Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TX - Initiatives - Proposition 6, Right to hunt, fish and harvest wildlife | Proposition 6 (2015) |
This proposed constitutional amendment recognizes the right of the people to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife subject to laws that promote wildlife conservation. It was a legislative referendum originally proposed as Senate Joint Resolution 22 (attached below). The measure passed in November 2015 with 82% of the vote. |
Statute | ||
| US - Service Animals - Part 35. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local | 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 to .139 | The purpose of this part is to effectuate subtitle A of title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12131), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities. The section defines "service animal" as any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. | Administrative | ||
| IL - Ecoterrorism - 5/48-2. Animal research and production facilities protection | 720 I.L.C.S. 5/48-2 | IL ST CH 720 § 5/48-2 | This new law replaces the Illinois' Animal Research and Production Facilities Protection Act, which was repealed in 2013. Under the new law, it is unlawful for any person to release, steal, or injure an animal held at a facility; to damage or vandalize any property; to obtain access to an animal facility by false pretenses for the purpose of performing unauthorized acts; to enter into an animal facility with an intent to destroy, alter, duplicate, or obtain unauthorized possession of records; or to enter or remain on an animal facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act. Violation of any of these acts is a felony, with classification based on the amount of property damage. | Statute | |
| Anderson v. Christopherson | 816 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 2012) | 2012 WL 2913222 (Minn.) |
This appeal asks two questions: whether defendant-dog owners (Christophersons) were strictly liable under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 for plaintiff Anderson's injuries suffered when he attempted to break up a fight between defendants' and plaintiff's dogs; and (2) whether one of the defendants was an "owner" for purposes of this law. In the case at hand, the court found that the events leading to Anderson's injury could produce three reasonable alternative inferences such that summary judgment was inappropriate. The court found there was an issue whether the father Dennis Christopherson was "harboring" the dog at the home for purposes of the animal owner liability statute. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Proceeds from Sale of Approximately 15,538 Panulirus Argus Lobster Tails | 834 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Fla. 1993) |
This case arose out of the seizure of some 15,538 lobster tails of the species Panulirus argus, more commonly known as "spiny lobster," imported into the United States by the Claimant Lista Enterprises Seafood, Inc. from the Turks and Caicos Islands, a British territory in the Caribbean. The court held the government had probable cause to seize the lobster tails based on the weight criteria established under Turks and Caicos law. Under the Lacey Act, anyone who "knowingly" imports fish or wildlife taken in violation of foreign law may be assessed a penalty of $10,000 per violation, where "knowingly" refers to situations where the violator knew or should have known that the wildlife was taken in violation of law. |
Case | ||
| Tighe v. N. Shore Animal League Am. | 36 N.Y.S.3d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | 142 A.D.3d 607, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05807 |
In this New York case, the defendant appeals denial of its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an action to recover damages for personal injuries after the dog she adopted from defendant-North Shore Animal League America bit plaintiff's face causing severe personal injuries. Plaintiff alleges causes of action that include negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and interposed a claim for punitive damages. After defendant opposed the filing, plaintiff submitted evidence that the dog previously had been returned to defendant animal shelter after biting another individual in the face. This court noted that, under long-standing rule, the owner of a domestic animal who knew or should have known of the animal's vicious propensities is liable for harm. However, here, even if defendant failed to disclose the dog's vicious propensities, that breach was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. In fact, the dog showed aggressive behavior during the three-and-a-half months the plaintiff owned the dog (including a previous bite to plaintiff's hand). This, in effect, placed the plaintiff on notice of the dog's vicious propensities. The court found that the lower court erred by not granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. With regard to the reach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the court found that even if a transaction from an animal shelter is subject to the warranty, the plaintiff failed to notify defendant of the "nonconformity of the goods" (to wit, the dog) within a reasonable period of time. The order was reversed. |
Case | |
| Map of Veterinary Reporting Laws for Animal Cruelty | This map links to laws related to reporting of animal cruelty by veterinarians (note that other animal care professionals and government employees may also have duties to report suspected cruelty). As of 2023, the majority of U.S. states have laws that either mandate or allow reporting (permissive reporting) of suspected animal cruelty by veterinary professionals OR have standalone laws that provide immunity for reporting of suspected cruelty. In most states with a mandatory or voluntary reporting law, a companion immunity provision is also provided. Such an immunity statute protects a veterinarian from any civil liability (and sometimes criminal) arising from the reporting of the abuse. About 23 states have MANDATORY reporting by veterinarians or veterinary professionals (note that some states are mandatory only for animal fighting or aggravated cruelty and Pennsylvania's regulation only applies to reporting abuse by other licensed veterinarians). Approximately 12 states have NO LAWS that deal with veterinary reporting of cruelty or immunity for reporting suspected cruelty. | State map | |||
| FL - Domestic Violence - 741.30. Domestic violence; injunction; powers | West's F. S. A. § 741.30 | FL ST § 741.30 | This Florida law allows petitioners to file injunctions for protection against domestic violence. Among the described incidents of domestic violence from which the petitioner may obtain protection is where the respondent has "intentionally injured or killed a family pet." The court may considers this as a factor when determining whether there is reasonable cause to believe the petitioner is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence. In 2020, Florida added this provision to (5)(a)(4): "Awarding to the petitioner the temporary exclusive care, possession, or control of an animal that is owned, possessed, harbored, kept, or held by the petitioner, the respondent, or a minor child residing in the residence or household of the petitioner or respondent. The court may order the respondent to temporarily have no contact with the animal and prohibit the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal. This subparagraph does not apply to an animal owned primarily for a bona fide agricultural purpose, as defined under s. 193.461, or to a service animal, as defined under s. 413.08, if the respondent is the service animal's handler." | Statute | |
| Lee v. State | 973 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind.App. 2012) | 2012 WL 3775862 (Ind.App. 2012) |
An attendant of a dog fight was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor under section 35-46-3-4 of the Indiana Code. On appeal, the defendant-appellant argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and that the statute invited arbitrary law enforcement, which violated the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitution. Though the appeals court found the defendant-appellant had waived her constitutional claims by not filing a motion at the bench trial, the appeals court found her claims lacked merit. The defendant-appellant’s conviction was therefore upheld. |
Case | |
| Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n | 99 S.Ct. 3055 (1979) | 443 U.S. 658 (1979) |
The United States initiated an action seeking an interpretation of Indian fishing rights under treaties with Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest. The Court held that the language of the treaties securing a "right of taking fish . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory" was not intended merely to guarantee the Indians access to usual and accustomed fishing sites and an "equal opportunity" for individual Indians, along with non-Indians, to try to catch fish, but instead secures to the Indian tribes a right to harvest a share of each run of anadromous fish that passes through tribal fishing areas. Thus, an equitable measure of the common right to take fish should initially divide the harvestable portion of each run that passes through a "usual and accustomed" place into approximately equal treaty and nontreaty shares, and should then reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may be satisfied by a lesser amount. The Court also held that any state-law prohibition against compliance with the District Court's decree cannot survive the command of the Supremacy Clause, and the State Game and Fisheries Departments, as parties to this litigation, may be ordered to prepare a set of rules that will implement the court's interpretation of the parties' rights even if state law withholds from them the power to do so. |
Case |