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Displaying 6601 - 6610 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
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| Derecho Animal Volume 7 Núm 3 |
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| AZ - Wildlife - Taking and Handling of Wildlife. Article 1. General Regulations | A. R. S. § 17-301 to 320 | AZ ST § 17-301 to 320 | The following statutes comprise Arizona's wildlife code. Among the provisions include methods of taking wildlife, hunting restrictions, the state's hunter interference laws, and laws specific to mountain lions, bears, and jaguars. | Statute | ||||||
| Michigan Compiled Laws 1838: Chapter 8: Section 22 | Mich. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, § 22 (1838) | The Michigan law concerning the treatment of animals from 1838. The law states the punishment for the crime, and factors for determining if the crime has occurred. | Statute | |||||||
| Dicesare v. Stout | 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 9796 | 992 F.2d 1222 (Table), 1993 WL 137110 (C.A.10 (Okla.)) |
The plaintiff was convicted under an Oklahoma anti-cruelty statute after officer seized his malnourished and neglected horses. Later, plaintiff brought suit against the officers under 42 U.S.C 1983 claiming that the officers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim after it determined that a horse corral near a home was not protected by the Fourth Amendment where the area was used for pastureland and the fence enclosing the area did not and was not intended to prevent the public from viewing the area. |
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| State v. Charles | 878 S.E.2d 166, review denied, 891 S.E.2d 299 (N.C. 2023) | 285 N.C.App. 494, 2022-NCCOA-628 (N.C.App., 2022) | Defendant Cheito Charles appealed from judgments entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of second-degree arson and felonious cruelty to animals. The incident stemmed from a house fire in the summer of 2020 where the defendant set fire to his sister's boyfriend's house while the boyfriend's puppy was still inside. At trial, the defendant contended that there was no evidence that he knew the existence of the puppy. However, the trial court instructed the jury that, in order to convict Defendant of felonious cruelty to animals, the jury need only conclude that Defendant maliciously and “intentionally start[ed] a house fire which proximately result[ed] in the injury or death to the animal.” There was no need to prove that Defendant was aware of the puppy in the home. Ultimately, Defendant was convicted of second-degree arson and felonious cruelty to animals. On appeal here, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent regarding the animal cruelty charge. This court rebuffed this argument, finding that there was no error with instruction since the jury only needed to conclude that Defendant maliciously set the fire that proximately caused the puppy's death. This same reasoning also supported the sufficiency of the evidence claim. The court dispensed with Defendant's final argument as to the sufficiency of the indictment. As a result, the appellate court found no error with Defendant's trial. | Case | ||||||
| ND - Damages - § 36-21-13. Exemplary damages for injuries to domestic animals | NDCC 36-21-13 | ND ST 36-21-13 | This North Dakota statutes provides that exemplary damages may be applied for any wrongful injury to an animal committed willfully or by gross negligence | Statute | ||||||
| Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader | LCA 1684/96 | The petitioner, an organization for the protection of animal rights, petitioned the magistrate court to issue an injunction against the respondents, which would prohibit the show they presented, which included a battle between a man and an alligator. The magistrate court held that the battle in question constituted cruelty to animals, which was prohibited under section 2 of the Cruelty to Animals Law (Protection of Animals)-1994. The respondents appealed this order to the district court, which cancelled the injunction. The petitioners requested leave to appeal this decision to this Court. The Court held that the show in question constituted cruelty against animals, as prohibited under section 2 of the Cruelty to Animals Law (Protection of Animals)-1994. | Case | |||||||
| Taiwan - Wildlife - Taiwan Wildlife Conservation Act | Taiwan Wildlife Conservation Act | An act which aims to conserve wildlife, protect species diversity and maintain the balance of natural ecosystems | Statute | |||||||
| ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, a California corporation, CHIMPANZEE COLLABORATORY, SARAH BAECKLER, AMAZING ANIMAL ACTORS, INC., a Ca | Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that defendants, individuals and companies who use non-human primates in television and movie productions, engage in physical and psychological abuse of chimpanzees. According to plaintiffs, the abuse has been going on for years and includes violent beatings with sticks and other implements. Plaintiffs raise their first cause of action under the federal Endangered Species Act, contending that defendant's harassment, beating, and brutalization of the chimpanzees constitutes a "taking" under the ESA. Plaintiffs also raise causes of action under California law for specific recovery of property (e.g., the primates), conversion, violations under the California Business Code, and violations under the cruelty provisions of the California Penal Code. | Pleading | ||||||||
| Ash v. State | 290 Ark. 278 (1986) | 290 Ark. 278 (1986) |
Police raided defendant's home and found an area converted into an arena for dog fighting. Defendant was found guilty of promoting or engaging in dog fighting or possessing a dog for that purpose. On appeal, the court found that the based on the evidence a jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant was aware that on property owned by her and her husband an arena had been built for the purpose of clandestine dog fighting and that she was aware it was so being used. |
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