Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IPPL v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc. | 799 F.2d 934 (1986) |
Private individuals and organizations brought action seeking to be named guardians of medical research animals seized from organization whose chief was convicted of state animal cruelty statute violations. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, John R. Hargrove, J., dismissed action, and individuals and organizations appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkinson, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) individuals and organizations lacked standing to bring action, and (2) Animal Welfare Act did not confer private cause of action. Case discussed in topic: US Animal Welfare Act. |
Case | ||
| Thompson v. Hancock County | 539 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1995) |
In this case, the Supreme court of Iowa held that hog confinement buildings were agricultural buildings and thus exempt from county zoning ordinances. |
Case | ||
| Stanton v. State | 395 S.W.3d 676 (Tenn. 2013) | 2013 WL 239099 (Tenn.2013) |
The defendant, a self-employed oil distributor, was charged with 16 counts of animal cruelty for intentionally or knowingly failing to provide food and care for his horses. After being denied a petition for pretrial division and a petition for a writ of certiorari, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, who granted the defendant permission to appeal, but affirmed the lower court's decision that the assistant district attorney general did not abuse his discretion and that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. |
Case | |
| PA - Permits - Chapter 133. Wildlife Classification. | 58 PA ADC § 133.1 - .6; 58 PA ADC § 133.21; 58 PA ADC § 133.41 | 58 Pa. Code § 133.1 to .6; 58 Pa. Code § 133.21; 58 Pa. Code § 133.41 | This set of Pennsylvania regulations defines terms used such as protected mammals, protected birds, endangered species, threatened species, and furbearers. | Administrative | |
| State v. Hammond | 569 S.W.3d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018) | Defendant Hammond appeals his conviction for misdemeanor animal abuse in violation of § 578.012. The facts underlying the conviction stem from defendant’s conduct with a horse. In 2016, police were dispatched to a horse that was "down" on a road. The officer observed multiple injuries on the horse's hooves, fetlocks, and lower legs. Its hooves were severely abraded, which was confirmed by subsequent veterinary examination. Another officer observed markings on the road indicative of a "blood trail" from defendant's residence to the location of the horse. According to this officer, defendant told him that he had been "doing farrier stuff to his horses and this particular horse had broke away from them five times and broke a couple of lead lines, burned some people’s hands, and that he was going to teach the horse a lesson." Ultimately, the officers were able to get the horse to stand and loaded into a trailer. It later died at the animal clinic to where it was taken. Defendant was charged with felony animal abuse and a jury trial was held. The jury convicted defendant of the lesser-included misdemeanor animal abuse. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow his counsel to read Missouri's right-to-farm amendment when it instructed the jury on the amendment. The court noted that, similar to a prior case evoking the right-to-farm amendment, the amendment itself was not intended to nullify or curtail longstanding laws. The prohibition against animal cruelty existed in some form in the Missouri code for 145 years. Further, the court disagreed with defendant's contention that his prosecution criminalized a legitimate farming practice. The jury convicted defendant based on a finding that, when he pulled the horse behind his truck, his conscious object was to cause injury or suffering to the horse. While defendant contends that his was employing a legitimate, established farming technique to "train" the horse, the jury rejected his claim. Defendant's claim on appeal that the animal abuse law could then be used to prosecute farmers for other legitimate farming activities (i.e., branding, castration, use of whips, etc.) was also rejected. The court found that the conscious object of such activities is not to inflect pain or suffering, but to achieve another goal. The pain is "incidental to the farmer's legitimate objectives." The jury found this not to be the case with defendant. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Hammond to read the right-to-farm amendment to the jury, and when it refused to instruct the jury on the amendment’s terms. Affirmed. | Case | ||
| Anti-cruelty laws that restrain future ownership of animals | This map surveys state laws that allow sentencing courts to restrict future ownership or possession of animals by those convicted of animal cruelty, commonly called "Possession Bans." To date (2024), it appears that 39 states have such laws. Generally, these laws apply only to felony convictions except for a couple states. With some state laws like Indiana, Missouri, and Texas, the possession ban covers only the animals who were subject to the cruelty and any other animals possessed by defendant at the time of the offense. Kansas' law makes those convicted of dogfighting who own dogs within five years of conviction a separate crime. Uniquely, Kentucky's laws restrain ownership if the crime involved sexual assault of an animal or if the animal at issue was an equine. The law does not prevent ownership of future animals. Most laws do address the issue of future animals, though. The most common number of years under which ownership of animals is enjoined by the court is five (5) years. However, California allows ten (10) years for a felony conviction and Delaware expands this to fifteen (15) years. Several states including Maine, Michigan, and Washington enable courts to impose permanent relinquishment of the ability to own or possess animals. The majority of states allow the sentencing court to affix a “reasonable” term of restricted ownership. Some states describe this as a term the judge feels “necessary” or “appropriate.” A few states even limit the ability of the defendant to work with animals in current or future jobs for certain convictions. These laws are distinguished from pre-conviction forfeiture laws that authorize law enforcement or humane officers to impound animals subject to suspected cruel treatment during the pendency of the proceedings. | State map | |||
| OK - Cruelty - Animal Facilities Protection Act/Consolidated Cruelty Laws | 21 Okl. St. Ann. 1680 - 1700; 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 886 | OK ST T. 21 1680 - 1700; OK ST T. 21 § 886 | These Oklahoma statutes comprise the Animal Protection Act. The main thrust of the act is the prohibition of animal cruelty and animal fighting. Included in the provisions are the definitions (including the statutory definition of "animal") and the prohibited acts related to animal facilities. The statute further provides that no one shall intentionally damage the enterprise conducted at an animal facility (including releasing animals there with the intent to deprive the owner of such facility). Violation incurs a felony with a fine of up to $5,000 or imprisonment up to seven years or both. | Statute | |
| State ex rel Del Monto v. Woodmansee | State ex rel Del Monto v. Woodmansee, 72 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1946). |
In an action in mandamus, relator property owner sought a writ ordering respondent building commissioner of the City of Euclid to issue a building permit for the construction of a store building. The store building would be used for the slaughter of chicken. The state tired to oppose the building by stating the use would be against Ohio's cruelty to animal statute. The Court ruled that the term "animals" as thus used meant a quadruped, not a bird or fowl. Thus, the court ruled in favor of the property owner in his mandamus action against the commissioner. |
Case | ||
| Coy v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Licensing Bd. | 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 756 | 2005 Ohio 773 |
A veterinarian's license was revoked by the Ohio Veterinarian Medical Licensing Board and the vet challenged the revocation of his license. The trial court found the vet guilty of gross incompetence and he appealed claiming there was no definition of gross incompetence in the statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court holding no specific definition was required. |
Case | |
| Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus | Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus | This decision was decided on an appeal of the writ of habeas corpus brought on behalf of an orangutan named Sandra after it was denied in its first instance. Pablo Buompadre, President of the Association of Officials and Attorneys for the Rights of Animals (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus against the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the City Zoological Garden of Buenos Aires on behalf of the hybrid of two different orangutan species, Sandra. AFADA sought the immediate release and relocation of Sandra to the primate sanctuary of Sorocaba, in the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil. AFADA argued that Sandra had been deprived illegitimately and arbitrarily of her freedom by the authorities of the zoo, and that her mental and physical health was at the time deeply deteriorated, with imminent risk of death. For the first time, basic legal rights were granted to an animal. In this case, Argentina’s Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation ruled that animals are holders of basic rights. The Court stated that “from a dynamic and non-static legal interpretation, it is necessary to recognize [Sandra] an orangutan as a subject of rights, as non-human subjects (animals) are holders of rights, so it imposes her protection." | Case |