Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AR - Batesville - Breed - Pit Bull Ordinance. Sec. 6.04.12 Vicious animals-quarantine required | BATESVILLE, AR., MUNICIPAL CODE, § 6.04.12 (2010) |
In Batesville, Arkansas, pit bull dogs are banned and may not be owned or kept within the City, with exceptions for dogs that were licensed prior to the effective date of the Ordinance. In this case, the owner must provide proof of sterilization, rabies vaccination, liability insurance of $100,000, and keep the dog properly confined and display a “Beware of Dog” sign. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Kanab City v. Popowich | 194 P.3d 198, (Utah App.,2008) | 2008 UT App 337 (2008); 2008 WL 4260702 |
In this Utah case, the defendant appeals the decision of the district court finding him guilty on four counts of failing to maintain a city dog license and one count of running an illegal kennel. In December 2005, a Kanab City animal control officer responded to numerous complaints of barking dogs at Defendant's residence. This officer observed four dogs over the age of three months on the premises during two separate visits to Defendant's home that month and on subsequent random visits in the following months. On appeal, defendant argued that the city ordinance on which his conviction for operating an illegal kennel is based is unconstitutionally vague. This court disagreed, finding that an ordinary person reading the ordinance would understand that, in order to keep more than two dogs over the age of three months in the same residence, a citizen must register for a kennel permit. |
Case |
| Zelenka v. Pratte | 912 N.W.2d 723 (Neb. 2018) | 300 Neb. 100 (2018) | Pratte and Zelenka were in a relationship up until their separation in 2015. Zelenka moved out of the residence that they had shared, however, he was unable to retrieve several items of personal property one of which was a French bulldog named Pavlov. Zelenka filed a complaint against Pratte alleging conversion. Zelenka contended that Pavlov was given to him as a birthday gift from Pratte. The district court ordered Pratte to return Pavlov to Zelenka and the rest of the personal property to remain with Pratte. Pratte appealed and Zelenka cross-appealed. The Supreme Court of Nebraska found that although the parties styled their complaint as one for conversion, the parties tried the action as one for replevin and treated the case in all respects as if replevin had been raised in the pleadings, therefore, the Court treated the action as one in which replevin had been raised in the pleadings. The Court ultimately found the following: Zelenka met his burden of proving that Pavlov was a gift from Pratte; Pratte failed to meet his burden of proving that the Niche leather couch, Niche lamps, and French bulldog lamp were gifts from Zelenka; and that those three items should be returned to Zelenka. As for the other items of personal property, the Court found that there was no basis to set aside the district court’s finding that Zelenka failed to meet his burden of proving ownership. The Court affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. | Case |
| PR - Ordinances - Municipal regulation of domestic animals | PR ST T. 24 § 651 | 24 L.P.R.A. § 651 |
This Puerto Rico statute confers authority to the municipal councils of Puerto Rico to regulate by ordinance, the running at large of domestic animals, destruction and impounding of such animals, as well as the regulation of muzzling and licensing of dogs. In addition, the councils are given authority to enact all needful ordinances to protect the public health as affected by the running at large of domestic animals. |
Statute |
| Bates (Guardian of) v. Horkoff | 1991 CarswellAlta 229 | 84 Alta. L.R. (2d) 236, 119 A.R. 270 |
The child plaintiff was at her daycare under appropriate supervision while in the playground when she was bitten on the hand by a neighbouring German Shepherd. The dog squeezed through an unmended gap in the fence and bit the child while she was on the swings; daycare staff were not negligent in supervising the children. While the dog had no history of biting, it was excitable and barked aggressively towards strangers outside the yard; the fence was in poor repair, but the owner had not thought it necessary to use the secure dog run that existed on his property. he was found negligent for not better securing and supervising the dog. |
Case |
| Williams v. Spinola | 622 P.2d 322 (Or.App., 1981) | 50 Or.App. 87 (1981) |
Defendant appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding plaintiff $3,600 in compensatory and $4,000 in punitive damages for the unlawful killing of plaintiff's dogs. Defendant contended at trial that the dogs were trying molest her sheep. With regard to defendant's claim on appeal that punitive damages were not appropriate in this case, the court agreed that the issue should not have been submitted to the jury. The court affirmed the jury's finding with regard to denial of defendant's directed verdict, and reversed the award of punitive damages. |
Case |
| Humane Society of the United States v. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service | 2019 WL 2342949 (D.D.C. June 3, 2019) | The Humane Society submitted two Freedom of Information Act requests to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. One was for site-inspection reports and the other was for inspection records for specific animal dealers and exhibitors. The Service released nine pages of inspection records in full but redacted information from the other 127 pages citing FOIA exemptions 6 and 7 that deal with privacy concerns. The Humane Society alleged that the redactions were improper and both parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. The Court found that the bulk of the Service’s redactions were improper under exemption 6 because the information did not implicate a licensee’s personal privacy interests. Exemption 6 was meant to protect individuals from public disclosure of intimate details of their lives. Details about a business’ compliance with regulations and statutes does not relate to intimate personal details. It only relates to business activities. Information about business judgments and relationships do not qualify for redaction. However, a substantial privacy interest is anything greater than a de minimus privacy interest and the licensees and third-parties had more than a de minimus privacy interest in their names, addresses, and contact information. The licensees were also homestead businesses meaning that the location of their business also served as their residence. The Court weighed the privacy interest in non-disclosure against the public interest in the release of the records and ultimately found that although the licensees and third parties had a substantial privacy interest in their names, addresses, and contact information, they only had a de minimus privacy interest in the other information that they withheld from the reports. If no significant privacy interest is implicated, FOIA demands disclosure. The service was required to disclose all reasonably segregable portions of the records that do not include identifying information. The Court found the Humane Society’s argument unpersuasive that releasing the addresses of the licensees would serve the public interest. The Service properly withheld the licensees’ addresses and names of third-party veterinarians. Exemption 7 allows for agencies to withhold information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of those law enforcement records could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Humane Society argued that inspection reports are not compiled for law enforcement purposes because the existence of such a report does not, on its face, reveal that there is any particular enforcement or investigatory action occurring. The Court found that the inspection records relate to the Service’s responsibility to enforce the AWA and ensure that licensees are in compliance, therefore, there was a nexus between the reports and the Service’s law enforcement duties. The Court also conducted the same balancing test that they did with exemption 6 and held that the Service releasing information other than the licensees’ addresses and third parties’ names could not reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Service properly withheld the licensees’ addresses and contact information and despite the Service’s improper withholding of dates, inspection narratives, animal inventories, etc., the Court found that they had otherwise met their burden of releasing all reasonably segregable information. Both the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment were granted in part and denied in part. | Case | |
| WY - Dangerous - Article 1. In General. (Dangerous Dog Provisions) | W. S. 1977 § 11-31-105 to 108 | WY ST § 11-31-105 to 108 | This Wyoming statute provides that every person, firm, copartnership, corporation or company owning any dog, which to his knowledge has killed sheep or other livestock, shall exterminate and destroy the dog. In addition, the owner of any dog is liable for all damages that accrue to any person, firm or corporation by reason of the dog killing, wounding, worrying or chasing any sheep or other domestic animals belonging to the person, firm or corporation. | Statute |
| NY - Dangerous Dog - Chapter 69. Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 123, 123-a | NY AGRI & MKTS § 123, 123-a | This New York statute provides that statutory penalties for dog bites and the process for declaring a dog "dangerous." Any person who witnesses an attack or threatened attack, or in the case of a minor, an adult acting on behalf of such minor, may make a complaint of an attack or threatened attack upon a person, companion animal, farm animal, or a domestic animal to a dog control officer or police officer of the appropriate municipality. Such officer shall immediately inform the complainant of his or her right to commence a proceeding as provided in subdivision two of this section and, if there is reason to believe the dog is a dangerous dog, the officer shall forthwith commence such proceeding himself or herself. Upon a finding that a dog is dangerous, the judge or justice may order humane euthanasia or permanent confinement of the dog if one listed aggravating circumstances is established at the judicial hearing. | Statute |
| Sebek v. City of Seattle | 290 P.3d 159 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2012) | 2012 WL 6098265 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2012); 172 Wash.App. 273 |
Two Seattle taxpayers filed a taxpayer action lawsuit against the city of Seattle for violating Washington’s animal cruelty statute and Seattle’s animal cruelty ordinance with regard to a zoo’s elephant exhibit. After the lawsuit was dismissed by the King County Superior Court for lack of taxpayer standing, plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision. The appeals court affirmed the lower court’s decision because the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged the zoological society, not the city, acted illegally and because the operating agreement between the city and the zoological society made it clear that the zoological society, not the city, had exclusive control over the operations of the elephant exhibit. Significantly, the appeals court found that a city’s contractual funding obligations to a zoological society that cares and owns an animal exhibit at a zoo is not enough to allege a city violated animal cruelty laws. |
Case |