Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GA - Bite - § 51-2-6. Dogs, liability of owner or keeper for injuries to livestock | Ga. Code Ann., § 51-2-6 to 7 | GA ST § 51-2-6 to 7 | This Georgia statute represents the state's relevant dog bite strict liability law. While the law imposes strict liability for injury to a person, the dog (or other animal) must first be considered "vicious" or "dangerous," which can be as simple as showing the animal was required to be leashed per city ordinance. Second, the animal must be at large by the careless management of the owner. Finally, the person injured must not have provoked the animal into attacking him or her. | Statute | |
| Evans v. Craig | 807 N.Y.S.2d 417 (2006) | 25 A.D.3d 582, 807 N.Y.S.2d 417, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 00331 (2006) |
A postal worker brought an action against dog owners to recover for injuries allegedly sustained when dog jumped on her while she was delivering mail to the owners' home. In affirming the denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court found that there factual issues as to whether the owners were aware of the potential danger from the dog and whether they took reasonable measures to prevent the dog from jumping on the plaintiff. |
Case | |
| Gonzales v. Kissner | 24 So.3d 214 ((La.App. 1 Cir.,2009) | 2009 WL 3029621 (La.App. 1 Cir.), 2008-2154 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/11/09) |
This Louisiana case concerns an action for personal injuries sustained by an animal control officer who was mauled about the head and neck by defendants' dog while investigating a complaint of an attack by the dog from the previous day. The dog's owners argued on appeal that the trial court failed to apply the Professional Rescuer's Doctrine, sometimes referred to as the “fireman's rule." Because under the facts here, where the dog had previously escaped after being confined in the house and the defendants failed to properly lock the house and/or restrain the dog, the court did not find that Ms. Gonzales' recovery for injuries was barred by the Professional Rescuer's Doctrine. The court held that based upon the record before this court, there was no error on the part of the trial court that warranted reversal of the plaintiff's motion for a partial summary judgment as to the liability of the dog's owners. |
Case | |
| FL - Wildlife - Chapter 68A-1. General: Ownership, Short Title, Severability and Definitions | Fla. Admin. Code r. 68A-1.001 - 1.004 | 68 FL ADC 68A-1.001 to 1.004 | This chapter of the Administrative Code provides the definitions for the remaining chapters of the Code, and includes a declaration of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission's authority to regulate all wild animal life within the state. | Administrative | |
| LA - Cruelty - Chapter 17. Cruelty to Animals (Corporations for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) | LSA-R.S. 3:2391 - 2501 | These chapters concerns the powers and duties of Louisiana corporations for prevention of cruelty to animals. | Statute | ||
| DE - Pet Sales - CHAPTER 40. PET WARRANTIES | 6 Del.C. § 4001 - 4011 | DE ST TI 6 § 4001 - 4011 | This Delaware statutory section comprises the state's "pet warranty" laws. Purchasers receive a statement of the dog's breed and any registration information when buying pets from a retail pet store under the law. Sellers are required to disclose any known disease or illness at the time of sale. Further, sellers must provide the following written statement when selling a registered pet: "A pedigree or a registration does not assure proper breeding condition, health, quality or claims to lineage." Buyers may receive a refund or replacement, or have veterinary expenses reimbursed by a seller where a dog becomes ill or dies within 20 days of purchase (or within two years for a congenital disorder). | Statute | |
| McBride v. Orr | 466 A.2d 952 (N.H., 1983) | 124 N.H. 66, 42 A.L.R.4th 835 (N.H. 1983) |
In this New Hampshire case, defendant animal control officer killed plaintiff’s dog believing that it was in pursuit of a deer. Defendant claimed immunity pursuant to a state statute. The Court reversed and remanded for a determination of damages for the plaintiff. The Court went on to state that the purpose of the statute was not to authorize defendant’s killing of plaintiff’s dog when the dog was no longer pursuing the deer. |
Case | |
| Morgan v. State | 656 S.E.2d 857(Ga.App., 2008) | 2008 WL 142325 (Ga.App.), 289 Ga.App. 209 (2008) |
Deputy removed sick and malnourished animals from Defendant's property, initiated by a neighbor's call to the Sheriff. Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of cruelty to animals. He appealed, alleging illegal search and seizure based on lack of exigent circumstances to enter his property. The court found that deputy's entry into the home was done with Morgan's lawful consent, and, as such, the subsequent seizure of the dogs in the home was based on the deputy's plain view observations in a location where he was authorized to be. |
Case | |
| SD - Vehicle - SDCL § 41-1-12. Euthanasia of animal injured in motor vehicle accident | SDCL § 41-1-12 - 13 | SD ST § 41-1-12 - 13 | Any person who has seriously injured a wildlife animal or who comes upon a wildlife animal that has been seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident may euthanize the animal if that person has the means, skill, and will to euthanize humanely. | Statute | |
| State v. Newcomb | 359 Or 756 (2016) | In this case, the Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed a case in which defendant accused the State of violating her constitutional rights by taking a blood sample of her dog without a warrant to do so. Ultimately, the court held that the defendant did not have a protected privacy interest in the dog’s blood and therefore the state did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights. Defendant’s dog, Juno, was seized by the Humane Society after a worker made a visit to plaintiff’s home and had probable cause to believe that Juno was emaciated from not receiving food from plaintiff. After Juno was seized and taken into custody for care, the veterinarian took a blood sample from Juno to confirm that there was no other medical reason as to why Juno was emaciated. Defendant argued that this blood test was a violation of her constitutional rights because the veterinarian did not have a warrant to perform the test. The court dismissed this argument and held that once Juno was taken into custody, defendant had “lost her rights of dominion and control over Juno, at least on a temporary basis.” Finally, the court held that because Juno was lawfully seized and Juno’s blood was “not ‘information’ that defendant placed in Juno for safekeeping or to conceal from view,” defendant’s constitutional rights had not been violated. | Case |