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Displaying 11 - 20 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OK - Breeders - Commercial Pet Breeder Operations Guidelines | OK ADC 532:15-1-1 - 532:15-7-6 | OAC 532:15-1-1 - 532:15-7-6 | These regulations describe standards for pet breeders including sufficient food and water, regular exercise, veterinary care, adequate grooming, natural or artificial light during daylight hours, adequate space in living quarters, protection from the elements and extreme temperatures, and adequate resting time between breeding cycles, that ensures the general health and well-being of all pets the commercial pet breeder owns.“Commercial pet breeder” means any person that possesses or has possessed at any time in the last twelve months eleven or more adult intact female animals for use in breeding or dealing in animals for direct or indirect sale or for exchange in return for consideration. Household pets kept by breeders which the breeder has registered with the Board as not being used in breeding or dealing shall not be counted under this definition. Mandated record-keeping is outlined in Subchapter 7, which includes a required pet health history provided to purchasers. | Administrative | |
| US - Marine Mammals - Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations | 1999 WL 379911 (F.R.) |
NMFS proposes regulations to implement provisions of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA). These regulations would allow the entry of yellowfin tuna into the United States under certain conditions from nations signatory to the International Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP) that otherwise would be under embargo. |
Administrative | ||
| AL - Facility dog - § 12-21-148. Use of certified facility dog in certain legal proceedings. | Ala.Code 1975 § 12-21-147 -148 | This Alabama law from 2017 covers use of both registered therapy dogs and registered facility dogs in certain legal proceedings. A "registered therapy dog" is defined as "[a] trained emotional support dog that has been tested and registered by a nonprofit therapy dog organization that sets standards and requirements for the health, welfare, task work, and oversight for therapy dogs and their handlers . . ." A "certified facility dog" is defined as "[a] trained working dog that is a graduate of an assistance dog organization, a nonprofit organization that sets standards of training for the health, welfare, task work, and oversight for assistance dogs and their handlers . . ." Both must meet minimum standards including minimum months/years of training, documentation showing graduation from an assistance dog organization, a current health certificate, and proof of at least $500,000 in liability insurance. During trial proceedings, all precautions should be taken to obscure the presence of the dog from the jury. | Statute | ||
| GA - Initiatives - Georgia Amendment 2 (right to hunt) | 2006 Georgia Amendment 2 | This Georgia constitutional amendment was presented to voters on the 2006 ballot. The measure preserves the state's tradition of hunting and fishing for the public good. Amendment 2 passed by a margin of 81% to 19%. | Statute | ||
| WV - Eagle - § 20-2-5c. Protection of bald eagles and golden eagles; unlawful acts; | W. Va. Code, § 20-2-5c | WV ST § 20-2-5c | This statute makes it a misdemeanor to possess or barter in golden or bald eagles, and any subsequent convictions under this chapter result in felony prosecution. In addition to fines and imprisonment, violators face revocation of hunting license privileges for up to ten years. | Statute | |
| Lee v. Cook |
Amicus Curae brief on why suit for wrongful death of a dog can include emotional damages. |
Pleading | |||
| Jippes v. van Landbouw | Case C-189/01(ECJ) |
Jippes, an ECJ case from 2001, involved a legal dispute over the hoof and mouth pandemic ravaging Europe at the time. To stem spread of the disease, the EU passed a community directive banning the use of preventative vaccinations and mandating compulsory slaughter. The plaintiff—or “applicant,” as plaintiffs are referred to in Europe—owned a variety of farm animals, and, loathe to kill them, argued that European law embraced a general principle that animals were shielded from physical pain and suffering. Such a principle, the applicant argued, could only be overridden when absolutely necessary; and the compulsory slaughter directive was in direct conflict with this principle. The ECJ, however, rejected the applicant’s argument, holding that the Animal Welfare Protocol of 1997 did not delineate any new important animal-friendly principles in European law, but merely codified old ones. |
Case | ||
| Wright v. Fish and Game Commission (unpublished) | 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8091 | 2003 WL 22007258 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.) |
The California Court of Appeal upheld the state's Fish and Game Commission’s ferret ban against an equal protection challenge from a ferret owner. The owner argued that the ban discriminated between ferret owners and owners of other companion animals. However, the court found a rational relation between the ban and concerns about wildlife and human health (from attacks and from rabies). |
Case | |
| Art and Antique Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Seggos | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 3817305 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019) | The plaintiffs are trade organizations representing arts and antique dealers. Plaintiff’s members have an “economic and professional interest in. . .the purchase, sale, distribution or trading of antique elephant ivory.” The Defendant is the Commissioner of DEC which is a state agency tasked with protecting New York’s natural resources and environment. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits the import and export of endangered species and the sale, offering for sale, or movement of endangered species in interstate or foreign commerce. The prohibitions, however, had exceptions for “antique articles” that are 100 years of age or older. Those wishing to import such antique articles needed to first obtain a federal permit. Under the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, trade of African elephant ivory is generally prohibited. Only certain items containing a de minimus quantity of ivory are exempt. The state of New York imposed a ban on elephant ivory with even narrower exceptions than the ESA. The DEC only issued licenses authorizing trade in ivory pursuant to the State Ivory Law’s exceptions. The licenses actually issued by the DEC restricted the advertisement and display of ivory products. Plaintiff’s filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the State Ivory Law on preemption and First Amendment grounds. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Defendants and Intervenors crossed-moved to dismiss. The Court examined the ESA and determined that section 1535(f) did not preempt the State Ivory Law because the ESA prohibitions only applied to interstate or foreign commerce while the State Ivory Law applied to intrastate commerce. As result, the exceptions contained in the State Ivory Law did not prohibit what was authorized by the ESA. The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on Count I because it was not “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state laws restricting purely intrastate commerce in ivory.” The Plaintiff’s second count alleged that the State Ivory Law’s permit requirement violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The display restriction in the license prohibited the physical display for sale of any item not authorized for intrastate sale under the State Ivory Law even if the merchant was authorized under the ESA to sell the item in interstate commerce. The Court determined that the in-store display of ivory products constituted commercial speech because the display constituted lawful activity, New York had a substantial interest in regulating the sale of ivory within its borders and the display restriction directly advanced that interest. The Court was unable to determine whether the display restriction burdened substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. Ultimately the Court granted the Defendant’s and Intervenor’s cross-motions to dismiss with respect to preemption and denied both the Defendant’s and Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment with respect to the First Amendment Claim. | Case | ||
| NJ - Education - 18A:35-4.25. Right of pupil to refuse participation in dissection activities | N.J.S.A. 18A:35-4.25 | This New Jersey law allows a public school pupil from kindergarten through grade 12 to refuse to dissect, vivisect, incubate, capture or otherwise harm or destroy animals or any parts thereof as part of a course of instruction. The school must notify pupils and parents at the beginning of each school on the right to decline participation. Any pupil who chooses to refrain from participation in or observation shall be offered an alternative education project for the purpose of providing the pupil with the factual knowledge, information or experience required by the course of study. A pupil shall not be discriminated against, in grading or in any other manner, based upon a decision to exercise the rights of this act. | Statute |