Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Michigan State University College of Law |
Teacher’s Manual Update, v. 1.5( 40 pages, cumulative as of August 2009) Animal Law: Welfare, Interests and RightsAspen Press (2008) |
Policy | ||
| People v. Collier | 160 N.E.3d 137 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2020) | 2020 IL App (1st) 162519 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2020) | Chicago police officers, while investigating reports of animal abuse, visited Samuel Collier’s place of residence and observed a dog chained up outside in 15-degree weather. On a second visit, the same dog was observed chained up outside in the cold. The dog happened to match the description of a dog that had been reported stolen in the neighborhood. Office Chausse executed a search warrant on Collier’s property and was welcomed by the smell of urine and feces. The house had feces everywhere. The house was also extremely cold with no running water. A total of four dogs were found that were kept in rooms without food or water. One of the dogs found was a bulldog that had been stolen from someone’s backyard. Collier was subsequently arrested. Collier was found guilty of one count of theft and four counts of cruel treatment of animals and was sentenced to two years in prison. Collier subsequently appealed. Collier argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove his guilt at trial because despite the photographs of his house the dogs were found to be in good health. The Court held that the poor conditions in which the dogs were kept along with the condition of the dogs and the premises was sufficient to prove that the dogs were abused or treated cruelly under Illinois law. Collier also attempted to argue that the charging instrument failed to adequately notify him of the offense he was charged with. The Court found no merit in this argument. Lastly, Collier argued that the animal cruelty statute violated due process because it was unconstitutionally vague and potentially criminalized innocent conduct. The Court, however, stated that the statute did not capture innocent conduct, instead, it captured conduct that can be defined as cruel or abusive. Cruel and abusive conduct is clearly not innocent conduct. The statute sufficiently informed reasonable persons of the conduct that was prohibited. The Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the trial court. | Case |
| Habeas Corpus para Chimpanzé - Íntegra (portuguese) | Heron J. de Santana e Luciano R. Santana ajuizar ação nos termos do art. 5 °, LXVIII, Constituição do Brasil. E, art. 647, Código de Processo Penal. Os peticionários buscar a Grande Writ em nome de Suíça, Chimpanzé (nome científico Pan Troglodytes), que é um prisioneiro no Zoológico de Getúlio Vargas, para alívio de ato ilegal e abusivo perpetrado por o diretor da Secretaria de Governo para a Biodiversidade, Meio Ambiente e da Água Recursos. Este é o primeiro caso de considerar que um chimpanzé pode ser uma pessoa jurídica de vir perante o tribunal no âmbito de um pedido de Habeas Corpus. | Pleading | ||
| Hoctor v. Dept of Agriculture | 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996) |
A dealer raised exotic animals (mainly big cats), and USDA ordered that the dangerous ones be fenced, with fencing being a minimum of eight-feet high. However, the animal housing standard only required that the fencing be sturdy enough to prevent the animals from escaping. The eight-foot rule established by USDA was considered arbitrary, and it did not have to be followed. |
Case | |
| PA - Pittsburgh - CHAPTER 635: Other Animals And Fowl ( Article 3: Dogs, Cats, and Other Animals) | Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Code of Ordinances, Article 3: Dogs, Cats, and Other Animals, Secs. 635.03 - 635.08 |
These Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania ordinances prohibit any person from riding or driving any animal-drawn conveyance on any street or sidewalk within the city except by permit or by authorization from the Director of the Department of Public Works. Whoever violates this provision will be fined $100 for the first offense and $300 for any subsequent offenses. Additionally, these ordinances provide provisions related to rodeos and whoever violates these provisions will be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000, imprisonment of up to 30 days, or both. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Petconnect Rescue, Inc. v. Salinas | Slip copy, 2021 WL 5178647 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2021) | Plaintiffs are animal rescue organizations and an individual consumer alleging that the Defendants import non-rescue dogs into California and sell these dogs under the fraudulent misrepresentation that the dogs are rescued animals. Plaintiffs allege that the Rothman Defendants broker the sale of dogs bred for profit from “puppy mills” in the Midwest to pet stores in southern California which harms consumers by defrauding them and making them believe they are adopting a "rescue animal" (what the Plaintiffs have termed as "pet laundering"). In addition, plaintiffs alleged Lanham Act violations for trademark infringement. Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants. In denying the motion to dismiss, the court held that Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that the Moving Defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to sell non-rescue dogs as rescue dogs under the “Pet Connect Rescue” name. | Case | |
| IN RE: DONALD STUMBO, D/B/A STUMBO FARMS | 43 Agric. Dec. 1079 (U.S.D.A.) | 1984 WL 54981 (U.S.D.A.) |
Imposition of $4,000 civil penalty was appropriate under 7 USCS § 2149(b) where respondent committed numerous, serious violations of Animal Welfare Act, respondent handled large number of animals, and violations continued after respondent was advised in writing of violations and given opportunity to correct them. |
Case |
| Commonwealth v. Creighton | 639 A.2d 1296 (Pa.Cmwlth.,1994) | 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 68 (1994) |
In this Pennsylvania case, a cat owner challenged a local ordinance that limited the number of cats she could own at her residence (she owned 25 cats that were rescued "mousers" from factories; the ordinance limited ownership to 5). The court noted that the preamble to the ordinance stated that pursuant to the Borough Code and "in the interest of preserving the public health, safety and general welfare of the residents ... [the Borough] desires to limit the number of dogs and cats kept by any one person and/or residence," but did not state what legitimate public health, safety and welfare goals the Borough sought to advance by enacting this ordinance. Thus, from the information before the court, it could not say whether the Borough ordinance here was a reasonable means to effectuate a legitimate governmental goal. |
Case |
| CT - Vehicle - § 52-557u. Entering the passenger motor vehicle of another to remove child or animal from vehicle | C. G. S. A. § 52-557u | CT ST § 52-557u | This Connecticut law, effective in 2018, gives an affirmative defense to civil or criminal penalties for any person who enters a passenger motor vehicle of another, including entry by force, to remove a child or animal from the passenger motor vehicle provided certain criteria are met. The person must have a reasonable belief that such entry is necessary to remove the child or animal from imminent danger of serious bodily harm and use no more force than necessary under the circumstances. Additionally, the person must report the entry to law enforcement/public safety within a reasonable period of time after entry and must also take reasonable steps to ensure the health and safety of the child or animal after removing from the vehicle. | Statute |
| Southeastern Community College v. Davis | 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979) |
Applicant to nursing program brought suit against the college alleging discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for denying her acceptance to the program based on her physical disability of being deaf. The college alleged that the applicant was not "otherwise qualified" under the statute because, even if provided accommodations for her hearing disability, she would be unable to safely participate in the clinical training program. The court held that "otherwise qualified" under the statute means that a person is qualified for the program "in spite of" the handicap, and that the applicant here was not otherwise qualified for the program. The court also held that a program authority is not required to ignore the disability of the applicant when determining eligibility for the program. Rather, the statute only requires that the disabled person not be denied the benefits of the program solely because of the disability. |
Case |