Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Divorce - § 2605. Care and ownership of pet animal | West's Ann. Cal. Fam. Code § 2605 | CA FAM § 2605 | This California law, effective January of 2019, allows to court to enter an order, at the request of a party, for a party to care for the pet animal prior to the entry of a final order. The existence of an order providing for the care of a pet animal during the course of proceedings for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties shall not have any impact on the court's final determination of ownership of the pet animal. | Statute |
| Canada - Saskatchewan - Dangerous Dog Law | SS 2005, c M-36.1, 374-380 | This set of Saskatchewan, Canada laws comprises the Dangerous Dog laws. | Statute | |
| DC - Restaurant - Subchapter VII. Dining with Dogs. | DC CODE § 8-1865.01, .02 | These laws from 2018 allow food establishments in D.C. to permit dogs in outdoor dining areas of food establishments or unenclosed sidewalk cafés. These establishments must post signage outside that states dogs are permitted along with any restrictions on dogs based on size or temperament. They must also provide an entrance that does not require dogs to enter an indoor dining area or an area in which food is being stored or prepared to access the outdoor dining area and provide patrons with waste bags and a means of proper disposal. Patrons must keep their dog in a carrier or on a leash at all times and never leave the dogs unattended. | Statute | |
| OH - Lakewood - Breed - 506.03 PIT BULL DOGS OR CANARY DOGS | LAKEWOOD, OH., ORDINANCES § 506.03 (2008) |
No person may keep, harbor or own pit bull dogs or canary dogs in Lakewood, Ohio, with exceptions for dogs in the city on the effective date. A dog may be allowed to stay provided it has a microchip for identification, has been sterilized, the owner has liability insurance of $100,000, and the dog is properly confined or secured. Failure to comply could result in the removal or impoundment of the dog. The owner may also be charged with a misdemeanor. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | 504 U.S. 555 (1992) |
Respondents filed suit challenging the new regulation under the ESA that limited the jurisdiction to the U.S. and the high seas. While the case, was remanded the central issue to this case was whether respondents had standing to challenge the ruling. |
Case | |
| Journal of Animal Law Table of Contents Volume 4 |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of LawJournal of Animal Law Vol. IV (2008)The table of contents is provided below. |
Policy | ||
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds | 297 F.Supp.3d 901 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 27, 2018) | 2018 WL 1151000 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 27, 2018) | In 2012, Iowa passed a statute (Iowa code § 717A.3A) that criminalized gaining access to agricultural facilities under false pretenses and making a false representation on a job application for those facilities. Plaintiffs in this case (animal rights groups including the Animal Legal Defense Fund and PETA) brought suit alleging that the statute was unconstitutional and sought to enjoin the Defendants (governor of Iowa) from enforcing it. Their complaint alleged that the statute violates the First Amendment as discrimination on the basis of content, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by targeting animals rights groups, and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by burdening the freedom of speech. This case decides the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ complaint based on lack of standing and failure to state a claim because the outlawed conduct is not protected by the First Amendment as false statements and is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting private property, thereby not violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denies Defendants' motion with respect to the First Amendment, concluding that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the intent to suppress their message because of their viewpoint. However, the court grants the motion to dismiss for the claim of a Fourteenth Amendment violation because the statute in fact serves a legitimate government purpose in protecting private property. | Case |
| Willoughby v. Board of Veterinary Examiners | 483 P.2d 498 (N.M. 1971) | 82 N.M. 443 (1971) |
Donald Wayne Willoughby, D.V.M., successfully appealed the suspension of his license for 180 days at the district court level. In an appeal by the Board of Veterinary Examiners, the Supreme Court found the Board's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence based on an examination of the entire record. The Court stated that the trial judge substituted his own judgment in reversing the decision of the Board, rather than basing his reversal upon any of the grounds set forth in the statute. While the Court affirmed the order of revocation, it held that there no language within the Uniform Licensing Act that gives the Board the power to place the appellee on probation after the period for which his license has been suspended. |
Case |
| WA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Chapter 16.52) | West's RCWA 16.52.010 - 360 | WA ST 16.52.010 - 360 | This section of statutes contains Washington's anti-cruelty provisions. Under the section, "animal" means any nonhuman mammal, bird, reptile, or amphibian. Sections 16.52.205 and 16.52.207 are the primary anti-cruelty provisions that categorize cruelty in either the first or second degree. A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the first degree (a class C felony) when he or she intentionally inflicts substantial pain on, causes physical injury to, or kills an animal by a means causing undue suffering, or forces a minor to inflict unnecessary pain, injury, or death on an animal. A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree (a misdemeanor) if, under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the person knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence inflicts unnecessary suffering or pain upon an animal. An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree the owner knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence fails to provide the animal with necessary food, water, shelter, rest, sanitation, ventilation, space, or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain as a result of the failure, or if he or she abandons the animal. | Statute |
| Respecting Animals: A Balanced Approach to Our Relationship with Pets, Food, and Wildlife |
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Policy |
