Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Chenault | 227 Cal. App. 4th 1503, review filed (Aug. 25, 2014) | 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal.App.Dist.4, 2014), review filed (Aug. 25, 2014) | Darrell Chenault was convicted on 13 counts of lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age and sentenced to 75 years to life in prison. On appeal he contended that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a support dog to be present during the testimony of two child witnesses without individualized showings of necessity, and that the presence of the dog was inherently prejudicial and violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses against him. The appellate court concluded that a trial court has authority under Evidence Code section 765 to allow the presence of a therapy or support dog during a witness’s testimony.” The court did “not believe that the presence of a support dog is inherently more prejudicial than the presence of a support person,” citing the New York case of Tohom. Chinault argued that “individualized showings of necessity” should have been required for F. and C. before the support dog could be present in the courtroom. The appellate court concluded however that “a case-specific finding that an individual witness needs the presence of a support dog is not required by the federal Constitution,” for which Tohom was again cited. Based on the court's review of the record, the appellate court concluded that the trial court made implicit findings that the presence of Asta, the support dog, would assist or enable F. and C. to testify completely and truthfully without undue harassment or embarrassment. The court also took measures to reduce any possible prejudice to Chenault by setting forth logistics for the entry, positioning, and departure of the support dog, along with F. and C., during jury recesses so the dog was as unobtrusive and least disruptive as reasonably possible. The judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| MI - Trapping - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M.C.L.A. 324.42501 - 42507 | MI ST 324.42501 - 42507 | These sections describe the regulations for trapping for furs, hides and pelts. This includes the requirement for a fur dealer's license and for a monthly report of all pelts on hand. | Statute | |
| DILLON v. O'CONNOR | 412 P.2d 126 (Wash. 1966) | 68 Wash.2d 184 (1966) |
As the court stated, "This is ‘The Case of the Costly Canine.' ‘Bimbo,’ an acknowledged ‘tree hound' but without pedigree or registration papers, lost a bout with defendant's automobile. For ‘Bimbo's' untimely demise, his owner, plaintiff, brought suit against defendant alleging that ‘Bimbo’ was killed as a result of defendant's negligent operation of his automobile." Ultimately, the court used a market value approach in determining damages. However, based on subsequent caselaw, it should be noted that Washington uses the market value approach only for negligent injury, and not intentional injury. |
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| IN RE: JAMES W. HICKEY, D/B/A S&S FARMS, AND S.S. FARMS, INC. | 47 Agric. Dec. 840 (1988) | 1988 WL 243389 (U.S.D.A.) | Licensed dealer found guilty of numerous violations of Act involving care and housing of dogs and cats, failure to allow inspection of records, and failure to keep and maintain adequate records as to acquisition and disposition of animals, is properly penalized with 25-year suspension of license, civil penalty of $40,000, and cease and desist order. | Case | |
| CO - Restaurant - 25-4-1615. Pet dogs in retail food establishments | C.R.S.A. § 25-4-1615 | CO ST § 25-4-1615 | This 2020 Colorado law allows a person to have a pet dog in an outdoor dining area of a retail food establishment if several conditions are met (including, but not limited to, the presence of a separate entrance for the dogs and their owners, requiring owners to keep dogs on leashes or in pet carriers, and not allowing the dogs on furniture or fixtures). The law allows a retail food establishment to elect not to allow dogs in its outdoor dining area. In addition, the governing body of a city, county, or city and county may prohibit the presence of pet dogs in outdoor dining areas of retail food establishments located within the governing body's jurisdiction | Statute | |
| ND - Hunting - Chapter 20.1-01. General Provisions. | NDCC 20.1-01-31 | ND ST 20.1-01-31 | This law reflects North Dakota's hunter harassment provision. Under the law, no person may intentionally interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife on public or private land by another or intentionally harass, drive, or disturb any wildlife on public or private land for the purpose of disrupting a lawful hunt. Also, no person may remove with or tamper with a legally set trap. This section does not apply to any incidental interference arising from lawful activity by public or private land users or to landowners or operators interfering with hunters on land owned or operated by that individual. | Statute | |
| MA - Disaster Planning - Massachusetts Emergency Animal Annex | Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) | The Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) is an all hazards plan developed to address the natural and man-caused hazards that threaten Massachusetts. The CEMP and ESF Annexes describes the system that will be used in Massachusetts to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from an emergency or disaster. It also identifies and assigns specific areas of responsibility for coordinating resources to support the response to an emergency or disaster. The Massachusetts Emergency Support Function 11 (MAESF-11) Agriculture, Animals and Natural Resources provides a framework for coordination and cooperation across state agencies and other organizations regarding the control and support of animal sheltering, search, rescue, recovery, and reunification needs and activities before, during, and after a disaster, or emergency. | Administrative | ||
| KS - Abandon - Chapter 47. Livestock and Domestic Animals. | K. S. A. 47-835 | KS ST § 47-835 | This Kansas statute provides that any animal placed in the custody of a licensed veterinarian that is unclaimed by its owner for a period of more than ten (10) days after written notice by registered or certified mail is given, shall be deemed to be abandoned and may be turned over to the nearest humane society, or dog pound or disposed of as the custodian may deem proper. The giving of notice to the owner of record immunizes the veterinarian from liability. | Statute | |
| Commonwealth v. Gardner | 74 Pa. D. & C. 539 (Pa. 1950) |
In this Pennsylvania case, a new resident moved next door to a woman who had been operating a kennel for years. He then complained to the borough council which then amended an ordinance such that the keeping of more than six dogs over six months of age was made a nuisance per se, illegal and a violation of the ordinance. The court held that it did not believe that the borough council or the court had the power or the authority to determine that more than a certain number is a nuisance per se, and less than that number is a nuisance only upon proof of the same being a nuisance. "In other words, it is our opinion that the borough council, in the exercise of its police power may not unreasonably and arbitrarily prohibit things which were not nuisances at common law, and their declaration in an ordinance that a thing is a public nuisance does not make it so, if it is not a nuisance in fact . . ." |
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| Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service | 930 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2013) | 2013 WL 1111285 (D.D.C.,2013) |
Using the Administrative Procedures Act, the Sierra Club filed a suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) due to the USFWS's response to the Sierra Club's petition to revise critical habitat for the leatherback sea turtle; the Sierra Club also charged the USFWS with unlawfully delaying the designation of the Northeastern Ecological Corridor of Puerto Rico as critical habitat for the leatherback sea turtle. While both sides filed a motion for summary judgment, the District Court only granted the USFWS motion for summary judgment because the USFWS's 12–month determination was unreviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act. |
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