Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reichley v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Agriculture | 427 F.3d 236 (Pa. 2005) |
Poultry Producers brought claims against the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture for deprivation of their property without adequate due process in response to an outbreak of avian influenza. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning there was no due process deprivation by failing to issue notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the quarantine and depopulation of the producers' flocks. |
Case | |
| Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels | 555 N.W.2d 689 (Iowa, 1996) | 61 A.L.R.5th 883 (1996) |
During a stay at defendant kennel, the kennel owner's dog tore off plaintiff's dog's left front leg and shoulder blade. Plaintiff's petition sought damages to compensate for the injuries and suffering the dog incurred and the loss of aesthetic intrinsic value of the dog. In upholding the district court's denial of damages for emotional injury and mental suffering, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's argument for damages based on the intrinsic value of a pet for the negligent injury to the dog. |
Case |
| Vanater v. Village of South Point | 717 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Ohio 1989) |
Village criminal ordinance, which prohibited the owning or harboring of pit bull terriers or other vicious dogs within village limits, was not overbroad, even though identification of a "pit bull" may be difficult in some situations, as there are methods to determine with sufficient certainty whether dog is a "pit bull.". |
Case | |
| MI - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | M.C.L. 287.261 - 395; 317.63; 324.73101 - 73110; 324.42101 - 42106 | MI ST 287.261 - 395; 317.63; 324.73101 - 73110; 324.42101 - 42106 | The regulation of dogs and cats in Michigan implicates three major issues: licensing and registration of dogs; the regulation of animal control facilities and pet shops; and the ever-present concern of dog bites. The primary statutory vehicle that regulates the licensing requirements for dogs is the The Dog Law of 1919. Under the dog law, it is unlawful for any person to own a dog six months or older unless the dog is licensed. MCL Sec. 287.262. It is also unlawful for a person to own a dog six months or older that does not wear a collar and tag at all times, except when engaged in hunting activities accompanied by his or her owner. MCL Sec. 287.262. A female dog that is in heat may not go beyond her owner's premises unless properly held on a leash under this section. | Statute |
| People v. Cumper | 83 Mich. App. 490 (Mich. 1978) |
Defendants were convicted of being spectators at a fight or baiting between dogs and appealed, charging that the "spectator" portion of the statute was impermissibly vague and unconstitutionally overbroad. The court found that the statute was constitutional because it punished attendance as a spectator at an event legitimately prohibited by law and defendants had fair notice of the conduct proscribed. The defendants also claimed that there was insufficient evidence however, the court found ample evidence upon which the jury rendered their decision. |
Case | |
| Missouri Primate Foundation v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. | Slip Copy, 2018 WL 1420239 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 22, 2018) | This matter is a motion of counterclaim by defendants Missouri Primate Foundation to dismiss PETA's (the counterclaim plaintiff) assertion that two chimpanzees were being held in conditions that deprived the chimpanzees of adequate social groups, space, and psychological stimulation, putting them at risk of and causing physical and psychological injury, such as deteriorated cardiovascular and musculoskeletal health, stress, anxiety and depression. PETA also alleges that the chimpanzees were denied a sanitary environment, proper ventilation, a healthy diet, and adequate veterinary care. PETA claimed that the Missouri Primate Foundation (MPF) (the counterclaim defendants) were holding the two chimpanzees in conditions that “harm” and “harass” the chimpanzees, thus violating the “take” prohibition of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). MPF's motion contends that PETA’s counterclaim is based on allegations that they failed to comply with the Animal Welfare Act, not the ESA. MPF further contends that because the chimpanzees at its facility were lawfully in captivity and under the auspices of the AWA as administered by the USDA–APHIS, so the chimpanzees cannot be subject to a “take” under the ESA. They further argued that PETA lacked standing as the AWA preempts or supersedes the ESA as to animals held at USDA licensed facilities. Because the AWA does not allow citizen suits, MPF argued, the case must be dismissed. After examining similar cases, this court concluded that claims under the AWA and ESA are complementary and do not conflict, and that the ESA protects captive animals regardless of whether the alleged violator is an AWA licensed entity. The court found that the allegations by PETA are sufficient at this stage of the case and issues of proof are reserved for trial. As such, the court denied the motions of the counterclaim defendants. | Case | |
| Kinara v. Jamaica Bay Riding Academy, Inc. | 783 N.Y.S.2d 636 (N.Y., 2004) | 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 07464 |
Plaintiff was kicked by a horse ridden by her friend while trail riding. Plaintiff sued the Defendant who owned the horse and trail Plaintiff was riding on. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision holding Plaintiff assumed the risk. |
Case |
| Alternatives Research & Development Foundation v. Glickman | 101 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C.,2000) |
In this case, the plaintiffs, a non-profit organization, a private firm and an individual, alleged that the defendants, the USDA and APHIS violated the mandate of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) by promulgating regulations that exclude birds, mice and rats from the definition of “animal” under the Act. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that all three plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit. Defendants also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the exclusion of the three species is within the agency's Congressionally delegated discretion, not subject to judicial review. The court denied defendant's motion, holding that based on Lujan , defendants challenge to standing failed. Further, the AWA does not grant the USDA "unreviewable discretion" to determine what animals are covered under the AWA. |
Case | |
| LA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | LSA-R.S. 3:2361 - 2367; LSA-R.S. 14:102 - .29 | These Louisiana statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty provisions. The term "cruel" is defined in the first section every act or failure to act whereby unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused or permitted. The crime of cruelty to animals is subdivided into simple cruelty or aggravated cruelty. Simple cruelty occurs when a person intentionally or with criminal negligence overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, or overworks, torments, cruelly beats, or unjustifiably injures, or, having charge, custody, or possession of any animal, either as owner or otherwise, unjustifiably fails to provide any living animal with proper food, proper drink, proper shelter, or proper veterinary care. | Statute | |
| Trimble v. State | 848 N.E.2d 278 (Ind., 2006) | 2006 WL 1413089 (Ind., 2006) |
In this Indiana case, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of cruelty to an animal and harboring a non-immunized dog. On rehearing, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant abandoned or neglected dog left in his care, so as to support conviction for cruelty to an animal. The court held that the evidence of Butchie's starved appearance, injured leg, and frost bitten extremities was sufficient to allow the trial judge to discount Trimble's testimony and infer that Trimble was responsible for feeding and caring for Butchie, and that he failed to do so. |
Case |