Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NH - Wolf - Chapter 207. General Provisions as to Fish and Game. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 207:61 | NH ST § 207:61 | This New Hampshire statute prohibits the introduction of wolf populations into the state by a person or state agency. | Statute | |
| Elephant, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. | 239 So.2d 692 (La.App., 1970) |
A veterinarian agreed to house, transport, and care for an elephant at no charge other than the actual expenses incurred therewith. One evening, the elephant ingested some poison left in its stall by the veterinarian and later died. On appeal of the trial court award to plaintiff, the Court disagreed with defendant’s contention that he, as a gratuitous depositary, could only be held liable for gross negligence, willful misconduct, or fraud. In fact, the civil code in Louisiana, states the burden of a depositary is "that of ordinary care which may be expected of a prudent man." However, an agreement between the parties was found to release Dr. Cane of liability from negligent acts. |
Case | ||
| Edmonds v. Cailloux | 2006 WL 398033 (Tex.App.-San Antonio) (Not Reported in S.W.3d) | Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2006 WL 398033 (Tex.App.-San Antonio) |
An in-home caretaker of a sick, elderly woman sued the woman, her trust, and her son after the son’s dog knocked her down causing injury. The court of appeals remanded the case because it found a genuine issue as to whether the dog had dangerous propensities and whether the son knew of the dog’s dangerous propensities to justify strict liability. The court did, however, affirm the order of summary judgment as to the negligence claim, where the son was not the caretaker’s employer and thus did not owe her a duty to exercise reasonable care. |
Case | |
| Strickland v. Pinellas Cty. | --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6518761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2018) | Andy G. Strickland appealed an order dismissing with prejudice his complaint for declaratory relief against Pinellas County. The request stems from letters he received from Animal Services of Pinellas County about his dog. Strickland and a neighbor were involved in a dispute after their dogs attacked each other. The neighbor filed a complaint with Animal Services claiming that Strickland's dog was the "aggressor dog" and then sent a letter to the Pinellas County Board of Commissioners. The County then sent two letters to Strickland, the first informing him that his dog had exhibited dangerous propensities, and the second, from an assistant county attorney, informing him of the possible criminal ramifications for keeping a dangerous dog or being an "Irresponsible Pet Owner" under the county code. As a result of these letters, Strickland filed a complaint in circuit court saying that he was not afforded any opportunity to dispute those claims and that he is entitled to have the threat of criminal prosecution removed. The County moved to dismiss Strickland's complaint arguing that he failed to allege a justiciable controversy and a bona fide dispute between the County and him. The County claimed that there were no legal findings made with respect to Strickland's dog and that the letters were possible ramifications and explanations of law. The trial court agreed and granted the County's motion, finding the letters were not accusatory and the case presented no justiciable issue. On appeal here, this court upheld the lower court's order because Strickland's allegations did not present a bona fide dispute. Both letters emphasized that his dog had not been classified as dangerous and that no action was being taken by the county. A speculative fear by Strickland that he may be subject to future consequences does not warrant declaratory relief and does not show imminent danger of prosecution. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Strickland's complaint. Affirmed. | Case | ||
| Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Prob. Div. | 837 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2016), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (Oct. 27, 2016) | This case dealt with the plaintiff's denial of the use of her service dog while in a courtroom to present a motion. After the denial, the plaintiff filed an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) action, alleging that there was a violation for denial of reasonable accommodations under the ADA. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, because as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Court of Appeals agreed, and held that as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Additionally, the district court held that it should exercise Younger abstention because the proceeding was ongoing and because the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise her federal claims about her dog in state court, but the Court of Appeals held that "Younger is now a moot question because there is no ongoing state proceeding for [the Court of Appeals] to disturb." As a result, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was AFFIRMED. | Case | ||
| OR - Equine Liability Act - Chapter 30. Actions and Suits in Particular Cases. Actions Arising Out of Equine Activities. | O. R. S. § 30.687 - 697 | OR ST § 30.687 - 697 | This act stipulates that an equine sponsor or an equine professional is immune from liability for the death or injury of a participant, arising out of riding, training, driving, grooming or riding as a passenger upon an equine. However, there are exceptions to this rule: an equine sponsor or professional will be held liable for injuries of an equine activity participant if he or she displays a willful and wanton or intentional disregard for the safety of the participant. | Statute | |
| MO - Endangered Species - Chapter 252. Department of Conservation--Fish and Game. | V.A.M.S. 252.020, 252.235, 252.240 | MO ST 252.020, 252.235, 252.240 | This Missouri statute provides that the importation, transportation, or sale of any endangered species of fish or wildlife, or hides or other parts thereof, or the sale or possession with intent to sell any article made in whole or in part from the skin, hide or other parts of any endangered species of fish or wildlife is prohibited. Violation of the statute constitutes a Class B misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| Mark, Stoner, Setter and Pearson v Henshaw | (1998) 155 ALR 118 | (1998) 85 FCR 555; [1998] FCA 556 |
The four appellants, members of Animal Liberation, entered premises containing battery hens without permission. This was done allegedly on concern as to the treatment of those battery hens and the appellants claimed this constituted a reasonable excuse. After a second appeal, the convictions were upheld and it was found that the appellants did not have a reasonable excuse for trespass. |
Case | |
| State v. Saurman | 413 N.E.2d 1197 (Ohio, 1980) |
The court reaffirmed the tenet that it is a proper exercise of state police power to adopt measures to protect wild animals as a resource for all citizens. In doing so, the court held that it was a proper exercise of police power for the legislature of Ohio to enact a wild animal "shining" prohibition. Appellants challenged the law as unconstitutional because it ostensibly outlawed otherwise innocent conduct, as an individual can shine for wild animals without the purpose of hunting those animals. The court disagreed, finding that the statute's purpose was to counteract the problems related to enforcement, since it was difficult to ascertain which individuals shining from vehicles also carried hunting implements. |
Case | ||
| NC - Exotic Pets - .0212 Importation Requirements: WIild Animals | 2 NC ADC 52B.0212 | 2 NCAC 52B.0212 | This North Carolina regulation states that person must obtain a permit from the State Veterinarian before importing any of the following animals into this State: skunk; fox; raccoon; ringtail; bobcat (includes lynx and other North and South American felines as cougars, jaguars, etc.); coyote; marten; brushtail Possum (Trichosurus vulpecula). Permits for the importation into this State of any of these animals shall be issued only if the animal(s) will be used in a research institute, or for exhibition by a USDA licensed exhibitor, or organized entertainment as in zoos or circuses. Any species or hybrid of a mammal not otherwise covered in the Administrative Code that is found to exist in the wild or naturally occurs in the wild must be accompanied by a valid certificate of veterinary inspection. | Administrative |