Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dallas Safari Club v. Bernhardt | 453 F. Supp. 3d 391 (D.D.C. 2020) | 2020 WL 1809181 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2020) | Individual elephant sport hunters and their hunting organizations (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) seeking to import their sport-hunted elephant trophies from Africa into the United States. The Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the Service to process pending and subsequently filed permit applications. The African Elephant is listed as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and is also a species that is regulated by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”). All African elephant trophy imports require the Service to make an enhancement finding, meaning that the killing of the trophy animal will enhance the survival of the species, and issue an ESA permit. Additionally, certain African elephant trophy imports require a non-detriment finding and a CITES import permit. Historically, the Service made periodic countrywide enhancement and non-detriment findings, however, this came to a halt due to a Presidential tweet surrounding media criticism over the Service’s decision to lift the suspension on Zimbabwe’s ESA enhancement finding. The Court found that injunctive relief was not warranted because the Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm as to any Plaintiff. The individual Plaintiffs argued that they had suffered both emotional harm and economic harm. However, the Plaintiffs were on notice that their applications could take a significant amount of time to process. Additionally, the emotional distress claimed by the Plaintiffs would be alleviated when the Service issues a decision either granting or denying their permit applications, therefore, the harm that the Plaintiffs were claiming was not irreparable. The Court found that the individual hunter Plaintiffs’ alleged emotional and economic injuries were insufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction. The organizational Plaintiffs argued that they each were suffering irreparable harm derivatively because the Service’s delay in processing permit applications would decrease the popularity of sport hunting in Africa and cause a decrease in funding for conservation efforts. The problem was that the organizational Plaintiffs offered no proof to substantiate this argument. The Court ultimately held that in light of the disruptions caused by COVID-19 and the diminished capacity of the Service to process permit applications during this unprecedented time, it would be unwise and not in the public interest to order the expeditious processing of sport trophy permit applications. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. | Case |
| CO - Initiatives - Amendment 14, Regulation of Commercial Hog Facilities | Amendment 14, 1998 | This 1998 Colorado Ballot Measure created additional regulations for large-scale hog producers. The goal was to better curb the waste run-off from such facilities. It passed in the 1998 election with 64.2% of the vote. | Statute | |
| WI - Horsemeat - 97.45. Labeling of horsemeat | W.S.A. 97.45 (97.45. Repealed by 2015 Act 243, § 59, eff. March 3, 2016) | WI ST 97.45 | [97.45. Repealed by 2015 Act 243, § 59, eff. March 3, 2016]. This former statute states that no person shall sell any horsemeat, unless it is conspicuously labeled, marked, branded or tagged “horsemeat.” Violation is a Class H felony. | Statute |
| N.E. GA. PET RESCUE, INC. and DONALD L. GILBERT, plaintiffs v. ELBERT COUNTY, defendant |
In this Georgia case, plaintiff ran a pet rescue out of his home. Defendant Elbert County enacted an ordinance effective in October 2005 that requires every owner or custodian of more than 15 dogs to obtain a kennel license from the Elbert County Animal Control Department. To obtain this license, the applicant must be ". . . accompanied by a written statement signed by the head of household of each residence located within 1,200 feet of the kennel or proposed location of the kennel, stating that said resident does not object to the location and operation of a kennel at said location or proposed location." Plaintiff was unable to obtain these signed statements. He then challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional and unenforceable because it conditions the granting of a license upon the completely arbitrary and subjective approval of neighbors and uses an unconstitutionally vague term ("head of household"). In the consent agreement between the parties, Elbert County agreed to stay enforcement of the ordinance and give plaintiff sufficient notice to again file injunctive relief if it chooses to amend the ordinance. |
Pleading | ||
| Drake v. Dean | 15 Cal. App. 4th 915 (Cal.App.3.Dist. 1993) | 15 Cal.App.4th 915 (Cal.App.3.Dist. 1993) |
Plaintiff, engaged in religious solicitations, was knocked down by dog owner's pit bull on the defendant's driveway. She argued that the superior court should have instructed on negligence in addition to strict liability. The court agreed, finding that a negligence cause of action arises whenever there is insufficient control of a dog in a context in which it could be reasonably expected that injury could occur and injury did proximately result from the negligence. Thus, the court reversed the decision for defendant dog owners. |
Case |
| Gomez v. Innocent | 765 S.E.2d 405 (Ga.App., 2014) | 330 Ga.App. 260 (2014) | Josh Gomez took his dog, Pilot, to Pet First Animal Hospital because Pilot was lethargic and throwing up. Gary Innocent, the veterinarian, diagnosed Pilot with parvo virus that could have killed him if left untreated. Innocent gave Gomez an estimate of $1,453.25 for the dog’s care. The animal hospital required full payment up front, but Gomez could not afford to pay so Innocent accepted $400 for one night’s care. Gomez left the dog for the night and called the following day. He was informed that he owed an additional $751.25. Gomez paid the $751.25 on the following day. Upon picking up Pilot from the animal hospital he was informed that he owed an additional $484.80. Gomez could not pay the $484.80 so Innocent asked Gomez to leave Pilot at the animal hospital until the bill was paid. Gomez obliged and left Pilot there. After Pilot was at the animal hospital for 20 days, a good Samaritan paid the dog’s accrued bill of $972. Gomez sued, alleging that Innocent and PetFirst breached their contract by refusing to return the dog after he paid the amounts agreed to, but before he paid “additional sums not agreed to by the parties in their initial contract.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Innocent and PetFirst. This appeal followed. Gomez claimed that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed as to the validity of the veterinary lien statute. The Court stated that Innocent was a licensed veterinarian who, at Gomez’s request, treated Gomez’s dog. Gomez signed a treatment authorization form and was informed that all professional fees were due at the time services were rendered. A detailed written estimate of the expected treatments and costs was given to Gomez which stated that the total final bill could vary from the estimate. Gomez did not present any evidence creating an issue of material fact as to the accuracy or validity of any of the charges on the itemized bill that Innocent produced. Innocent met his burden by showing that he acted properly in relying on the veterinary lien statute to retain the dog when Gomez failed to pay. The Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. | Case |
| UT - Equine Activity Liability - Part 2. Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities | U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-4-201 - 203 | UT ST § 78B-4-201 - 203 | This Utah section states that it is presumed that participants in equine or livestock activities are aware of and understand that there are inherent risks associated with these activities. Thus, an equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock activity sponsor, or livestock professional is not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with these activities. The section also requires an equine professional to give notice to participants of the limitation of liability, either by the posting of a sign or by the execution of a written release. | Statute |
| KS - Salina - Breed - DIVISION 1. PIT BULL DOGS | SALINA, KS., CITY CODE §§ 7-141 - 7-149 (2010) |
No resident shall own, keep, harbor, or possess a pit bull dog within the city limits of Salina, Kansas. Exceptions are made for pit bulls registered on the effective date of this ordinance as long as the owners comply with the requirements. The requirements include keeping the dog on a leash if not confined, microchipping, “Beware of Dog” signs, a color collar, liability insurance of $100,000, and identification photographs. Violations may result in seizure of the dog(s), a fine of $2,500, and/or by imprisonment up to one year.
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Local Ordinance | |
| Williams v. Neutercorp (Unpublished) | 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 833 (Tex Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1995). |
Appellant sought review of the order from the County Court dismissing appellant's lawsuit after it sustained the special exception filed by appellee company, appellee animal hospital, and appellee veterinarian in appellant's suit which alleged negligence and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50. The special execption is that the Veterinary Licensing Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8890, 18C, expressly provided that the DTPA did not apply in veterinary malpractice cases.The court affirmed the lower court's order dismissing appellant's suit against appellees because the lower court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing appellant's pleadings with prejudice, after the lower court sustained the special exception regarding the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, and after appellant refused to amend her pleading. |
Case | |
| Park Management Corp v. In Defense of Animals | --- Cal.Rptr.3d ----, 2019 WL 2539295 (Cal. Ct. App. June 20, 2019) | An animal rights activist named Joseph Cuviello appealed the entry of a permanent injunction in a trespass action that prohibited him from demonstrating outside of Six Flags Discovery Kingdom ("The Park") in California. The superior court rejected Cuviello’s federal and state constitutional claims that he had a right to picket there peacefully and his common law defense based on a claimed prescriptive easement. The Park was originally municipally owned and privately operated until 2007 when the Park's management acquired the park from the City of Vallejo. After that acquisition, the Park began to limit free speech until it ultimately banned all expressive activity on the property. Cuviello was one of the many people that protested at the park advocating for animals and he had done so many times in the past. The Park filed a single cause of action for private trespass against several animal advocacy groups. Cuviello argued that he had a First Amendment right to protest there because the park had been dedicated to public use, the park was a public forum under state constitutional law, and given the amount of times he had protested at the park in the past, he had acquired a common law prescriptive easement right to protest there. The trial court denied Cuviello’s cross-motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the Park. It ruled that the First Amendment does not apply to private property and that the property was not a public forum under California’s constitution. It also rejected the prescriptive easement claims. Although the Park was zoned as a public and quasi-public property, the Appeals Court grappled with whether to classify the Park as a private or public forum. The Court applied a balancing test which balanced society’s interest in free expression against the Park’s interests as a private property owner. The Court concluded that the unticketed, exterior portions of the Park was a public forum. Ultimately the Court held that the trial court erred in granting the Park’s summary judgment and in denying Cuviello’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the trial court and held that on the undisputed facts here, the Park may not ban expressive activity in the non-ticketed, exterior areas of Six Flags. | Case |