Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ME - Transport - § 2087. Transporting dogs in open vehicle regulated | 29-A M. R. S. A. § 2087 | ME ST T. 29-A § 2087 | This Maine law regulates the transporting of dogs in open vehicles (like pick-up trucks or convertibles). Under the law, a person driving an open vehicle may not transport a dog in the open portion of that vehicle on a public way unless the dog is protected in a manner that prevents the dog from falling or jumping or being thrown from the vehicle. The law excludes transportation of a dog by a farmer engaged in agricultural activities involving the dog or a hunting dog that is between transported between hunting sites by a licensed hunter. | Statute |
| State v. Peabody | 343 Ga. App. 362, 807 S.E.2d 107 (2017) | 2017 WL 4801538 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2017) | This Georgia case involves a former police lieutenant who was indicted on two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals after he left his K-9 named Inka locked in his police vehicle while he attended to tasks inside his home. The dog died after being left inside the vehicle, which had all doors and windows closed with no A/C or ventilation running. The state appeals the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to quash the indictment. Specifically, the state argues that OCGA § 17-7-52 (a law that requires at least a 20-day notice prior to presentment of a proposed indictment to a grand jury when a peace officer is charged with a crime that occurred in the performance of his or her duties) is inapplicable. The state did not send defendant a copy of the proposed indictment before it presented the case to the grand jury. The state contends defendant "stepped aside" from his police-related duties and was therefore not afforded the protections of OCGA § 17-7-52. This court disagreed with that assessment. Since Peabody was responsible for the care and housing of Inka as her K-9 handler, leaving her unattended, albeit in an illegal manner, was still in performance of his police duties. As such, Peabody was entitled to the procedural protections of the statute according to the appellate court. The trial court's motion to quash his indictment was affirmed. | Case |
| VA - Endangered Species - Article 6. Endangered Species. | Va. Code Ann. §§ 29.1-563 - 570 | VA ST §§ 29.1-563 - 570 | The taking, transportation, possession, sale, or offer for sale within the Commonwealth of any fish or wildlife appearing on any list of threatened or endangered species published by the United States Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the provisions of the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-205), or any modifications or amendments thereto, is prohibited except as provided in § 29.1-568. Interestingly, the state mandates that anyone who keeps a non-native or exotic reptile must keep the reptile so as to prevent it from running-at-large or escaping. Violation of this provision is a Class 2 misdemeanor. | Statute |
| KS - Sterling - Breed - Pit Bull Ordinance (2-113. Prohibited owning; exemptions) | STERLING, KS., CITY CODE § 2-113 |
In Sterling, Kansas, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or in any way possess any "Rottweiler" dog or "Pit Bull" dog. Pit Bulls include the Staffordshire bull terrier, American pit bull terrier, the American Staffordshire terrier, or any dog which has the appearance and characteristics of being predominantly of these breeds or a combination of any of these breeds. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Becker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. | 416 N.W.2d 906 (Wis.,1987) | 141 Wis.2d 804 (1987) |
Motorist sued dog owner after he was injured in a car accident allegedly caused by dog. The Court of Appeals held that the “injury by dog” statute creates strict liability for any injury or damage caused by dog if owner was negligent (with public policy exceptions). Here, the dog owner was not strictly liable because he was not negligent when his dog escaped from its enclosure. |
Case |
| In the Matter of: Thomas E. Rainelli | 1999 NOAA LEXIS 10 | 1999 NOAA LEXIS 10 |
This case involves violations of the MMPA by taking, in the form of harassment by feeding or attempting to feed wild dolphins. The respondents, a captain of a vessel used in a dolphin-feeding encounter, and the sole shareholder of a boat renal company, were both found guilty and assessed civil penalties in the amount of $4500. Though the shareholder was not on the vessel when it committed the feeding violations, he was found guilty of violating the MMPA, by providing a platform from which feeding is conducted or supported. |
Case |
| Ley 22.584, 1982 | LEY N° 22.584 | Ley 22584 approves the "Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources” that was adopted at the Diplomatic Conference held in Canberra on May 20, 1980 and subscribed by Argentina on the September 11th of that year. | Statute | |
| SC - Equine Activity Liability - Article 7. Equine Liability Immunity. | Code 1976 § 47-9-710 - 730 | SC ST § 47-9-710 - 730 | This South Carolina section provides that an equine activity sponsor or an equine professional is not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from an inherent risk of equine activity. The statute also requires the visible displaying of warning signs that alert participants to the limitation of liability by law. Failure to comply with the requirements concerning warning signs and notices provided in this section prevents an equine activity sponsor or equine professional from invoking the privileges of immunity provided by this article. | Statute |
| Colorado Dog Fanciers v. City and County of Denver | 820 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991) | The plaintiffs, dog owners and related canine and humane associations (dog owners), filed a complaint in the Denver District Court against the defendant, City and County of Denver (city), seeking both a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the "Pit Bulls Prohibited" ordinance, Denver, Colo., Rev.Mun.Code § 8-55 (1989), and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement. The dog owners in this case claim the ordinance is unconstitutional, violating their rights to procedural and substantive due process and equal protection, is unconstitutionally vague, and constitutes a taking of private property. | Case | |
| Harris v. Anderson County Sheriff's Office | 673 S.E.2d 423 (S.C.,2009) | 381 S.C. 357 (2009); 2009 WL 294756 |
In this South Carolina case, the court considered the meaning of the term "or" in the state's dog bite statute, SC ST 47-3-110, and whether that word allows a plaintiff to pursue a statutory claim against the owner of the dog while that dog is in the care of another. The facts concerned a veterinary assistant who sued a county sheriff's officer after she was bitten by a police dog while the dog was kenneled at the veterinary clinic where she worked. The lower court granted summary judgment for the sheriff's office. The Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation. Based on a plain language reading of the statute, the Court concluded that the Legislature intended to allow a claim against the owner of the dog when another person has the dog in his care or keeping. |
Case |