Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools | 137 S.Ct. 743 (U.S., 2017) | 2017 WL 685533 (U.S., 2017) |
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) offers federal funds to States in exchange for “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to children with certain disabilities. The Act also establishes formal administrative procedures for resolving disputes between parents and schools. When trained service dog, Wonder, attempted to join Plaintiff E.F. in kindergarten, officials at Ezra Eby Elementary School refused. Plaintiff E.F. is a child with severe cerebral palsy; Wonder assists her with various daily life activities. E.F.'s parents, Plaintiffs Stacy and Brent Fry, removed E.F. from the school and filed a complaint with the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR). The Plaintiffs claimed that the exclusion of E.F.'s service dog violated her rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. OCR agreed, and school officials invited E.F. to return to the school. Yet, the Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court against the Defendants, Ezra Eby's local and regional school districts, and the principal, (collectively, the school districts). In the federal suit, Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants violated Title II and § 504 and sought declaratory and monetary relief. The Defendant school districts filed a motion to dismiss. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the motion. The Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit where the District Court's motion to dismiss was affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated and remanded. The Supreme Court held that, on remand, the Appeals Court should: (1) establish whether (or to what extent) the plaintiff parents invoked the IDEA's dispute resolution process before bringing this suit; and (2) decide whether Plaintiffs' actions reveal that the gravamen of their complaint is indeed the denial of FAPE. The court reasoned that Exhaustion of the IDEA's administrative procedures is unnecessary where the gravamen of the Plaintiffs' suit is something other than the denial of the IDEA's core guarantee of a FAPE. |
Case |
| Harris v. Barefoot | 704 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. App. 2010) | 2010 WL 3001399 (N.C.App.) , 206 N.C.App. 308 (2010) |
A mail carrier was attacked by two dogs, and sued the dogs’ owners for negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that a dog owner is not liable unless there is evidence that the dog had a vicious propensity and that the owner knew or should have known that the dog was dangerous. |
Case |
| MN - Liens - § 514.93. Summary sale of unclaimed animal; notice; proceeds; record | M. S. A. § 514.93 - .94 | MN ST § 514.93 - .94 | Under Minnesota statute, a veterinarian may lawfully sell an animal if it is left unclaimed with the veterinarian for ten or more days following a procedure that is provided by the veterinarian. Prior to sale, the veterinarian must provide notice to the owner of the animal. The veterinarian is also required to follow all necessary procedures before and after the sale of the animal that is listed in the statute. | Statute |
| Tran v. Bancroft | 648 So.2d 314 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.,1995) | Fla. L. Weekly D191 |
In this Florida case, a tenant's next-door neighbor, who was bitten by tenant's dog when it leaped over fence and then attacked the neighbor on property not owned by landlord, brought a personal injury suit against the landlord. The appellate court upheld a motion of summary judgment in favor of the defendant non-owner. The court found that t he existence of a duty in a negligence action is a question to be decided as a matter of law. Although the so-called "dog bite" statute, section 767.04, Florida Statutes (1993) controls actions against a dog's owner, actions against a non-owner must be brought upon a theory of common law liability. Essentially, a landlord has no duty to prevent injuries to third parties caused by a tenant's dog away from leased premises. |
Case |
| NE - Livestock - Article 23. Domesticated Cervine Animal Act | Neb. Rev. St. § 54-2301 to 54- 2324 | NE ST § 54-2301 to 54- 2324 | This set of laws comprises Nebraska's Domesticated Cervine Animal Act. Under the act, it is unlawful for any person to own, possess, buy, sell, or barter any domesticated cervine animal in this state unless such animal is individually identified and kept at a premises for which a domesticated cervine animal facility permit has been issued by the department. A municipal, state, or federal zoo, park, refuge, or wildlife area, a bona fide circus or animal exhibit, or any private, nonprofit zoological society is not required to obtain a permit in order to own, possess, buy, sell, or barter a domesticated cervine animal, but such facilities are still governed by the provisions of the act regarding the testing, control, and eradication of cervidae diseases including chronic wasting disease. | Statute |
| KY - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 437. Offenses Against Public Peace | KRS § 437.410 - 429 | KY ST § 437.410 - 429 | This chapter concerns the protection of animal enterprise facilities in Kentucky. Prohibited acts include exercising control over a facility or its property without consent of the owner, disruption or destruction of property of a facility, entering a facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act, and entering a facility with the intent to disrupt or damage the enterprise and then remaining on the grounds knowing that entry is forbidden. Any person who violates any provision of KRS 437.410 to 437.420 shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not less than 6 months but not more than 1 year, or both, for each violation. | Statute |
| Sammons v. C.I.R. | 838 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1988) |
In a tax proceeding, the Commissioner argues that defendant should be disallowed a charitable deduction for donating several artifacts containing eagle parts to a museum because it will frustrate the purpose behind the BGEPA. The court disagrees, finding it unlikely that such an allowance will encourage others to procure eagle artifacts for the sole purpose of obtaining a tax deduction. Further, the court disagrees with the Commissioner that Sammons acquired illegal title to the artifacts, finding Sammons had sufficient ownership interest in the eagle artifacts for donation. For further discussion on commerce in eagle parts under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |
| Eastern Band of Cherokee - Natural resources - Sec. 14-10.10- Cutting timber, removing rock, trapping animals | The Cherokee Code. Part II. Section 14. Article III. Sec. 14-10.10 |
This statute is intended to preserve natural resources and protect wild animals from any trapping conducted without the knowledge of a property owner or the Tribe. The language provides for both land owner through a tribal assignment or lease, as well as lands that are reserved and used exclusively by the Tribe. The language also restricts any person, firm, or corporation from engaging in this conduct without consent and knowledge from the land owner and/or the Tribe. |
Statute | |
| Honeycutt v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. | 890 So.2d 756 (2nd Cir. 2004) |
A driver hit a cow standing in the road and the driver brought suit against the cow's owner and the owner's insurance agency. The trial court held in favor of the driver and the Court of Appeals affirmed based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. |
Case | |
| Stevens v. Hollywood Towers and Condominium Ass'n | 836 F.Supp.2d 800 (N.D. Ill. 2011) | Plaintiffs brought the instant suit contending that their Condo Board's refusal to accommodate the need for an emotional support animal forced them to sell their condo. The Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. After finding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to unrestricted access for their dog despite a no pet waiver and after needing more facts to determine whether Defendants restrictions on Plaintiffs’ access to the building were reasonable, the District Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under the Federal Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). The District Court also found Plaintiffs' interference or intimidation allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. However, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim because Plaintiffs had not contended that Defendants unreasonably used their own property to interfere in Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their home, but rather, contended that Defendants made rules that interfered with the Plaintiff's ability to use the common areas of the property as they wished. Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was also dismissed because Plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that Defendants' conduct was extreme or outrageous. Finally, the constructive eviction claim was dismissed because more than a year had past between the owners’ accommodation request and the sale of their condominium. In sum, Counts I, II, and III went forward, but the remainder of the complaint was dismissed. Additionally, Defendant Sudler Building Services was dismissed from the complaint. | Case |