Results
Displaying 5761 - 5770 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stanko v. Maher | 419 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005) | 2005 WL 1953514 (10th Cir.(Wyo.)) | A livestock owner and drover sued the Wyoming state brand inspector, alleging that inspector violated his state and federal constitutional rights in making warrantless seizure of five head of livestock, and that inspector abused his office in violation of state constitution. Plaintiff Rudy Stanko, proceeding pro se, appealed from the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendant Jim Maher. The appellate court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Mr. Maher, holding that the warrantless search of cattle did not violate Fourth Amendment and the inspector did not violate the Fourth Amendment by making warrantless seizure of cattle as estrays. Further, the procedure provided under Wyoming brand inspection statutes prior to seizure of cattle deemed to be estrays satisfied due process requirements. | Case |
| RSPCA v. McCormick | [2016] EWHC 928 (Admin) | It was held that for an animal fight to have taken place, contrary to Section 8 of the Animal Welfare Act, the following must have occurred: a "protected animal" must have been placed with another animal in an environment where the ability of both to escape is restricted and controlled by some person or persons connected with that activity or by some artificial restraint. ‘Placed with’ is to be construed as a ‘matter of normal language.’ | Case | |
| AR - Initiatives - Constitutional Amendment 1 (right to hunt) | Constitutional Amendment 1 (2010) | This resolution proposes to amend the Arkansas Constitution to provide for a constitutional right for citizens of the state of Arkansas to hunt, fish, trap, and harvest wildlife. The resolution states that the right would be limited only by the regulations consistent with Amendment 35 of the Arkansas Constitution. It was passed in 2010 by 82.8% of voters. | Statute | |
| WI - Breed - 95.13. Misrepresenting breed of domestic animal | W. S. A. 95.13 | WI ST 95.13 | Under this Wisconsin statute, no person may sell any domestic animal or represent that such domestic animal is a pure bred animal, if the animal is not registered or entitled to be registered, in any pure breed registry for that breed. | Statute |
| UK - Farming - UK General Welfare of Farmed Animals Regs. 2000 | Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 1870 |
For historical purposes only. Law has been repealed and/or replaced. The UK's general animal welfare legislation affecting any animal (including fish, reptiles or amphibians) bred or kept for the production of food, wool, skin or fur or for other farming purposes. |
Statute | |
| UNITED STATES of America v. Robert J. v. STEVENS, Appellant |
The Third Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 48, the federal law that criminalizes depictions of animal cruelty, is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. This brief supports the United States' petition for certiorari. Cert. was granted in April of 2009 by the U.S. Supreme Court. |
Pleading | ||
| Priebe v. Nelson | 140 P.3d 848 (Cal. 2006) | 39 Cal.4th 1112, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 553 |
A kennel worker who was bitten by a dog while the dog was in the care of the kennel sued the owner of the dog under a theory of strict liability under a statute and under the common law. The court found that the dog owner was not liable to the kennel worker because under the "veterinarian's rule," the kennel owner had assumed the risk of being bitten by the dog. |
Case |
| Historical Materials |
Historical Collection
|
Basic page | ||
| Cotton v. Ben Hill County | 208 F. Supp. 3d 1353 (M.D. Ga. 2016) | 2016 WL 5387627 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2016) | In this case, Cotton filed suit against Ben Hill County after Cotton’s cattle was seized for alleged animal cruelty and roaming at large. Cotton filed suit against Ben Hill County and the Sheriff’s Department arguing that he had been deprived of his property in violation of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the violation of the Constitution of Georgia. The court reviewed the issue and granted summary judgment in favor of Ben Hill County and the Sheriff's Department. The court granted summary judgment because Cotton was unable to establish that his rights were violated under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cotton was unable to establish that his Due Process rights were violated because he was unable to provide any evidence that the allegations against Ben Hill County and the Sheriff’s Department were “the result of an official policy, custom or practice of the county or that the County acted with deliberate indifference to these rights.” Also, the court found that there was not a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause because under state law, Georgia provided for a “post deprivation remedy for the loss.” Lastly, the court found that Cotton’s claims against the Sheriff's Department failed as a matter of law because Cotton was unable to establish that anyone from the Sheriff’s Department actually participated in the seizure and impoundment of the cattle. For those reasons, the court held in favor of Ben Hill County and granted summary judgment. | Case |
| UT - Ecoterrorism - § 76-6-110. Offenses committed against animal enterprises--Definitions--Enhanced penalties | U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-203.16 (Formerly cited as UT ST § 76-6-110) | UT ST § 76-3-203.16 | This section comprises Utah's animal enterprise interference law. A person who commits any criminal offense with the intent to halt, impede, obstruct, or interfere with the lawful operation of an animal enterprise or to damage, take, or cause the loss of any property owned by, used by, or in the possession of a lawful animal enterprise, is subject to an enhanced penalty. These penalties enhancements raise the level of the crime one degree (e.g., a class C misdemeanor becomes a class B misdemeanor and a class A misdemeanor becomes a third degree felony). | Statute |