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Displaying 31 - 40 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NH - Divorce - 458:16-a Property Settlement. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 458:16-a | NH ST § 458:16-a | This New Hampshire statute defines "property" for purposes of the state's marriage dissolution (divorce) procedure. In August of 2019, a new provision was added to this law related to animals (Subsection II-a). This subsection states that "[t]angible property shall include animals. In such cases, the property settlement shall address the care and ownership of the parties' animals, taking into consideration the animals' wellbeing." | Statute |
| Rowley v. City of New Bedford | 333 F.Supp.3d 30 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2018) | 2018 WL 4600647 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2018) | This opinion concerns the City of New Bedford, Massachusetts' motion to dismiss plaintiff Rowley's (formerly plaintiff "Friends of Ruth & Emily, Inc.") citizen suit for injunction under the federal Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that two Asian Elephants, Ruth and Emily, were mistreated by the Buttonwood Park Zoo in New Bedford by chaining their legs, housing them in inadequate facilities, failing to provide proper socialization, and failing to provide adequate veterinary care, which gives rise to a "taking" under Section 9 of the ESA. Rowley claims that she is a member of the zoological society there and visits the elephants on a "near daily basis," resulting in “an aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual relationship with Ruth and Emily over the years.” The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asked both parties to brief on the issue of standing for the instant action. The court first noted that the ESA expressly authorizes citizen suits for injunctive relief. To survive a motion to dismiss, Rowley must, through facts, clearly demonstrate standing, and then the court must analyze those facts under a multi-pronged approach. To begin, the court distinguished cases that established the proper "animal nexus" for injury in fact with those that did not meet that finding. Here, Rowley's complaint established injury in fact because she lives in New Bedford, is a member of the Zoo's Zoological Society, and observes the elephants on a near daily basis. Rowley alleges that the maltreatment of Ruth and Emily injures this ability because she observes their ongoing suffering while in substandard captivity. The court was not persuaded by New Bedford's claim that Rowley has not established injury in fact because she has no specialized training in wildlife or animal welfare. In fact, this claim ignored precedent from this very circuit that "aesthetic injury" can be established by viewing animals in inhumane conditions. In addition, the court rejected New Bedford's "nonexistent requirement into the injury in fact analysis" that Rowley must have observed or will observe Asian elephants in their native habitats. As a result, the court found Rowley properly established injury in fact. As to the next requirement of causation, the court found that Rowley sufficiently alleged that the Zoo's actions caused the harm complained of for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. Finally, as to redressability, the court found that Rowley's request for a declaratory judgment as to the Zoo's treatment of Ruth and Emily, and an injunction prohibiting the Zoo from euthanizing the elephants met this prong. New Bedford's contention that Rowley's further suggestion of moving the elephants to a sanctuary in Tennessee impaired her redressability argument because Rowley did not propose how the cost of relocation would be funded was also rejected. At this stage, the court does not need to determine whether this solution is necessary or feasible. The District Court ultimately held that Rowley demonstrated sufficient standing to pursue her claims. Hence, New Bedford's motion to dismiss was denied. | Case |
| Cruelty, Police Shooting Pets, Domestic Violence and Hoarding | Policy | |||
| VA - Dangerous - § 3.2-6553. Compensation for livestock and poultry killed by dogs | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6553 | VA ST § 3.2-6553 | This Virginia statute states that any person who has any livestock or poultry killed or injured by any dog not his or her own shall be entitled to receive the fair market value of such livestock or poultry not to exceed $750 per animal or $10 per fowl, provided that the claimant has furnished evidence, the animal control officer was notified within seventy-two hours after discovery of the damage, and the claimant has exhausted other legal remedies. However, local jurisdictions may by ordinance waive the last two requirements provided that the ordinance adopted requires that the animal control officer has conducted an investigation and that his investigation supports the claim. | Statute |
| MI - Alma - Breed - DIVISION 2. VICIOUS DOGS | ALMA, MI., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 10-51 - 10-60 (2006) |
In Alma, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own, or possess any vicious dog, with exceptions. "Vicious dog" is defined as any dog with a propensity to attack, injure, or otherwise endanger the safety of people or domestic animals. A vicious dog is also any dog that attacks or indicates that it is liable to attack a person or domestic animal. There is a rebuttable presumption that a pit bull dog is a vicious dog. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Maupin v. Sidiropolis | 600 S.E.2d 204 (W.V. 2004) |
Dog owner appealed the decision of the State Racing Commission which found that the owner was not eligible for payments under the State Greyhound Breeding Development Fund. The Circuit Court reversed, and the Commission appealed. The Court of Appeals found that (1) any owner of a greyhound may participate in the fund as long as eligibility requirements are met; (2) that the inclusion of a nonresident joint tenant did not prevent the joint tenant from receiving money from the Fund; and (3) that a joint ownership interest in the dogs was created by the styling of the registration documents. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Hayashi | 22 F.3d 859 (1993) |
Appellant challenged the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, which convicted him of taking a marine mammal in violation of the MMPA. The court reversed appellant's conviction for taking a marine mammal under the MMPA. It held that the MMPA and the regulations implementing the act did not make it a crime to take reasonable steps to deter porpoises from eating fish or bait off a fisherman's line. |
Case | |
| England, Wales & Scotland - Wildlife, badgers - Protection of Badgers Act 1992 | 1992 CHAPTER 51 | This Act prohibits the deliberate killing, injuring or capturing of a wild badger; and any interfering with badger setts (and the attempt to do so). General exemptions are provided, and licenses may be issued for the taking and killing of badgers (for example, as obtained for recent badger culls). | Statute | |
| WY - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | W.S.1977 § 6-3-1001 - 1010; § 6-4-601 | WY ST § 6-3-1001 - 1010; § 6-4-601 | This compilation of laws contains Wyoming's anti-cruelty provisions that were amended in 2021. Under the new laws, a person commits cruelty to animals if the person knowingly overrides an animal or drives an animal when overloaded; intentionally or knowingly, unnecessarily injures or beats an animal; or knowingly carries an animal in a manner that poses undue risk of injury or death. Additionally, a person has the charge or custody of any animal under circumstances that manifest "extreme indifference" to the animal's safety, health or life, and fails to provide it with listed necessities, abandons the animal, fails to provide the animal with appropriate care in the case of immediate and obvious serious injury or illness also commits cruelty to animals. Other prohibitions include animal fighting, shooting or poisoning livestock or domestic animals on property where the animal is authorized to be. A first offense of cruelty to animals or of a violation of W.S. 6-3-1003 is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six months, a fine of not more than $750.00, or both, with enhanced penalties for subsequent convictions. Felony cruelty to animals occurs when a person commits cruelty to animals as defined in W.S. 6-3-1002(a)(v) through (ix), that results in the death or required euthanasia of the animal; or (ii) knowingly, and with intent to cause death or undue suffering, beats with cruelty, tortures, torments or mutilates an animal. Such acts incur permanent forfeiture of the animal at issue and imprisonment for not more than two years and/or a fine of up to $5,000. With either misdemeanor or felony convictions, the court may order forfeiture of the animals involved, payment of reasonable costs of animal impoundment, and restraints on future ownership of animals. A bestiality law was also enacted in 2021 that prohibits actors from engaging in sexual acts with animals. Violation is a misdemeanor with punishment of up to one year imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $1,000. | Statute |
| SC - Leash - § 51-3-145. Certain acts unlawful at state parks. | Code 1976 § 51-3-145 | SC ST § 51-3-145 | This South Carolina law contains a dog leash provision that states that it is unlawful for any person to bring a dog or any other animal into the park or facility unless it is crated, caged, or upon a leash not longer than six feet or otherwise under physically restrictive control at all times (see section P). This provision concerns any park or facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism. | Statute |