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Displaying 21 - 30 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN - Vehicle - Chapter 30. Immunity for Removing a Domestic Animal from a Locked Motor Vehicle | I.C. 34-30-30-1 - 4 | IN ST 34-30-30-1 - 4 | This Indiana chapter on pets in motor vehicles was enacted in 2017. Under the chapter, "domestic animal" means a dog, cat or other vertebrate animal kept as a household pet (not including livestock). Section 34-30-30-3 provides that a person who forcibly enters a motor vehicle to remove a domestic animal from a motor vehicle is liable for one-half the cost of repairing the damage to the motor vehicle caused by the forcible entry. To meet this immunity, the person must reasonably believe that the domestic animal is in imminent danger of suffering serious bodily harm. The person must do all the following first: (1) determine the motor vehicle is locked and forcible entry is necessary to remove the domestic animal; (2) call 911 or attempt to contact law enforcement/animal control; (3) use no more force than is necessary to remove the domestic animal from the vehicle; and (4) remain with the animal until first responders or law enforcement arrive. The statute gives complete immunity from the costs of damage to any first responder, law enforcement/animal control officer, public safety government employee, or veterinary professional. Finally, the chapter immunizes the owner of the domestic animal from liability for bites or physical injury to the rescuer. | Statute | |
| WY - Livestock - Chapter 30. Offenses Concerning Livestock and Other Animals. | W. S. 1977 § 11-30-101 to 115 | WY ST § 11-30-101 to 115 | This Wyoming chapter of laws covers such offenses from misbranding livestock to a prohibition on the desertion and abandonment of sheep. Specific horse offenses are detailed, such as taking possession of any horse or mule found running at large on the open range with the intent of working or riding it, and the use of horses by a stable keeper without consent of the owner. The chapter also makes it a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $750 and/or imprisonment for up to 6 months for willfully or maliciously killing a wild horse. | Statute | |
| SC - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | Code 1976 § 16-13-60; Code 1976 § 23-1-100; Code 1976 § 23-23-140; Code 1976 § 1-1-655; Code 1976 § 47-3-10 - 990; Code 1976 § 47-5-10 - 210; Code 1976 § 47-7-10 - 170; Code 1976 § 50-11-65, § 50-11-770, § 50-11-780, and § 51-3-145; Code 1976 § 50-19-960 | ST SC § 16-13-60; ST SC § 23-1-100; SC ST § 1-1-655; SC ST § 47-3-10 - 990; SC ST § 47-5-10 - 210; SC ST § 47-7-10 - 170; SC ST § 50-11-65, § 50-11-770, § 50-11-780; § 51-3-145; § 50-19-960 | These statutes comprise South Carolina's state dog laws. Among the provisions include laws concerning damage done by dogs (especially to livestock), rabies control provisions, and registration requirements. | Statute | |
| Gregg and Linda Schumacher, and Gregg Schumacher Furs, LLC dba as Schumacher Furs and Outerwear, Plaintiffs v. City of Portland, | In this Opinion, the judge granted the defendants a total of $96,870.85 in attorneys fees. The action stemmed from a lawsuit filed by the Schumachers for $ 6.6 million dollars against the City of Portland and the named defendants seeking damages for alleged illegal protest activities in front of their fur store. The defendants all prevailed on their Motion to Strike. The court observed that awarding of attorney fees is mandatory under Oregon law when a party prevails in an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) lawsuit. Thus, the issue at hand was the amount of the attorney fees. The court went through the factors under Oregon law in analyzing the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees. When examining each factor, the court determined that the evidence either was in favor of defendants or was neutral. Notably, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims against defendants were not objectively reasonable because the plaintiffs did not produce any evidence that the prevailing defendants did anything illegal. | Pleading | |||
| State of Florida v. Peters | 534 So.2d 760 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1988). | This is an appeal from an order of the county court invalidating a City of North Miami ordinance regulating the ownership of pit bull dogs. The ordinance in question, City of North Miami Ordinance No. 422.5, regulates the ownership of pit bulls by requiring their owners to carry insurance or furnish other evidence of financial responsibility, register their pit bulls with the City, and confine the dogs indoors or in a locked pen. The court dismissed defendants claims that the ordinance violates equal protection and due process, and that the ordinance's definition of a pit bull is on its face unconstitutionally vague. | Case | ||
| United States v. Bowman | 43 S.Ct. 39 (1922) | 260 U.S. 94 (1922) |
This case involves a conspiracy charge to defraud a corporation in which the United States was a stockholder. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Mitchell referred to this Supreme Court case when it found that the nature of the MMPA does not compel its application to foreign territories. |
Case | |
| Ladnier v. Hester | 98 So.3d 1025 (Miss., 2012) |
Plaintiff motorist sued horse owner for negligence after he collided with the horse that was loose on the highway. Plaintiff sought damages for personal injury. The Court of Appeals sustained summary judgment for horse owner because the motorist produced no evidence that owner 1) had failed to act with reasonable care in enclosing his horses, and 2) that horse had a propensity to escape or cause injury that gave rise to a heightened duty on owner's part. After being granted a writ of certiorari by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the court held that the Plaintiffs had offered sufficient evidence to withstand the horse owner's motion for summary judgment.The case was then reversed and remanded.
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Case | ||
| CA - Housing - § 4715. Pets within common interest developments | West's Ann. Cal. Civ. Code § 4715 | CA CIVIL § 4715 | This California statute states that no governing documents shall prohibit the owner of a separate interest within a common interest development from keeping at least one pet. | Statute | |
| Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund | --- S.W.3d ----, 2018 WL 5075116 (Tex. App. Oct. 18, 2018) | This is an appeal of a dismissal of appellant Landry's claims under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“the TCPA”) and the subsequent required awarding of attorney fees and sanction under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.009. Landry's is a large corporation that owns and operates more than 500 entertainment properties across the country, including the Houston Aquarium, Inc. The aquarium houses four white tigers in an human-made enclosure known as "Maharaja's Temple." Appellees, including the Animal Legal Defense Fund and its attorneys as well as a radio station owner (Cheryl Conley), asserted a variety of claims in connection with the publication of the notice to intend to sue under the Endangered Species Act due to the care and housing of the tigers. As a result of that notice and the associated publicity, Landry's asserted claims in the trial court for defamation, business disparagement, tortious interference with prospective business relations, abuse of process, trespass, conspiracy to commit each of these torts, and conspiracy to commit theft. Conley and ALDF moved to dismiss the claims under the TCPA, arguing that the claims related to exercise of free speech, petition, and association, and that Landry's could not make out a prima facie case. Additionally, they also argued that the claims were barred by the judicial-proceedings privilege. The lower court agreed and granted Conley's motion to dismiss. It also awarded $250,000 to ALDF and $200,000 to Conley. On appeal here, Landry again points to the allegedly defamatory statements released on social media (Twitter and Facebook) and through news media regarding the tigers' care. The court noted that many of the statements were non-actionable because they were not shown to be false statements of fact or were opinions. Nonetheless, even on those statements where Landry's met their burden of proving a defamation claim, the statements were protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege. The court was not convinced by Landry's contention that the statements were not made in contemplation of litigation because they were made after the required federal notice for filing suit under the ESA. Additionally, the court also rejected Landry's claim that the ALDF cannot claim attorney immunity because it is not a law firm and instead is comprised of attorneys who hold law licenses. The court observed that law licenses are not issued to business entities, but to individuals. The court also rejected Landry's remaining causes of action. As to the attorneys' fee and sanctions, the court did modify the attorneys' fees because one attorney at the trial court level did not participate in the appeal. Landry's then argued that the $450,000 in sanctions was excessive. The court first noted the TCPA mandates an award of sanctions and attorneys' fees. In reviewing the award for abuse of discretion, this court reviewed arguments by ALDF concerning Landry's hiring of the third largest law firm to defend a relatively small initial action, the filing of a 157-page response, with Landry's unwillingness to concede any points. The court took that in addition to several factors under the TCPA. The court was particularly concerned with Landry's filing of this suit on day 59 of the 60-day notice to file suit under the ESA (which may have been an indication to preempt the federal suit, according to the court). Despite that and more, the court did conclude that sanctions that were 2.4 and 2.8 times the attorneys' fees awards were excessive. The court suggested a remittitur, which would bring those awards respectively to $103,191.26 and $71,295.00. Thus, the lower court's decision to dismiss Landry's claims was affirmed, but the awards for attorneys' fee and sanctions were modified. | Case | ||
| VA - Horse Transport - Chapter 160. Rules and Regulations Governing the Transportation of Horses (repealed 2016) | 2 VA ADC 5-160-10 to 90 | 2 VAC 5-160-10 to 90 | [Note: these regulations were repealed in 2016 and are provided for historical context only.] These previous Virginia regulations address the transportation of loads of more than six horses being transported to a commercial slaughter facility in a vehicle. Vehicles that have more than one tier holding horses are allowed only if the tier is designed, constructed, and maintained to withstand the weight of the horses held by it. | Administrative |