Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Hogan | 428 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2005) | 368 U.S.App.D.C. 238 (D.C. Cir 2005) |
The Fund for Animals petitioned the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to list as endangered the trumpeter swans living in Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho. The Fish and Wildlife Service denied the petition without giving a good explanation why, so the Fund for Animals sued. The court found that because the Fish and Wildlife Service had subsequently provided a letter finding that the swans were not "markedly separated from other populations" and were part of the Rocky Mountain population, which was growing in numbers, the FWS had provided a sufficient explanation and the case against it was therefore moot. |
Case | |
| DC - Restaurant - Subchapter VII. Dining with Dogs. | DC CODE § 8-1865.01, .02 | These laws from 2018 allow food establishments in D.C. to permit dogs in outdoor dining areas of food establishments or unenclosed sidewalk cafés. These establishments must post signage outside that states dogs are permitted along with any restrictions on dogs based on size or temperament. They must also provide an entrance that does not require dogs to enter an indoor dining area or an area in which food is being stored or prepared to access the outdoor dining area and provide patrons with waste bags and a means of proper disposal. Patrons must keep their dog in a carrier or on a leash at all times and never leave the dogs unattended. | Statute | ||
| VA - Ordinances - § 3.2-6537. Ordinances; penalties (pet shops) | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6537 | VA ST § 3.2-6537 | This Virginia statute provides that the governing body of any county, city or town may, by local ordinance, require a person operating a pet shop or operating as a dealer in companion animals to obtain a permit. It further outlines the specific requirements the ordinance may provide, including record-keeping and penalties. | Statute | |
| OH - Cruelty - Chapter 1717. Humane Societies. County Humane Societies | R.C. § 1717.01 - 1717.18 | OH ST § 1717.01 - 1717.18 | This chapter relates to the formation and powers of humane societies in Ohio. Under the chapter, a county humane society organized under section 1717.05 of the Revised Code may appoint agents, who are residents of the county or municipal corporation for which the appointment is made, for the purpose of prosecuting any person guilty of an act of cruelty to persons or animals. Such agents may arrest any person found violating this chapter or any other law for protecting persons or animals or preventing acts of cruelty. | Statute | |
| US - Endangered Species - 50 CFR Part 17. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Mariana Fruit Bat (Pteropus mariannus m | 50 CFR Part 17, RIN 1018-AH55 |
This final rule downgrades the Mariana fruit bat from endangered to threatened throughout its range in the Mariana archipelago, which is subject to US jurisdiction. The reason for the down grade is the FWS initially made a mistake in the taxonomy of the Mariana fruit bat. When the FWS listed the bat as endangered on Guam in 1984, it believed that the bat was a species only endemic to Guam. Since that time, the FWS has discovered that the bat is endemic to the entire Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and the Territory of Guam, thus there is actually a larger number of bats with a wider distribution. Yet, threats to the Mariana fruit bat still remain, so its listing as threatened is still warranted. Additionally, it is more convenient for the FWS to update the listing of the Mariana fruit bat to threatened in the entire Mariana archipelago, than to keep the species in the Guam as endangered and hold the remainder of the archipelago as threatened. |
Administrative | ||
| KS - Pet Trusts - Chapter 58A. Kansas Uniform Trust Code. | K. S. A. 58a-408 | KS ST 58a-408 | This Kansas statute provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime (note that it does not state "domestic" or "pet" animal). The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its intended use, except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount required for the intended use. | Statute | |
| CO - Pet Shop - Article 80. Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act | C. R. S. A. § 35-80-101 - 117 | CO ST § 35-80-101 to 117 | This Colorado Act regulates pet animal facilities (i.e., shelters, large kennels, and breeders). The Act covers licensing of the facilities and those activities deemed unlawful, such as selling a kitten or puppy under the age of 8 weeks and refusing a lawful inspection. | Statute | |
| U.S. v. Mitchell | 985 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1993) |
Defendant, a zoologist working for the Department of Interior, was charged in nine count indictment taking and transporting animals in violation of foreign law under the Lacey Act among other violations. Defendant filed motion to dismiss and government filed motion to determine foreign law. The government alleged in Count 8 that in September of 1987, Mitchell transported the hides and horns of a Punjab urial (wild sheep) and a Chinkara gazelle out of Pakistan and into the United States knowing that the animals had been taken, possessed or transported in violation of Pakistani law; the Pakistani Imports and Exports (Control) Act of 1950 and the Punjab Wildlife Act of 1974. The court rejected defendant's reading of the imports and exports law and found it unnecessary to determine the constitutionality of the Punjab Wildlife Act as the Lacey Act impinges on whether defendant violated the portions of the law prohibiting possession of the animals without a permit. |
Case | ||
| Conservancy v. USFWS | 677 F.3d 1073 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) | 2012 WL 1319857 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) |
In this case, many environmental advocacy groups petitioned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate critical habitat for a species, the Florida panther, which was listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1967. The petition was denied. Claiming the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, the groups filed a citizens suit under the ESA in district court. At district, the group's complaints were dismissed and the groups subsequently lost on appeal. |
Case | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds | 297 F.Supp.3d 901 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 27, 2018) | 2018 WL 1151000 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 27, 2018) | In 2012, Iowa passed a statute (Iowa code § 717A.3A) that criminalized gaining access to agricultural facilities under false pretenses and making a false representation on a job application for those facilities. Plaintiffs in this case (animal rights groups including the Animal Legal Defense Fund and PETA) brought suit alleging that the statute was unconstitutional and sought to enjoin the Defendants (governor of Iowa) from enforcing it. Their complaint alleged that the statute violates the First Amendment as discrimination on the basis of content, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by targeting animals rights groups, and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by burdening the freedom of speech. This case decides the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ complaint based on lack of standing and failure to state a claim because the outlawed conduct is not protected by the First Amendment as false statements and is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting private property, thereby not violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denies Defendants' motion with respect to the First Amendment, concluding that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the intent to suppress their message because of their viewpoint. However, the court grants the motion to dismiss for the claim of a Fourteenth Amendment violation because the statute in fact serves a legitimate government purpose in protecting private property. | Case |