Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hairston v. Burger King Corp. | 764 So.2d 176 (La.App. 2 Cir.,2000) |
Louisiana appeals court affirmed trial court's finding that plaintiff failed to adequately link her stomach ailment with a burger purchased from Burger King and thus could not sustain an action that sought recovery of alleged damages suffering due to food poisoning. |
Case | |
| In re: JULIAN J. TONEY AND ANITA L. TONEY | 54 Agric. Dec. 923 (1995) | 923, 1995 WL 785952 (U.S.D.A.) | Civil penalty of $200,000.00 (largest civil penalty ever imposed under Act) was appropriate, where degree of willfulness and flagrancy of respondents' violations was astonishing, and even after hearing was pending on initial complaint, respondents continued to violate Act. | Case |
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| OR - Vehicle, unattended animal - 30.813. Entrance into motor vehicle to remove unattended child or domestic animal; | O. R. S. § 30.813 | OR ST § 30.813 | This Oregon law enacted in 2017 gives immunity from civil or criminal liability to a person who enters a motor vehicle, by force or otherwise, to remove a child or domestic animal if he or she follows steps listed in the law. The person must first determine the vehicle is locked and there is no reasonable method for the animal or child to exit the vehicle. That person must also have a good faith and reasonable belief based on the circumstances that entry is necessary due to imminent harm. Additionally, that person must notify law enforcement/emergency services before or soon as is reasonably practicable, use no more force than necessary to enter the vehicle, and remain with the child or animal until responders arrive. | Statute |
| NY - Dangerous Dog - Chapter 69. Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 123, 123-a | NY AGRI & MKTS § 123, 123-a | This New York statute provides that statutory penalties for dog bites and the process for declaring a dog "dangerous." Any person who witnesses an attack or threatened attack, or in the case of a minor, an adult acting on behalf of such minor, may make a complaint of an attack or threatened attack upon a person, companion animal, farm animal, or a domestic animal to a dog control officer or police officer of the appropriate municipality. Such officer shall immediately inform the complainant of his or her right to commence a proceeding as provided in subdivision two of this section and, if there is reason to believe the dog is a dangerous dog, the officer shall forthwith commence such proceeding himself or herself. Upon a finding that a dog is dangerous, the judge or justice may order humane euthanasia or permanent confinement of the dog if one listed aggravating circumstances is established at the judicial hearing. | Statute |
| Sebek v. City of Seattle | 290 P.3d 159 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2012) | 2012 WL 6098265 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2012); 172 Wash.App. 273 |
Two Seattle taxpayers filed a taxpayer action lawsuit against the city of Seattle for violating Washington’s animal cruelty statute and Seattle’s animal cruelty ordinance with regard to a zoo’s elephant exhibit. After the lawsuit was dismissed by the King County Superior Court for lack of taxpayer standing, plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision. The appeals court affirmed the lower court’s decision because the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged the zoological society, not the city, acted illegally and because the operating agreement between the city and the zoological society made it clear that the zoological society, not the city, had exclusive control over the operations of the elephant exhibit. Significantly, the appeals court found that a city’s contractual funding obligations to a zoological society that cares and owns an animal exhibit at a zoo is not enough to allege a city violated animal cruelty laws. |
Case |
| SIRMANS v. THE STATE | 244 Ga. App. 252 (2000) |
Criminal defendant was convicted of four counts of animal cruelty and one count of simple assault. The motion to suppress was properly denied, because the search was authorized under the "plain view" doctrine and any objections regarding photographs were subsequently waived when they were tendered into evidence without objection. The trial court did not have authority to deprive defendant of animals which the State failed to demonstrate were neglected or abused, because such animals were not contraband or evidence of a crime. |
Case | |
| Haberman v. United States | 26 Cl. Ct. 1405 (1992) | 38 Cont.Cas.Fed. (CCH) P 76,420 |
The U.S. Claims Court upheld its jurisdiction over an action brought by individuals who had their Private Maintenance and Care Agreements (PMCA) revoked by the Bureau of Land Management and their adopted wild horses repossessed when the agency learned that the individuals intended to sell the horses to slaughter once they obtained full legal title to them under the Wild and Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act. The court found that the PMCA agreement constituted a contract between the government and the adopter, and thus that the Claims Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. Though the court noted that individual adopters would have to overcome the suggestion that they violated the terms of the PMCA by intending to sell the horses to slaughter. |
Case |
| CT - Education - § 10-18d. Animal dissection. Students to be excused from participation or observation | C. G. S. A. § 10-18d | CT ST § 10-18d | This Connecticut law states that a local or regional school district shall excuse any student from participating in, or observing, the dissection of any animal as part of classroom instruction, provided the parent or guardian of such student has requested, in writing, that such student be excused from such participation or observation. A student excused under this law shall be required to complete an alternate assignment to be determined by the local or regional school district. | Statute |
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden | 878 F.3d 1184 | 18 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 142 | In 2012, an animal rights activist went undercover to get a job at an Idaho dairy farm and then secretly filmed ongoing animal abuse there. Mercy for Animals, an animal rights group, publicly released portions of the video, drawing national attention. The dairy farm owner responded to the video by firing the abusive employees who were caught on camera, instituting operational protocols, and conducting an animal welfare audit at the farm. Local law enforcement authorities launched an investigation that culminated in the conviction of one of the employees for animal cruelty. After the video's release, the dairy farm owner and his family received multiple threats. In 2012, an animal rights activist went undercover to get a job at an Idaho dairy farm and then secretly filmed ongoing animal abuse there. Mercy for Animals, an animal rights group, publicly released portions of the video, drawing national attention. The dairy farm owner responded to the video by firing the abusive employees who were caught on camera, instituting operational protocols, and conducting an animal welfare audit at the farm. Local law enforcement authorities launched an investigation that culminated in the conviction of one of the employees for animal cruelty. After the video's release, the dairy farm owner and his family received multiple threats. Animal rights advocacy organization brought action against the Governor and Attorney General of Idaho, challenging statute that criminalized interference with agricultural production facilities as violative of the First Amendment's free speech protections, violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and preempted by federal law. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho entered summary judgment in favor of organization and granted organization's motion to permanently enjoin enforcement of the statute. The court held that 1) Idaho statute criminalizing entry into an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation violated First Amendment; 2) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining records of an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation did not violate First Amendment; 3) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining records of an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation did not violate Equal Protection Clause; 4) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining employment with an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility's operations, property, or personnel, did not violate First Amendment; 5) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining employment with an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility's operations, property, or personnel did not violate Equal Protection Clause; and 6) Idaho statute prohibiting a person from entering a private agricultural production facility and, without express consent from the facility owner, making audio or video recordings of the conduct of an agricultural production facility's operations violated First Amendment. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. | Case |