Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| State v. Bonilla | 28 A.3d 1005 (Conn.App.,2011) | 131 Conn.App. 388 (2011) |
The issue before the court in this case is whether defendant's felony conviction for being a spectator at a cockfight (contrary to General Statutes § 53–247(c)) violates defendant's constitutional rights to assemble and associate, and his equal protection rights. In rejecting defendant's arguments, the court noted first that the right to assemble does not encompass the right to assemble for an unlawful purpose. Further, the right to associate was not infringed because "[a]ttending a cockfight as a spectator is neither a form of 'intimate association' nor a form of 'expressive association' as recognized by our courts or the United States Supreme Court . . ." As to defendant's claim of violation of equal protection, the court found that the aim of § 53–247(c)(4), criminalizing being a spectator at a cockfighting event, is rationally related to the legislative goal of preventing such fights from being staged. |
Case |
| DE - Law-Enforcement Animal - § 1250. Offenses against law-enforcement animals | 11 Del.C. § 1250 | DE ST TI 11 § 1250 | This Delaware statute penalizes those who harass a law-enforcement animal. The statute states what constitutes assault in the first and second degree against a law-enforcement animal. | Statute |
| Perez v. County of Monterey | --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- 2019 WL 621483 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019) | Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1493 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019) | In this California case, the plaintiffs sued to challenge the validity of the County of Monterey rooster-keeping ordinance, seeking a declaratory judgment that the law is unconstitutional. The ordinance limits residents to no more than four roosters on a single property without a rooster keeping permit and also describes care and keeping requirements. The trial court found that the ordinance did not violate the constitution and entered judgment for the City. Plaintiffs here appeal that decision, arguing that the ordinance: (1) takes property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) infringes on Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce; (3) violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (4) is a prohibited bill of attainder; and (5) violates the rights to privacy and to possess property guaranteed by the California Constitution. With respect to the Fifth Amendment taking challenge, the court found that the regulatory takings argument failed because there is no evidence that the ordinance affected plaintiffs or that they even applied for or were eligible for a permit. As to the interstate commerce challenge, plaintiffs provided no evidence that the ordinance would cause excess roosters to be divested from owners and sold in commerce to support this claim. As to Equal Protection, the plaintiffs correctly assert that the ordinance treats people differently based on age (i.e., students engaged in 4-H or FFA activities are exempted from the four-rooster limitation). However, the court found that the county stated a legitimate objective of public health and safety and this differential treatment of a non-suspect class advances that interest. Finally, the court found the ordinance was not a bill of attainder since it prospectively regulates roosters and also that it does not violate California's right to privacy and property possession. Indeed, the court found that plaintiff did not identify a specific privacy interest implicated by the ordinance. Thus, the judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| Larobina v R | [2009] NSWDC 79 |
The appellant appeal against a conviction for animal cruelty sustained in a lower court. After an examination of the elements of the statutory offense, it was found that the charge upon which the conviction was sustained was unknown to law. |
Case | |
| GREEN v. LECKINGTON | 236 P.2d 335 (Or. 1951) | 192 Or. 601 (Or. 1951) |
In this Oregon case, defendant appeals a judgment of $700 in damages obtained against him after he shot plaintiff’s dog. The dog had gone onto to defendant’s property and was chasing his chickens. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that because it was a general verdict, there was no way to determine a basis for the jury’s verdict; specifically, whether erroneous instructions on exemplary damages and the proper measure of damages influenced the verdict. Because the Court had the whole record before it (and in the interest of “harmony between neighbors”), the Court fixed the damages at the true market value of the dog ($250). |
Case |
| WA - Trade - 77.15.260. Unlawful trafficking in fish, shellfish, or wildlife--Penalty | West's RCWA 77.15.260 | WA ST 77.15.260 | This Washington statute pertains to unlawful trafficking in fish, shellfish, and wildlife. A person is guilty of unlawful trafficking in the second degree if s/he traffics in such animals with a wholesale value of less than $250 and the animals are unclassified or classified as game, food fish, shellfish, game fish, or protected wildlife. Unlawful trafficking in the first degree occurs when the animals have a value of $250 or more or the animals are classified as endangered or deleterious exotic wildlife. | Statute |
| PA - Pet Sales - § 201-9.3. Dog purchaser protection | 73 P.S. § 201-9.3 | PA ST 73 P.S. § 201-9.3 | This Pennsylvania statute comprises the state's Dog Purchaser Protection law. The law mandates disclosure of a dog's health history by a seller (defined as pet shop operator or other individual who sells dogs to the public and who owns or operates a kennel or pet shop licensed by the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture or the United States Department of Agriculture). If, within ten days after the date of purchase, a dog purchased from a seller is determined, through physical examination, diagnostic tests or necropsy by a veterinarian, to be clinically ill or dies from any contagious or infectious illness or any parasitic illness which renders it unfit for purchase or results in its death, the purchaser may exercise one of the described statutory elections. | Statute |
| NY - Eagles - Chapter 43-B. Of the Consolidated Laws. | N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-0537 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 11-0537 | New York makes it illegal to "knowingly or with wanton disregard for the consequences" take, transport, possess, or engage in commerce of bald eagles or their parts without a valid permit. This incorporates the exact language of the federal act. | Statute |
| DON'T FENCE ME IN--APPLICATION OF THE UNLAWFUL INCLOSURES OF PUBLIC LANDS ACT TO BENEFIT WILDLIFE | 5 Animal L. 1 (1999) | The Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service manage millions of acres of public land across the United States. Most of this land serves more than one purpose-grazing, mining, recreation, timber, wildlife-and thus must remain available for these uses. Historically, the Unlawful Inclosures Act (UIA) preserved access for ranchers and homesteaders. More recently, the UIA has also protected access for wildlife whose movements are impeded by fences or other illegal obstructions. This article argues that such protection should be extended to the Sonoran pronghorn antelope in the southwestern United States. | Article | |
| Chile - Slaughter - Decreto 28, 2013 | Decreto 28, 2013 (1051388) | This "Decreto" or executive order contains the regulations for the protection of animals that are used for meat, leather, feathers, and other byproducts by imposing the use of rational methods to avoid unnecessary suffering during technical procedures and slaughter. It is an indirect result of the agreement DS N° 28/2003 between Chile and the European Union together with decretos 29, and 30, 2013. Animals must be stunned by the use of adequate methods that minimize their suffering before slaughter, and the animal must remain insensible until death. Article 24 exempts ritual slaughter. | Statute |