Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AZ - Initiatives - Proposition 102 (voter wildlife initatives) | Proposition 102 (2000) | This 2000 Arizona ballot proposition sought to restrict voter initiatives related to wildlife. It was defeated with only 37.5% voting for the measures. According to the summary by the Arizona Legislative Council, Proposition 102 directs the State to manage wildlife in the public trust to assure the continued existence of wildlife populations. Public trust is a legal concept relating to the ownership, protection and use of natural resources. Under the public trust, the State must manage wildlife for the public benefit, which includes both present and future generations. Proposition 102 would also amend the Arizona Constitution to require that any initiative measure relating to the taking of wildlife does not go into effect unless it is approved by at least two-thirds of the voters who vote on the measure. Currently, the Arizona Constitution requires a simple majority vote for initiative measures. The two-thirds requirement would also apply to measures authorizing or restricting (1) the methods of taking wildlife (2) the seasons when wildlife may be taken. The two-thirds requirement would not apply to legislative enactments or to measures that the Legislature refers to the voters. | Statute | |
| TX - Trusts - Chapter 112. Creation, Validity, Modification, and Termination of Trusts. | V. T. C. A., Property Code § 112.037 | TX PROPERTY § 112.037 | This Texas statute comprises the state's pet trust law. A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates on the death of the animal or, if the trust is created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, on the death of the last surviving animal. The law also provides a distribution schedule for the trust's remaining assets. | Statute |
| NY - Domestic Violence - Article 8. Family Offenses Proceedings. | McKinney's Family Court Act § 842 | NY FAM CT § 842 | This New York law pertains to the issuance of protection orders. In July of 2006, the amendment that allows companion animals owned by the petitioner of the order or a minor child residing in the household to be included in the order was signed into law. The law specifically allows a court to order the respondent to refrain from intentionally injuring or killing, without justification, any companion animal the respondent knows to be owned, possessed, leased, kept or held by the petitioner or a minor child residing in the household (subsection (i)(1) - (2)). | Statute |
| MD - Humane officers - § 1-1314. Humane society or animal control officers; education and training requirements | MD Code, Local Government, § 1-1314 | MD LOCAL GOVT § 1-1314 | This Maryland law, added in 2021, creates education and training requirements for new humane and animal control officers. The training requires satisfactory completion of at least 80 hours of animal care and control coursework as described in the law. There are also continuing education requirements on an annual basis. | Statute |
| Sexton v. Brown | Not Reported in P.3d, 147 Wash.App. 1005, 2008 WL 4616705 (Wash.App. Div. 1) |
In this Washington case, Valeri Sexton and Corey Recla sued Kenny Brown, DVM, for damages arising from the death of their dog. Plaintiffs alleged a number of causes of action including negligence, breach of bailment, conversion, and trespass to chattels. The incident occurred after plaintiff's dog ran away while plaintiff was camping Marblemount area. Another party found the Yorkshire terrier and took it to defendant-veterinarian's office, the Pet Emergency Center (PEC). After being examined first by a one veterinarian, defendant-veterinarian Brown took over care and determined that the dog suffered from a life threatening condition; he then told the finders that if they did not want to pay for further care, they could have the dog euthanized. This court affirmed the trial court's decision that the medical malpractice act does not apply to veterinarians. It also affirmed the dismissal of Sexton's breach of bailment claim, finding that Brown was not a finder under relevant Washington law. The court did find that there were material issues of fact about the measure of damages, and reversed the decision to limit damages to the fair market or replacement value of the dog. Further, the court found genuine issues of material fact about whether Brown's actions were justified when viewed under the requirements of Washington's veterinary practice laws. |
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| Ruffin v. Wood | 95 A.D.3d 1290 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) | 2012 WL 1939443 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.); 945 N.Y.S.2d 417 |
While the plaintiff was tending her garden, the defendant's dog jumped on a chain-linked fence that separated the plaintiff's and defendant's property. Startled, the plaintiff fell and injured herself. As a result of the incident, the plaintiff brought a personal injury suit against the defendant. Finding the dog had no vicious propensities, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant; the plaintiff then appealed and lost. |
Case |
| RI - Immunity - § 4-15-15. Veterinarian's emergency treatment of animals--Immunity from liability | Gen.Laws 1956, § 4-15-15 | RI ST § 4-15-15 | This Rhode Island statute provides that any licensed veterinarian of this state has the right to treat any animal which has become injured upon any public highway of this state or upon any public or private property of this state which is transported to that veterinarian by any person. If in the veterinarian's opinion the injuries sustained by the animal will result in death, the veterinarian has the right to apply euthanasia to eliminate any unnecessary suffering. Further, any animal treated by the veterinarian not reclaimed within 72 hours may be relinquished to the appropriate animal control facility. A veterinarian incurs no civil liability for actions taken in treating such animals. | Statute |
| NC - Endangered Species - Subchapter IV. Conservation of Marine and Estuarine and Wildlife Resources. Article 25. Endangered an | N.C.G.S.A. § 113-331 to 113-350 | NC ST § 113-331 to 113-350 | This North Carolina statutory section comprises the state's endangered species provisions. Endangered species is defined as any native or once-native species of wild animal whose continued existence as a viable component of the State's fauna is determined by the Wildlife Resources Commission to be in jeopardy or any species of wild animal determined to be an "endangered species" pursuant to the Endangered Species Act. The statute empowers the Wildlife Resources Commission to list species and also outlines the criteria for listing. | Statute |
| NV - Sales, pet - 597.997. Prohibition on certain offers to lease living animal or goods | N. R. S. 597.997 | NV ST 597.997 | This Nevada law, enacted in 2017, prohibits a person from offering a lease on living animals for personal or household use, if the living animal is expected to have not more than a de minimis residual financial value at the end of the term of the lease or contract. The failure of a person to comply with this section constitutes a deceptive trade practice. A violation of this section constitutes consumer fraud for the purposes of NRS 41.600 | Statute |
| Com. v. Seyler | 929 A.2d 262 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2007) | 2007 WL 2033260 (Pa.Cmwlth.) |
This Pennsylvania case construes the term "owner" for purposes of the state's Dog and Rabies Laws. Gretta R. Seyler appeals from an order of the trial court, which found her guilty of two counts each of violating Dog Law and guilty of two counts of violating Section 8 of the Rabies Prevention and Control in Domestic Animals and Wildlife Act after a pit bull jumped out of a window of her home and attacked a neighbor. First, the court found that there was no question that Seyler was caring for the dogs at the time the incident occurred or was permitting them to remain “on or about” the premises occupied by her. Although Seyler argues that the record clearly indicates that the two dogs were owned by her adult sons, the court found that the argument is without much force, as no paperwork showing the sons' ownership of the dogs was introduced at the hearing. Further, the court observed that the plain and unambiguous intent of Sections 8 of the Rabies Act and 305 of the Dog Law is that dogs be vaccinated and confined at all times. Thus, if the person having the property interest in a dog does not perform that function, then the statutes clearly require one harboring or caring for the dog, here Seyler, to perform it. |
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