Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner, v. Robert J. STEVENS |
The Third Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 48, the federal law that criminalizes depictions of animal cruelty, is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. This brief by Stevens opposes the United States' petition for certiorari. Cert. was granted in April of 2009 by the U.S. Supreme Court. |
Pleading | ||
| Physicians Committee For Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc. | 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 926 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.,2004) | 119 Cal.App.4th 120, 04 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4705, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6501 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.,2004) |
In this California case, PCRM, a nonprofit health-advocacy organization, filed suit for injunctive relief against Tyson alleging that the company made false and deceptive representations about chicken products that it sold to consumers in California. The complaint alleges that Tyson engaged in two advertising campaigns, which disseminated false and deceptive statements about its products in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500. Tyson filed a motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statute. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the amendment to the anti-SLAPP statute, which was enacted while the appeal was pending did not apply to actions against sellers of goods as to the representations about or promotions of those goods. Further, by holding that Tyson was not entitled to invoke the anti-SLAPP remedy, the court stated that it did not compromise or prejudice Tyson’s right to raise First Amendment issues in defense of PCRM's suit . |
Case |
| State v. Hackett | 502 P.3d 228 (2021) | 315 Or.App. 360, 2021 WL 4987629 (Or.App., 2021) | Defendant was convicted of second-degree animal abuse, among other crimes. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) and imposed fines (in addition to incarceration) without first determining his ability to pay. The conviction was supported by testimony at trial from two witnesses, a mother and her daughter. The daughter was visiting her mother and heard a dog "yike" in pain outside while she was at her mother's house. She thought a dog may have been hit by a car, so she went outside where she observed defendant and his dog Bosco. The dog was whimpering and laying in submission as the defendant hit the dog. Then, after going inside briefly to call police, the witness returned outside to see defendant was "just going to town and beating the dog" and throwing rocks at the dog to the point where the witness was concerned for the dog's life. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred on the second-degree animal abuse charge because the evidence did not permit a rational inference that Bosco experienced "substantial pain" as required by the statute. The court, in a matter of first impression, examined whether Bosco experienced substantial pain. Both the state and defendant acknowledged that appellate courts have not yet interpreted the meaning of "substantial pain" for animal victims, so both parties rely on cases involving human victims. Defendant suggests that Bosco did not experience a significant duration of pain to permit a finding of substantial pain. The court disagreed, analogizing with cases where a human victim could not testify concerning the pain. Thus, the court concluded that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that Bosco's pain was not "fleeting" or "momentary." Not only did the witnesses see the defendant kick and pelt the dog with rocks, but one witness left to phone police and returned to find the defendant still abusing the dog. As to the fines, the court found that the trial court did err in ordering payment of fines within 30-days without making an assessment of defendant's ability to pay. Thus, the the trial court did not err in denying defendant's MJOA, but the matter was remanded for entry of judgment that omitted the "due in 30 days" for the fines. | Case |
| Animal Law Index Volume 3 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 3 (1997)INTRODUCTIONOBSTACLES TO LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS: CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE? |
Policy | ||
| UT - Abandonment - § 58-28-601. Animal abandonment | U.C.A. 1953 § 58-28-601 | UT ST § 58-28-601 | This Utah statute provides that any animal abandoned at a veterinarian's office for a period of ten days may be sold or placed in the custody of the nearest humane society or county dog pound after giving notice to the owner. If no humane society or dog pound is located in the county, the animal may be disposed of in a humane manner. | Statute |
| AU - Nature Conservation Act 1980 ( ACT) | Nature Conservation Act 1980 |
An Act to make provision for the protection and conservation of native animals and native plants, and for the preservation of areas for those purposes.
The Act creates the office of Conservator of Flora and Fauna and the
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Statute | |
| KS - Leawood - Breed - Pit Bull Ordinance §§ 2-101, 2-109 - 2-110 | LEAWOOD, KS., CITY CODE §§ 2-101, 2-109 - 2-110 (2000) |
In Leawood, Kansas, it is unlawful to own, keep or harbor any dangerous animal (including pit bulls), with exceptions made for holders of a special permit. Entities such as zoos, circuses, veterinary hospitals, etc, may obtain a permit for display or exhibition purposes, but no person may keep any dangerous animal as a pet. Any dangerous animal not in compliance may be seized and impounded, or even killed. The owner will be responsible for any expenses incurred, in addition to any fine that might be imposed for violating the ordinance. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Longhi v. APHIS | 165 F3d 1057 (6th Cir. 1999) |
APHIS was unsuccessful in asserting that an applicant who is part of one license as a partnership can not apply for another as a corporation. |
Case | |
| Town of Ogden v. Lavilla | 185 A.D.3d 1414, 126 N.Y.S.3d 832 (2020) | No. 19-02157, 492, N.Y. Slip Op. 04032, 2020 WL 4034223 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept., July 17, 2020) | This matter involves an appeal of an order for euthanasia of respondent's dog. The Justice Court of the Town of Ogden found respondent's dog to be dangerous under Agriculture and Markets Law § 123 and ordered the dog to be euthanized. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department agreed with respondent that the lower court misapprehended and misapplied the law. The court found the power to apply the most drastic measure (euthanasia) under Section 123 is reserved for aggravating circumstances, namely a serious disfigurement. The court noted that emotional trauma is not a factor in determining whether a victim has been disfigured. In addition, the language of the law is permissive, not mandatory; even with aggravating circumstances, a court may direct other measures to keep the dog contained. The court noted that the lower court repeatedly misstated the law, saying it only had two options, euthanasia or permanent confinement. As a result, this court modified the by vacating that part affirming the order of the Justice Court insofar as it directed that respondent's dog be euthanized, and remitting to the Justice Court for a determination whether petitioner established the existence of an aggravating circumstance and for the imposition of remedial measures as permitted by statute. | Case |
| AZ - Motor vehicle - 12-558.02. Limited liability; removing minor or confined animal from motor vehicle; definition | A. R. S. § 12-558.02 | AZ ST § 12-558.02 | This Arizona law insulates a person from liability for civil damages when he or she uses reasonable force to enter a locked and unattended motor vehicle to remove a minor or confined domestic animal if certain factors apply. The person first must determine that the motor vehicle is locked or there is no reasonable manner in which the person can remove the minor or domestic animal from the vehicle. Before entering the vehicle, the person must notify law enforcement or first responders. No more force than is necessary to remove the animal or minor may be used and the person must remain with the minor or domestic animal until first responders arrive. For the purposes of this section, “domestic animal” means a dog, a cat or another animal that is domesticated and kept as a household pet. | Statute |