Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tarquinio v. City of Lakewood, Ohio (unpublished) | Slip Copy, 2011 WL 4458165 (N.D.Ohio) |
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment from the court that Lakewood City Ordinance (“LCO”) 506.01, which bans pit bull dogs or those dogs with "appearance and characteristics of being predominantly of such breeds," unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution Home Rule provisions. In this motion, plaintiffs argue that LCO 506 conflicts with and impermissibly expands the provisions of Ohio Revised Code § 955.22. The court found that while § 955.22 outlines requirements that must be met by a person who houses vicious dogs, including all pit bulls, it does not explicitly permit pit bulls. The court found that the General Assembly intended to allow municipalities to regulate the possession of pit bulls. |
Case | |
| Free v. Jordan | 10 S.W.2d 19 (Ark. 1928) | 178 Ark. 168 (1928) |
In a replevin action to recover possession of a lost dog from its finder, the court reversed and remanded the case so a jury could determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled due to the defendant's alleged fraudulent concealment of his possession of the dog. |
Case |
| Matter of Marriage of Niemi | 496 P.3d 305 (Wash.App. Div. 1, 2021) | 19 Wash.App.2d 357 (Wash.App. Div. 1, 2021) | Douglas Niemi appealed the trial court's order granting Mariah Niemi visits with their two dogs, which were awarded to Douglas as his separate property in a dissolution proceeding. Douglas and Mariah were married for 27 years and had two large dogs who were each about two years old. During the petition for legal separation, Mariah asked for 10 hours a week of visitation with the dogs because they were "family members." Following the trial, Mariah continued to emphasize her desire to have access to the dogs and the court ultimately awarded the dogs to Douglas as separate property, but allowed Mariah visits with the dogs three times a week. Douglas appealed that award, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding visitation of his separate property. Mariah countered with the fact a court has discretion to grant her access to this "special classification" of property. Here, the Court of Appeals agreed with Douglas, finding that the lower court had no authority under Washington law to compel a party to produce separate property after a marital dissolution. The court also held that is not the province of the court to recognize a special category of personal property when the statute has not done so. Finally, the court observed that such agreements about visitation with animals would lead to continuing supervision and enforcement problems in the court system. Because the trial court exceeded its authority in awarding visitation rights, this court reversed and remanded the issue for the trial court to strike the provision related to visitation and maintenance costs for the dogs. | Case |
| ANIMAL WELFARE LAW IN CANADA AND EUROPE | 6 Animal L. 23 (2000) | The idea that animals are entities that deserve protection, irrespective of their utility to man, is firmly grounded in the Enlightenment. The principle that a creature's need for considerate treatment did not depend on the possession of a soul or the ability to reason, but on the capacity to feel pain was formulated and debated at that time. The debate continues today-Canada is in the midst of examining its own ethical, philosophical and legal beliefs about animal welfare and cruelty. This article examines the current state of animal welfare and cruelty laws and recent attempts through federal legislation to modernize the animal welfare provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code. Comparisons are drawn with European animal welfare and cruelty laws, which tend to be more concerned with an animal's welfare than Canadian laws, which tend to be more concerned with the economic interests of humans. | Article | |
| AU - Cruelty - South Australia Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) | Animal Welfare Act 1985 |
The South Australian Animal Welfare Act’s primary purpose is for the promotion of animal welfare. The Act is enforced by RSPCA SA and is the primary piece of legislation that aims to protect animals from cruelty in South Australia. The Act generally governs domestic privately owned animals (pets). |
Statute | |
| GA - Avondale Estates - Chapter 1: General Provisions & Chapter 4: Animals and Fowl | Code of Ordinances, City of Avondale Estates, Georgia §§ 1-8,4-1, 4-5, 4-6, 4-14, 4-15 |
In Avondale Estates, Georgia, animal fighting is not only prohibited by ordinance, but an animal trained for fighting is also considered a public nuisance, and an abused and dangerous animal. This ordinance provides provisions for each of the respective categories, as well as penalties for the violations. Notably, the city will not respond to a citizen's compliant about a violation of this chapter if the citizen chooses to remain anonymous. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Cabinet Resource Group v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service | 465 F.Supp.2d 1067 (D. Mont. 2006) | 2006 WL 3615512 (D. Mont.) |
The Forest Service builds roads in National Forests, and has to determine what density of road coverage is safe for grizzly bear survival in making its Land Use Plan. Here, the Land Use Plan did not violate the Endangered Species Act, because an agency action is not required to help the survival of an endangered species, it simply may not reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the endangered species, grizzly bears. However, because the Forest Service relied upon a scientific study with acknowledged weaknesses to make its road standards, but failed to adequately address those weaknesses in its Final Environmental Impact Statement, the Forest Service violated NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act). |
Case |
| India |
Introduction to the Indian Judicial System |
Topical Introduction | ||
| Giarrusso v. Giarrusso | --- A.3d ----, 2019 WL 1606351 (R.I. Apr. 16, 2019) | This Rhode Island Supreme Court case centers on a disagreement among former spouses concerning the ex-husband's visitation with their two dogs acquired during marriage. Before the Court is an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After review, the Court concluded that cause was not shown and affirmed the order of the Family Court. The couple entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) formalizing the terms of the dissolution of Diane and Paul Giarrusso's marriage and giving Diane all title and interest to the dogs and Paul twice a week visitation. The weekly visitation proceeded according to the agreement for over a year, when Diane ceased allowing Paul's visits. Paul then filed a motion for post-final judgment relief citing breach of the agreement and Diane counterclaimed. A justice of the Family Court held a hearing on the issue, where each party testified and submitted associated texts and emails. In one recounted incident, a dog was missing for some time at Paul's house. Ultimately, the dog was found to be accidentally locked in a closet. At the conclusion of the hearing, Diane argued that the justice should withdraw approval for the MSA because Paul failed to care for the dogs and showed bad faith, while Paul argued that Diane had breached the terms. The hearing justice affirmed the visitation schedule of the MSA, denied Diane's requested relief, and awarded attorney fees to Paul. On appeal here, Diane argues that the hearing justice was "clearly wrong and overlooked material evidence when she found that Paul had acted in good faith." In particular, Diane contends that the dogs are chattel and Paul failed to provide safe conditions and return them to her in an undamaged condition. The Supreme Court held, in noting that the MSA retains the characteristics of a contract, that it would not overturn the hearing justice's determination in absence of mutual mistake in the contract (the MSA). There was no mutual mistake in the MSA's visitation provision and no basis for the hearing justice to conclude that the MSA needs to be reformed. Further, this court found no evidence of bad faith on Paul's part and that the hearing justice's findings were support by the evidence. Thus, it was not inequitable to enforce the visitation term in the MSA as written. The order of the Family Court was affirmed and the matter returned to Family Court. | Case | |
| MA - Initiatives - Question 3, 2000 (dog racing) | Question 3 (2000) | This Massachusetts ballot question asked voters in 2000 whether they wanted to prohibit in Massachusetts any dog racing where any form of betting or wagering on the speed or ability of dogs occurs. Any person violating the proposed law could be required to pay a civil penalty of not less than $20,000 to the State Racing Commission. The question failed with 49% voting "yes" and 51% voting "no" on the question. | Statute |
