Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IL - Exotic pets - 5/48-10. Dangerous animals | 720 I.L.C.S. 5/48-10 | IL ST CH 720 § 5/48-10 | This Illinois law states that no person shall have a right of property in, keep, harbor, care for, act as custodian of or maintain in his or her possession any dangerous animal or primate except at a properly maintained zoological park, federally licensed exhibit, circus, college or university, scientific institution, research laboratory, veterinary hospital, hound running area, or animal refuge in an escape-proof enclosure. A "dangerous animal" is defined as a lion, tiger, leopard, ocelot, jaguar, cheetah, margay, mountain lion, lynx, bobcat, jaguarundi, bear, hyena, wolf or coyote.This Section does not prohibit a person who had lawful possession of a primate before January 1, 2011, from continuing to possess that primate if the person registers the animal by providing written notification to the local animal control administrator on or before April 1, 2011. Violation is a Class C misdemeanor. | Statute |
| State v. Gerard | 832 N.W.2d 314 (Minn.App.,2013) | 2013 WL 3155477 (Minn.App.,2013) |
This case considers whether the trial court erred when it dismissed the felony count of unjustifiably killing an animal based on lack of probable cause. The incident stems from the killing of the neighbors' cat with a shotgun by defendant-respondent. At trial, he filed a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause that was accompanied by a notarized affidavit of the responding police deputy stating the shooting of the cat was "justified." The trial court dismissed the complaint finding insufficient evidence that respondent had unjustifiably killed the cat. On appeal, the court found the district court's reliance on the deputy's lay opinion was improper. The court found it was within the jury's province to determine whether respondent's actions were justified or unjustified based on the evidence at trial. |
Case |
| Humane Soc. of the U.S. v. Hodel | 840 F.2d 45 (C.A.D.C.,1988) | 268 U.S.App.D.C. 165, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,636 (C.A.D.C.,1988) |
In this appeal, the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) challenged a series of actions by the Fish and Wildlife Service to allow hunting on some of America's national wildlife refuges. The District Court held that HSUS failed to satisfy the Supreme Court's requirements for associational standing because the 'recreational' interest of Society members was not germane to the group's self-described mission of insuring the humane treatment of animals and other wildlife. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's finding that the Humane Society had no standing to challenge the hunt openings, and remanded the action to allow HSUS to pursue its challenge to the introduction of hunting. This Court did affirm the district court's finding on the merits that the Wildlife Service complied with NEPA when it permitted hunting at the Chincoteague preserve. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. |
Case |
| Panattieri v. City of New York | 53 Misc. 3d 865, 37 N.Y.S.3d 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) | 2016 WL 4691555, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 26283 |
Ceasar, a mixed breed dog, was seized by police after he killed another dog and injured the other dogs’ owner. Petitioners, Kristina & Douglas Panattieri, owned Ceasar and demanded his return to their custody. They also challenged the determination by Respondent, Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), to execute Ceasar pursuant to the New York City Health Code (24 RCNY) § 161.07. The Petitioners argued that Ceasar’s execution would be unconstitutional under the City Code because it was preempted by the state statute, Agriculture & Markets Law § 123.The Supreme Court, New York County, denied their petition and held that the New York City Health Code was not preempted by the state statute. The Court reasoned that the Agriculture and Markets Law § 107(5), which governed licensing, identification, and control of dogs, expressly allowed municipalities to enact their own Codes governing dangerous dogs. However the City Codes were to incorporate standards that were as or more protective of public health and safety than those set forth in the state statute. The New York City Code met the requirement and was therefore not preempted by state law. |
Case |
| Woudenberg v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 794 F.3d 595 (6th Cir., 2015) | 2015 WL 4503212 (6th Cir., 2015) | According to Department of Agriculture regulations promulgated under the federal Animal Welfare Act (with certain exceptions not applicable here), persons who were in the business of buying and selling dogs and cats (i.e. class B dealers) may not obtain dogs or cats from an individual donor “who did not breed and raise them on his or her premises.” Another provision required a dealer in such a case to “obtain [ ] a certification that the animals were born and raised on that person's premises.” The question in this case was whether there was a violation when the dealer obtained the required certification, but the certification was false. The regulatory language was clear that a dealer violated the law by obtaining a dog or cat from an individual donor who did not breed or raise it on the donor's premises and it was still a violation even when the dealer in good faith obtained certifications that the animals had been so bred and raised. The certification requirement was an enforcement mechanism for the prohibition, not an exception. The Department of Agriculture therefore properly entered a cease-and-desist order against the petitioner. | Case |
| FL - Ordinances - Interpretation of Dog Ordinances under Dangerous Dogs | West's F. S. A. § 767.07 | FL ST § 767.07 | This Florida statute provides that the statutory section relating to state regulation of dangerous dogs is supplemental to all other state laws affecting dogs and shall not be construed to modify those laws or to prevent municipalities from prohibiting, licensing, or regulating the running at large of dogs within their respective limits by law or ordinance. | Statute |
| AKERS v. SELLERS | 54 N.E.2d 779 (Ind.App.1944) | 114 Ind.App. 660 (1944) |
This Indiana case involves an action in replevin by John W. Akers against his former wife, Stella Sellers. The controversy at issue was ownership and possession of a Boston bull terrier dog. At the time of the divorce decree, the dog was not part of the property division and was instead left at the marriage domicile in custody of the former wife. Appellant-Akers claimed that legal title and the dog's best interests rested with him and unsuccessfully brought a suit in replevin in the lower court. On appeal, this Court held that there was no sufficient evidence to overturn the lower court's determination. The judgment was affirmed.
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| IN RE: JAMES AND JULIA STUEKERJUERGEN, D/B/A CORNER VIEW KENNELS. | 44 Agric. Dec. 186 (1985) | 1985 WL 62918 (U.S.D.A.) | Dog broker shipping dogs under 8 weeks old was assessed civil penalty of $7,000 and license as dealer under Animal Welfare Act was suspended for 35 days, since broker was one of largest dog brokers in state, 8-week minimum age requirement was based on finding that ability of dogs to function in adult environment was adversely affected if shipped under that age, violations were serious and flagrant in view of large number of puppies shipped on 10 different occasions during 2-month period, and broker had violated Act and standards on prior occasion resulting in 12 day license suspension. | Case |
| Mathis v. Crawford | Not Reported in N.E. Rptr., 2021 WL 3127697 (Ill.App. 5 Dist., 2021) | 2021 IL App (5th) 190012-U | Plaintiff filed this suit in small claims court seeking damages for the destruction of his three dogs, that were mauled to death by dogs owned by defendant over a period of 15 years. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded him $5,000. Defendant appealed to request that the court of appeals amend the trial court's award of damages to a lesser amount of $500. The court found that, although plaintiff was able to show that he suffered damages at the result of defendant's dogs killing his dogs, the value of the dogs was still unclear. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial solely to discern the issue of the value of the dogs. | Case |
| Riley v. Bd. of Commissioners of Tippecanoe Cty. | Slip Copy, 2016 WL 90770, 2016 WL 90770 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2016) (unpublished) | The plaintiff filed suit based on violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA) after he was denied entrance into the Tippecanoe County Courthouse with his service dog. Initially, defendant's claims were dismissed because the Court did not adequately allege that his dog was a service dog. Defendant then filed an amended complaint with plausible allegations that his dog is a service dog. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, stating that the plaintiff had not established that his dog was a service dog according to the definition listed under rules promulgated under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that the plaintiff’s dog was a service dog under the definition because the dog was “individually trained to, among other things, provide [plaintiff] with balance support and assistance during episodes of PTSD.” As a result, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case was denied. | Case |