Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reece v. Edmonton (City) | 335 DLR (4th) 600; 513 AR 199; [2011] CarswellAlta 1349; 530 WAC 199 | This case dealt with the procedure the applicants used to get their claim heard by the court. The respondent City holds a licence under the Wildlife Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W‑10 to operate a zoo, which houses a lone Asian elephant named Lucy. The appellants commenced this action by originating notice for an order. The chambers judge concluded that the proceedings were an abuse of process because a private litigant cannot seek a declaration that the respondent is in breach of a penal provision in a statute, namely that the elephant was kept in distress because of health concerns. Alternatively, he concluded that the application should have been brought by way of statement of claim, not originating notice. Further, the chambers judge concluded that the appellants had no private interest standing, and that there were barriers to them being awarded public interest standing. On appeal, the parties raised two issues: (1) whether the chambers judge erred in denying the appellants standing to seek a declaration; and (2) whether the chambers judge erred in concluding that the proceedings were an abuse of process. This court held that the chambers judge came to the correct conclusion that these proceedings are an abuse of process. APPEAL DISMISSED. | Case | |
| CA - Fighting - § 597d. Fighting animals or birds; entries and arrests without warrant | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597d | CA PENAL § 597d | This provision allows for law enforcement officers to enter any place, building, or tenement, where there is an exhibition of the fighting of birds or animals, or where preparations are being made for such an exhibition, and, without a warrant, arrest all persons present. | Statute |
| Canada - Newfoundland and Labrador Statutes - Dog Act(Repealed) | R.S.N. 1990, c. D-26, s. 1 - 15(2)(Repealed) |
This act was replaced by the Animal Health and Protection Act in 2010. This set of laws comprises the Newfoundland and Labrador Dog Act. Under the Act, an owner of a dog must keep it safely tethered or penned up at all times unless on a leash, herding sheep, or hunting with an owner. The minister may in writing authorize a person to destroy dogs found at large in the province. Notably, a person shall not bring into or keep on the island a dog either wholly or partly of the breed native to Labrador, commonly known as Eskimo or Husky, unless he or she has obtained a permit. A person who contravenes this Act or accompanying regulations is guilty of an offence. |
Statute | |
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne | 2008 WL 4542947 (N.D.Cal.) |
Plaintiffs brought various claims against Defendants relating to Defendants’ final rule designating the polar bear as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and Defendants’ promulgation of a special rule under section 4(d) of the ESA, allowing certain activities with respect to the polar bear that might otherwise be prohibited. The United States District Court, N.D. California tentatively granted a non-profit organization’s motion to intervene with respect to the action challenging Defendants’ section 4(d) rule as contrary to the ESA, finding that although the Organization did not show that the current Plaintiffs will not adequately represent the Organization’s interest, a decision for Defendants could jeopardize the Organization’s interests and the Organization’s motion was timely. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Smith | 29 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1994) |
Defendant was convicted of possessing Bald Eagle feathers in violation of Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) after receiving the feathers in the mail from a friend to complete a craft project. On appeal, defendant challenged her conviction, alleging that she did not possess the requisite knowledge and that the act itself was vague as to the level of intent, or scienter . The court affirmed defendant's conviction finding that the evidence established that defendant knowingly possessed eagle feathers in violation of MBTA, the conviction did not amount to punishment of wholly passive conduct contrary to defendant's suggestion, and that MBTA was not vague nor overbroad with regard to intent. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion of the Eagle Act . |
Case | |
| Naruto v. Slater | 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018) | 2018 WL 1902414 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018) | A seven-year-old monkey named Naruto that lived in a reserve on the island of Sulawesi, Indonesia got ahold of a wildlife photographer’s unattended camera in 2011 and took several photos of himself. David Slater, the owner of the camera, and Wildlife Personalities, Ltd., (“Wildlife”) published the photos in a book that identifies Slater and Wildlife as the copyright owners of the photographs. In 2015 PETA and Dr. Engelhardt filed a complaint against Slater, Wildlife, and Blurb (the website that helped create the book) for copyright infringement on behalf of Naruto. The defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to establish standing under Article III or statutory standing under the Copyright Act. The district court granted the motions to dismiss. PETA and Dr. Engelhardt appealed on Naruto’s behalf. Dr. Engelhardt ended up withdrawing from the litigation, so PETA remained as the next friend of Naruto. The Court of Appeals held that PETA cannot validly assert a “next friend” status to represent Naruto because they failed to allege any facts to establish the required significant relationship between a next friend and a real party in interest and secondly an animal cannot be represented by a “next friend” under the laws of the United States. The Court pointed out, however, that lack of a next friend does not destroy an incompetent party’s standing entirely. “Article III standing does not compel a conclusion that a statutorily authorized suit in the name of an animal is not a case or controversy.” Based on precedent, the Court concluded that Naruto did not have standing to sue under the Copyright Act because the statute did not expressly state that animals have standing. The Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that held that Naruto and animals in general lack statutory standing to sue under the Copyright Act. The Court also awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees. Circuit Court Judge N.R. Smith wrote a concurring opinion agreeing that the case must be dismissed but disagreeing with the Majority’s conclusion that next friend standing is non-jurisdictional. Judge Smith stated that “the Majority ignores its own conclusion by determining that 1) next-friend standing is non-jurisdictional; and 2) even if the elements of next-friend standing are not met, any third party may still bring suit on behalf of anyone or anything – without the real party in interest’s permission – as long as the real party in interest has an Article III injury; and the real party in interest is adequately protected by the purported next friend’s (or self-appointed lawyer’s) representation. In his opinion, this fails to follow both Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. Judge Smith further concludes that Supreme Court precedent bars next friend standing for animals because the scope of next friend standing is limited by historical practice and there is no historical evidence that animals have ever been granted authority to sue by next friend, absent an act of Congress. There is also no textual support in the habeas corpus statute or Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is because only a natural person can have a habeas corpus petition filed on their behalf. Rule 17 only authorizes next friend suits on behalf of “a minor or an incompetent person.” The Majority’s conclusion that next friend standing is non-jurisdictional and, therefore, allowed the case to go forward is incorrect and is legally unsupportable by precedent. In his opinion, the case must be dismissed if there is no next friend standing and the Majority should have never reached the merits of the Copyright Act question. The question before the court was whether a third-party had next friend standing allowing it to invoke the authority of the court and stand in Naruto’s shoes to advance his claims. The question was not whether Naruto was properly protected or was brought into the litigation as a defendant. | Case |
| European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes |
This treaty applies to animals kept for farming purposes. It outlines the keeping, caring for and housing of farm animals on the farm and especially in modern stock farming systems. Freedom of movement is especially important for animals kept in these systems as well as appropriate lighting, ventilation, temperature and environmental conditions |
Treaty | ||
| Leider v. Lewis | 2 Cal. 5th 1121, 394 P.3d 1055 (2017) | 2017 WL 2276526 (Cal. May 25, 2017) | The Plaintiffs, Residents of Los Angeles, brought a taxpayer action against the Defendants, the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Zoo, alleging elephant abuse in violation of various Penal Code provisions. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, granted the Defendants summary judgment. The Residents appealed. At trial, the Residents were awarded injunctive and declaratory relief. The Court of Appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court rejected many of the Resident’s claims, but issued limited injunctions prohibiting use of particular forms of discipline, requiring the elephants to have specific amounts of exercise time, and requiring the rototilling of soil in exhibit. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of California granted review and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the prior Court of Appeals decision was not law of the case as to the argument that the Residents was precluded from obtaining injunctive relief for conduct that violated Penal Code, and (2) the Residents' challenge to the city's treatment of elephants improperly sought injunctive relief for Penal Code violations. | Case |
| AL - Dog Bite/Dangerous Animal - Liability of Owners of Dogs Biting or Injuring Persons. | Ala. Code 1975 § 3-1-1 - 6; § 3-6-1 - 4; Ala.Code 1975 § 3-6A-1 - 8; § 3-7A-9 | AL ST § 3-1-1 - 6; AL ST § 3-6-1 - 4; AL ST § 3-7A-9 | These Alabama statutes outline the state's dog bite law. The law first provides that, when any person owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and, as a result of his or her careless management or allowing the dog to go at liberty, and another person, without fault is injured, such owner shall be liable in damages for such injury. If any dog shall, without provocation, bite or injure any person who is at the time at a place where he or she has a legal right to be, the owner of such dog shall be liable in damages to the person so bitten or injured. This apparent strict liability has a mitigation provision that states that the owner of such dog shall be entitled to plead and prove in mitigation of damages that he had no knowledge of any circumstances indicating such dog to be or to have been vicious or dangerous. If an owner, however, is aware that his or her dog is rabid at the time of the bite, he or she shall be liable for twice the damages sustained. | Statute |
| Animal Law Volume 14 Part 2 Index |
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Policy |