Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PA - Pet Sales - § 201-9.3. Dog purchaser protection | 73 P.S. § 201-9.3 | PA ST 73 P.S. § 201-9.3 | This Pennsylvania statute comprises the state's Dog Purchaser Protection law. The law mandates disclosure of a dog's health history by a seller (defined as pet shop operator or other individual who sells dogs to the public and who owns or operates a kennel or pet shop licensed by the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture or the United States Department of Agriculture). If, within ten days after the date of purchase, a dog purchased from a seller is determined, through physical examination, diagnostic tests or necropsy by a veterinarian, to be clinically ill or dies from any contagious or infectious illness or any parasitic illness which renders it unfit for purchase or results in its death, the purchaser may exercise one of the described statutory elections. | Statute |
| CALIFORNIA VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff & Respondent, v. City of West Hollywood, Defendant & Appellant | This California action concerns the adoption of an ordinance in 2003 by the City of West Hollywood that prohibits the de-clawing of house cats. Amici Curiae Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF" ), the Association of Veterinarians for Animal Rights (" A V AR" ), and the Paw Project submitted a brief to assist the Court in its determination of whether the ordinance at issue on this appeal legally prohibits non-therapeutic onychectomies (commonly known as " de-clawing") of domestic animals within the City of West Hollywood. The California Superior Court found that the Business and Professions Code section 460 preempts a municipal ordinance that attempts to regulate veterinarian procedures. The Amici contend that the CVMA examines only one section of the Code and disregards other sections that apply. Further, the amici find that the CVMA’s “. . . members have a pecuniary interest in performing the acts that the City has determined to be cruel.” On Friday, June 22, 2007, the Second District Court of Appeal in Los Angeles ruled 2-1 that a city can regulate the conduct of its professionals provided it does not prohibit procedures that state law expressly allows. | Pleading | ||
| Crump v Equine Nutrition Systems Pty Ltd t/as Horsepower | [2006] NSWSC 512 |
The plaintiffs claimed that they purchased horse feed from the first respondent and that the feed was contaminated with monensin. The second respondent manufactured the feed. They claimed that as a result, one of their horses died and five others were permanently injured so that they could not be used for the desired purpose. After addressing several factual issues, the trial judge found for the plaintiffs in regards to the issue of negligence by the second respondent and proceeded to assess damages with regard to the economic value of the horses to the plaintiffs, the cost of replacement, loss of profits and maintenance. |
Case | |
| TX - Ordinances - § 215.032. Exhibitions; Shows; Amusements | V.T.C.A., Local Government Code § 215.032 | TX LOCAL GOVT § 215.032 | This statute authorizes municipalities to prohibit or regulate circuses, exhibitions, and menageries. | Statute |
| NV - Disaster - Chapter 414. Emergency Management. General Provisions. | N. R. S. 414.095 and 414.097 | NV ST 414.095 and 414.097 | In Nevada, an emergency management plan must address the needs of persons with pets or service animals during and after an emergency or disaster. | Statute |
| CA - West Hollywood - Chapter 9.48 Animal Control Regulations. | Chapter 9.48, 9.49, 9.50 |
This comprises the City of West Hollywood, California's animal control ordinances. The animal control ordinances of Los Angeles County have been adopted by reference, prohibiting animal nuisances as well as the keeping of dangerous animals. The code also defines and outlines procedures for feral cats. Uniquely, West Hollywood has a ban on onychectomy (“declawing") of domestic cats unless done as a medically necessary procedure, as well as a ban on the sale of fur (with some exceptions). Further, subject to some exemptions, the city prohibits the retail sale of cats and dogs. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Ford v. Com. | 630 S.E.2d 332 (Va. 2006) | 48 Va.App. 262 (2006) |
In this Virginia case, the defendant was convicted of maliciously shooting a companion animal of another “with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or kill,” contrary to Va. Code § 18.2-144, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions, where the defendant admitted he drove the vehicle witnesses saw by the barn where the dog was shot and one witness saw him shoot toward the barn. |
Case |
| SD - Vehicle - SDCL § 41-1-12. Euthanasia of animal injured in motor vehicle accident | SDCL § 41-1-12 - 13 | SD ST § 41-1-12 - 13 | Any person who has seriously injured a wildlife animal or who comes upon a wildlife animal that has been seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident may euthanize the animal if that person has the means, skill, and will to euthanize humanely. | Statute |
| RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-1.1. Towns of Portsmouth, West Warwick, and Middletown and city of Woonsocket--Vicious dog ordinance | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-1.1 | RI ST § 4-13-1.1 | This Rhode Island statute provides that the town councils of the towns of Portsmouth, West Warwick and Middletown may, by ordinance, provide that the owner or keeper of any dog that assaults any person shall be fined an amount not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two hundred dollars. The investigation must prove that the dog was off the owner's property or that the assault was the result of owner negligence. It further provides that, in the city of Woonsocket, an owner shall not be declared negligent if an injury is sustained by a person who was committing a trespass or other tort upon the owner's premises or was teasing, tormenting, provoking, abusing or assaulting the dog or was committing or attempting to commit a crime. | Statute |
| State v. Newcomb | 359 Or 756 (2016) | In this case, the Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed a case in which defendant accused the State of violating her constitutional rights by taking a blood sample of her dog without a warrant to do so. Ultimately, the court held that the defendant did not have a protected privacy interest in the dog’s blood and therefore the state did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights. Defendant’s dog, Juno, was seized by the Humane Society after a worker made a visit to plaintiff’s home and had probable cause to believe that Juno was emaciated from not receiving food from plaintiff. After Juno was seized and taken into custody for care, the veterinarian took a blood sample from Juno to confirm that there was no other medical reason as to why Juno was emaciated. Defendant argued that this blood test was a violation of her constitutional rights because the veterinarian did not have a warrant to perform the test. The court dismissed this argument and held that once Juno was taken into custody, defendant had “lost her rights of dominion and control over Juno, at least on a temporary basis.” Finally, the court held that because Juno was lawfully seized and Juno’s blood was “not ‘information’ that defendant placed in Juno for safekeeping or to conceal from view,” defendant’s constitutional rights had not been violated. | Case |