Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN - Property - (Repealed by P.L.162-2006, SEC.49.) - Dogs as Personal Property for Taxation | I.C. 15-5-10-1 (Repealed by P.L.162-2006, SEC.49.) | IN ST 15-5-10-1 | Dogs are considered personal property in Indiana (repealed). | Statute | ||||||||
| CO - Impound - Colorado Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act | C. R. S. A. § 35-80-106.3 | CO ST § 35-80-106.3 | This is an example of a state statute that creates minimum holding periods that shelters must hold found pets for before allowing the pets to be adopted or otherwise disposed of. | Statute | ||||||||
| Hyatt v. Anoka Police Department | 691 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 2005) |
Plaintiff was injured by a police dog during the arrest of her husband. Plaintiff sued under a Minnesota Statute requiring strict liability for dog injuries. The trial court held the statute applied to police dogs, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court ultimately held the statute does apply to police dogs. |
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| Animal Protection Institute of America v. Hodel | 860 F.2d 920 (C.A.9 (Nev.),1988) | 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,251 (C.A.9 (Nev.),1988) |
The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary could not transfer title to a private individual whom the secretary knows will commercially exploit the adopted horse. The Secretary argued that the WFRHBA placed only one requirement on the transfer of title: the private individual must humanely care for and maintain the horse for one year prior to title transfer. The court, however, concluded that the statute commands the secretary to not only determine that the animal has been well cared for, but also that the adopter remains a qualified individual. Given the statute’s prohibition of commercial exploitation of wild horses as well as its concern with their humane treatment, the court concluded that a private individual cannot remain a “qualified individual” if he or she intends to commercially exploit the horse after they obtain title. |
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| Derecho Animal Volume 3 Núm 3 |
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| New Orleans Bulldog Soc'y v. Louisiana Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | 200 So. 3d 996 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/7/16), writ granted, 2016-1809 (La. 1/9/17), 214 So. 3d 859, and aff'd, 2016-1809 (La. 5/3/17), 222 So. 3d 679 | 2016 WL 4698255 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/7/16) | The Plaintiff, the Bulldog Rescue Mission, is a nonprofit dog welfare organization organized under Louisiana law to advocate for dog welfare in New Orleans. The plaintiff sought information under Louisiana’s Public Records Law related to the dogs euthanized by the Defendant, the Louisiana Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (LSPCA). LSPCA declared that they were not a public body and thus, not subject to the Public Records Law. The Bulldog Rescue Mission filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed their petition and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit held that LSPCA was a quasi-public entity subject to Public Records Law because the organization performed municipal functions on behalf of the municipal government. The court found LSPCA receives an annual compensation of almost two million dollars for providing services for quasi-municipal functions such as enforcing code violations and taking and receiving animals. Thus, it cannot characterize the service as "voluntary" since it "clearly operates[s] under the color of City Authority." Bulldog rescue also claims error with the trial court ruling that, even if LSPCA is subject to public records laws, these obligations are met through its Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) reporting requirement. This court found that the CEA contractual agreement made between the city of Louisiana and LSPCA allowing the organization to provide mandated city services related to animal control could not be used to circumscribe Public Records Law compliance. In other words, the limited statistical reporting required under the CEA is not a valid substitute for a public record request that would show all governmental functions and duties performed. The judgment of the trial court was reversed where this court found the trial court clearly erred in dismissing the Bulldog Rescue petition for a writ of mandamus. | Case | ||||||||
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter | Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 4623943 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015) | The Animal Legal Defense Fund, and various other organizations and individuals, challenge Idaho Code § 18–7042 as unconstitutional. Section 18-7042 criminalizes undercover investigations of agricultural production facilities. ALDF alleges that § 18–7042 has both the purpose and effect of stifling public debate about modern agriculture and raises two substantive constitutional challenges against the State: (1) violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; and (2) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first found that § 18–7042 is both content and viewpoint based, and thus, must survive the highest level of scrutiny. The Court held that the law does not survive strict scrutiny because it "would contravene strong First Amendment values to say the State has a compelling interest in affording these heavily regulated facilities extra protection from public scrutiny." Even if the interests in property and privacy of these industries is compelling, the law is not narrowly tailored as it restricts more speech than necessary and poses a "particularly serious threat to whistleblowers' free speech rights." Finally, the Court found that the law also violated the Equal Protection clause because the law was spurred by an improper animus toward animal welfare groups, furthers no legitimate or rational purpose, and classifies activities protected by the First Amendment based on content. ALDF's motion for summary judgment was granted. | Case | |||||||||
| FL - Fur - Sale of garments or items of clothing containing dog or cat fur prohibited; | West's F. S. A. § 828.1231 | FL ST § 828.1231 | Makes it illegal for a person to knowingly sell or offer to sell a garment which contains dog or cat fur, or a dog or cat pelt. Defines the first violation of this provision as a misdemeanor of the first degree, and any subsequent violations as felonies of the third degree. Allows any law enforcement agency or humane officer to enforce this provision and to seek a civil penalty up to $5,000 for each violation. | Statute | ||||||||
| CA - Ordinances - Local regulations | West's Ann. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7582.5 | CA BUS & PROF § 7582.5 | This California statute provides great deference to local municipalities by providing that regulations governing local municipalities shall not infringe upon the police powers of those local units to regulate dogs. Specifically, it states that this chapter shall not prevent the local authorities in any city, county, or city and county, by ordinance and within the exercise of the police power of the city, county, or city and county from imposing reasonable additional requirements necessary to regulate and control protection dogs according to their local needs and not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter. | Statute | ||||||||
| Hardsaw v. Courtney | 665 N.E.2d 603 (Ind.App.,1996) |
In this Indiana case, the Hardsaws appeal a jury verdict in favor of the Courtneys stemming from their complaint for damages against the Hardsaws after their daughter Kimberly was attacked and bitten by the Hardsaws' dog who was under the supervision of the Hardsaw's 12-year-old daughter at the time of the attack. The Courtneys alleged negligent entrustment. On appeal, the Hardaws argue that, as a matter of law, absent evidence of prior viciousness, they could not have been negligent in entrusting Buster to their daughter and, thus, that this case should not have been submitted to the jury. The court found that the question of whether owner's entrustment of the control and restraint of a dog to a child was reasonable under the circumstances is a question for the jury. Here, the dog was restrained in the yard by a chain, but he was left under the care and supervision of a twelve-year-old child who had no previous experience supervising him. The judgment was affirmed. |
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