Results
Displaying 6021 - 6030 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Law Index Volume 17, Part 1 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 17, Issue 1 (Fall 2010)
INTRODUCTIONLEGAL PERSONHOOD AND THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
|
Policy | |||
| Mongelli v. Cabral | 632 N.Y.S.2d 927 (City of Younkers Ct. 1995) | 166 Misc.2d 240 (1995) |
A couple boarded their pet bird with a couple who groomed and boarded birds while the wife underwent extensive medical treatment. There was a dispute between the owners and the boarders over whether the bird was a gift or the subject of long-term boarding. The court found that the boarders had not established that the bird had been a gift. |
Case | |
| ME - Dog, Dangerous - Maine Dangerous Dog Laws | 7 M. R. S. A. § 3951 - 3955; 7 M. R. S. A. § 3961 - 3964; 7 M. R. S. A. § 3907 | ME ST T. 7 § 3951 - 3955; ME ST T. 7 § 3961 - 3964; ME ST T.7 § 3907 | This Maine statutory sections outlines the state's dangerous dog laws. It first provides that any person may lawfully kill a dog if necessary to protect that person, another person or a domesticated animal during the course of a sudden, unprovoked assault. A person who owns or keeps a dangerous dog commits a civil violation for which the court shall adjudge a fine of not less than $250 and not more than $1,000. The dog may be ordered to be muzzled, or euthanized if it has killed, maimed or inflicted serious bodily injury upon a person or has a history of a prior assault. Notably, if a dog whose owner refuses or neglects to comply with the order wounds any person by a sudden assault or wounds or kills any domestic animal, the owner shall pay the person injured treble damages and costs to be recovered by a civil action. The statute sets out the specific procedure for declaring a dog dangerous and the statutory definition of dangerous is also provided by reference to a companion statute. | Statute | |
| NM - Invasive Species - Chapter 17. Game and Fish and Outdoor Recreation. | NMSA 1978, § 17-4-35 | NM ST § 17-4-35 | These New Mexico statutes pertain to controlling aquatic invasive species. If a conveyance or equipment has been in an infested water body, the owner must decontaminate it or have it inspected and certified prior to entering another water body in the state. Law enforcement officers must take action to prevent infested equipment from entering water bodies, and may impound equipment if the person transporting it refuses to submit to an inspection and the officer has reason to believe that an aquatic invasive species may be present. | Statute | |
| MD - Vehicle - § 20-106. Duty of driver upon striking domestic animal with vehicle | MD Code, Transportation, § 20-106 | MD TRANS § 20-106 | Under this Maryland statute, if a motor vehicle strikes and injures a domestic animal, the driver of the motor vehicle immediately shall notify the appropriate State or local police of the accident. Once notified, the police shall notify the local organization or governmental agency designated by the appropriate local government to give the injured animals medical care. | Statute | |
| Connecticut v. Devon D. | 321 Conn. 656, 138 A.3d 849 (2016) | 321 Conn. 656 (2016), 2016 WL 3194779 (Conn.,2016) | Devon D. was convicted of four counts sexual assault and three counts of risk of injury to a child upon allegations made by three of Devon D.’s biological children, C1, C2, and C3. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial court had abused its discretion by having the three cases to be tried jointly and by permitting C1 to testify with a dog at her feet. The appellate court had accepted these arguments and reversed and remanded for a new trial, but the Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the appellate court. The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that “the trial court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the cases to be tried together because the evidence in all three cases was cross admissible,” and reversed on that issue. As to the appellate court’s determination that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting a dog to sit near C1 during her testimony to provide comfort and support,” the Supreme Court also reversed, reinstating the verdict and judgment of the trial court. | Case | |
| State v. Arnold | 147 N.C. App. 670 (N.C. App. 2001) | 147 N.C. App. 670 |
Defendant appealed from a conviction of participating as a spectator at an exhibition featuring dog fighting alleging that the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad and an invalid exercise of police power. The appellate court found the statute to be constitutional. Defendant also argued that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence, however the appellate court found that there is substantial evidence to support the conviction. |
Case | |
| IA - Breeders - Chapter 67 Animal Welfare | Iowa Admin. Code 21-67.1(162) - 17 | IA ADC 21-67.1 to 17 | The following Iowa regulations provide provisions that pet stores, kennels, pounds, and other animal housing facilities must follow in order to handle, transport, and care for animals. These regulations provide specific instructions for dog day cares and for breeding greyhound dogs. | Administrative | |
| IL - Ecoterrorism - 5/48-2. Animal research and production facilities protection | 720 I.L.C.S. 5/48-2 | IL ST CH 720 § 5/48-2 | This new law replaces the Illinois' Animal Research and Production Facilities Protection Act, which was repealed in 2013. Under the new law, it is unlawful for any person to release, steal, or injure an animal held at a facility; to damage or vandalize any property; to obtain access to an animal facility by false pretenses for the purpose of performing unauthorized acts; to enter into an animal facility with an intent to destroy, alter, duplicate, or obtain unauthorized possession of records; or to enter or remain on an animal facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act. Violation of any of these acts is a felony, with classification based on the amount of property damage. | Statute | |
| American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign v. Vilsack | 133 F. Supp. 3d 200 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 5726880 (D.D.C., 2015) | The American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign (Plaintiffs) brought this action against the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) to prevent the implementation of the new Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory Plan (WHT) that Modoc County helped develop. Plaintiffs brought six claims against defendants, all under the Administrative Procedures Act. In Counts I, II, and III, plaintiffs alleged that the boundary clarification was arbitrary and capricious because it violated the Wild Horses Act, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and in Counts IV, V, and VI, they claimed that the adjustment to the "appropriate management level" (AML) range was arbitrary and capricious because it was contrary to the same three statutes. Because the Forest Service reasonably concluded that the disputed territory was never formally incorporated into the Devil's Garden WHT, and that any references to one contiguous territory were the result of administrative error, the Court found that it was not arbitrary and capricious or in violation of the law for the Forest Service to act to correct the boundary in the 2013 Environmental Assessment and the 2013 Management Plan. Thus, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III. And because the Forest Service articulated a rational basis for its decision to adjust the AML range for the Devil's Garden WHT that was not counter to record evidence or otherwise contrary to the law, the Court found that defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Counts IV, V, and VI. Thus, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied, defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was granted, and because they sought the same relief as defendants, the intervenor-defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was denied as moot. | Case |