undercover investigators to seek employment with defendants and collect information in an effort to support their mission to "reform[] animal agriculture." The district court found that plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing to sue, finding that the injury at hand was too speculative. On appeal here, the court noted found that plaintiffs established the three primary elements of standing from the Lujan case ("(1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress the injury."). First, but for the statute, plaintiffs allege that they would engage in the protected constitutional conduct. Second, the plaintiffs adequately outlined their intention to engage in a course of conduct that is proscribed by the statute. Finally, the court found a credible threat of enforcement that was objectively reasonable. This is bolstered by the fact plaintiffs have successfully engaged in the conduct at other facilities in the past. While defendants contend that there is no credible threat that they would enforce the statute because these organizations would not find entry to their facilities worthwhile. However, plaintiffs presented allegations that indeed they would be interested in documenting the plaintiffs' operations because of the conditions of pigs in "nearly immovable quarters" and the use of controversial methods of slaughter. The court was equally unpersuaded by defendants' claims that there is no injury in fact since plaintiffs are not poised to publish any information gathered from their facilities. Additionally, plaintiffs sent letters to defendants asking them to waive their rights to sue and neither defendant responded. Thus, the complaint sufficiently established a case or controversy. The lower court judgment was reversed and the case was remanded. | Case | ||||||||
| LA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | LSA-R.S. 3:2361 - 2367; LSA-R.S. 14:102 - .29 | These Louisiana statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty provisions. The term "cruel" is defined in the first section every act or failure to act whereby unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused or permitted. The crime of cruelty to animals is subdivided into simple cruelty or aggravated cruelty. Simple cruelty occurs when a person intentionally or with criminal negligence overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, or overworks, torments, cruelly beats, or unjustifiably injures, or, having charge, custody, or possession of any animal, either as owner or otherwise, unjustifiably fails to provide any living animal with proper food, proper drink, proper shelter, or proper veterinary care. | Statute |