Results
Displaying 6601 - 6610 of 6649
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MD - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | MD Code, Local Government, § 13-101 - 134; MD Code, Transportation, § 21-1004.1; MD Code, Natural Resources, § 10-413, 416, 701, 703, and 807; MD Code, Public Safety, § 2-313; MD Code, Health General, § 18-312 - 321; MD Code, General Provisions, § 7-304 | MD Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 3-1901; MD Code, Insurance, § 19-206.1; MD Code, Health - General, § 21-304, 304.2 | These statutes comprise Maryland's dog laws. Maryland is unique in that the state law governs the specific licensing and other regulations certain counties may adopt or enforce. Also included are the state rabies provisions and even the law that designates the state dog (the Chesapeake Bay retriever). | Statute | |
| MN - Trust - 501C.0408. Trust for care of animal | M.S.A. § 501C.0408 | MN ST § 501C.0408 | This Minnesota law enacted in 2016 allows for the creation of a pet trust. A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. Interestingly, the trust may not be enforced for more than 90 years. | Statute | |
| Stamm v. New York City Transit Authority | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 2011 WL 1315935 (E.D.N.Y., 2011) | Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and New York State and New York City laws, alleging that the New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”) and the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (“MaBSTOA”) (collectively, “Defendants”) failed to ensure that their vehicles and facilities were accessible to her and other persons with disabilities who utilize service animals. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff (1) was not disabled, (2) was not entitled to use a “service animal,” (3) was seeking to bring dogs which do not qualify as “service animals” onto Defendants' vehicles; had not made out a Title II claim and (5) could not make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted only with respect to that portion of the eleventh cause of action that alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties were also directed to submit supplemental briefing. | Case | ||
| Nuijens v. Novy | 144 Misc.2d 453 (N.Y. 1989) | 144 Misc.2d 453, 543 N.Y.S.2d 887, 10 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1179 (1989) |
Plaintiff brought a New York Small Claims Court action seeking recovery of the sum of $254.63, after a licensed veterinarian determined that plaintiff's newly purchased dog was unfit according to Article 35-B of the General Business Law. Specifically, plaintiff sought damages under two alternate theories: violation of the sale contract's five-day express warranty and violation of the implied warranty of merchantability. Due to the vet's initial diagnosis, plaintiff did not return the dog. The court held that plaintiff elected to forgo the express warranty by retaining the dog. With regard to the implied warranty of merchantability, the court found defendant is not a "person who deals in goods of the kind" to fall within the definition of merchant under the statute. |
Case | |
| Confiscated night monkeys veterinary evaluation | Slideshow Images | ||||
| MS - Veterinary - Chapter 39. Veterinarians. | Miss. Code Ann. § 73-39-51 to 73-39- 95 | MS ST § 73-39-51 to 73-39- 95 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| IL - Ordinances - 5/24. Powers of municipalities and other political subdivisions to regulate dogs and other animals | 510 I.L.C.S. 5/24 | IL ST CH 510 § 5/24 | This Illinois statute provides that nothing in the Animal Control Act shall be held to limit the power of any municipality to prohibit animals from running at large, nor shall anything in this Act be construed to limit the power of any municipality to further control and regulate dogs, cats or other animals in such municipality or other political subdivision provided that no regulation or ordinance is specific to breed. | Statute | |
| IN - Liens - 32-33-8-1 Feed and care bestowed upon livestock; mechanic's and tradesman lien | I.C. 32-33-8-1 | Ind. Code Ann. § 32-33-8-1 (West) | This statute allows the keeper of a livery stable or any person engaged in feeding horses, cattle, hogs, and other livestock to place a lien on any of the animals that he or she cares for. | Statute | |
| US - AWA - Congressional Conference Report on Adoption of 1966 AWA | 1966 Act Conference Report No. 1848 |
There were three main purposes for the proposed law in 1966: to protect the owners of pet dogs and cats from the theft of their pets; to prevent the use or sale of stolen dogs or cats for purposes of research or experimentation; and to establish humane standards for the treatment of dogs, cats, and certain other animals by animal dealers and research facilities. |
Administrative | ||
| Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife v. Kelly | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2015 WL 1293338 (D. Idaho 2015) | Plaintiffs brought an action against the Defendants, challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”)'s November 28, 2012 Final Rule designating 30,010 acres in Idaho and Washington as critical habitat for the southern Selkirk Mountains population of woodland caribou under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged (1) that the Final Rule's critical habitat designation was arbitrary and capricious because the Defendants failed to explain how the limited amount of critical habitat designated was sufficient to recover this population of caribou and (2) that Defendants failed to provide public notice and comment on the substantially revised critical habitat designation before issuing the Final Rule. Defendants and Intervenors argued that the Final Rule satisfied the requirements of the ESA and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA").While the district court stated that the Final Rule's analysis seemed reasonably based on the best available science, it refused to make a conclusive determination on the arbitrary and capricious issue because procedural requirements necessitated a further public review and comment period. The court therefore found the error in this case was a procedural one resulting from the FWS failing to provide a period of public review and comment on the Final Rule's critical change in reasoning. The Court therefore remanded this matter to the FWS to cure the procedural error by affording the necessary public comment period and to consider anew the critical habitat designation in light of those comments. | Case |