Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Beasley v. Sorsaia | 880 S.E.2d 875 (2022) | 247 W.Va. 409 (W.Va., 2022) | Petitioner was charged with animal cruelty in West Virginia. The incident stemmed from 2020 where humane officers in Putnam County seized several horses and a donkey that were denied “basic animal husbandry and adequate nutrition[.]” After the seizure, petitioner claimed the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the case because farm animals are excluded under the Code. That motion was granted by the magistrate and the animals were returned to the petitioner. After a short period of time, petitioner was charged with six counts of criminal animal cruelty and again the magistrate dismissed the complaint. However, the magistrate stayed the dismissal on the State's motion so that the circuit court could determine whether § 61-8-19(f) excludes livestock. The circuit court agreed that the section encompasses livestock from inhumane treatment and the magistrate was prohibited from dismissing the complaint. Petitioner now appeals that decision here. This court first examined the anti-cruelty statute finding that the structure of the exception under subsection (f) refers back to the conditional phrase that ends in "standards" for keeping the listed categories of animals. The court disagreed with the petitioner's claim of a "blanket exclusion" for livestock since the Commissioner of Agriculture has promulgated rules that govern the care of livestock animals that includes equines. The court rejected petitioner's attempt to parse the placement of clauses and antecedents to support her claim. The court held that § 61-8-19(f) establishes an exclusion for farm livestock only when they are “kept and maintained according to usual and accepted standards of livestock ... production and management." The circuit court's writ of prohibition was affirmed and the matter was remanded. | Case |
| AL - Lien, vet - § 35-11-390. Lien declared | Ala. Code 1975 § 35-11-390 - 391 | AL ST § 35-11-390 - 391 | This Alabama section relates to veterinary liens. The law states that every licensed veterinarian has a lien on every animal kept, fed, treated or surgically treated or operated on by him or her while in his or her custody and under contract with the owner of such animal. This lien is for payment of the veterinarian's charges for keeping, feeding, treating or surgically treating or operating on such animal, and the vet has the right to retain such animal until said charges are paid. | Statute |
| European Union - COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes | Administrative | |||
| Animal Hospital of Elmont, Inc. v. Gianfrancisco | 418 N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y.Dist.Ct., 1979) | 100 Misc.2d 406 (N.Y.Dist.Ct., 1979) |
In this New York case, defendant presented his puppy to plaintiff-animal hospital for treatment. After discussions between about the cost of the care, defendant apparently felt that he would not be allowed to retrieve the puppy from the hospital's possession. As a consequence, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant describing the balance owed, and stating that the hospital would retain the puppy for 10 more days after which it would "take care of the dog in accordance with the legal methods available to dispose of abandoned dogs." The issue on appeal is whether this letter qualified as noticed required by the Agriculture and Markets Act, Sec. 331. The court found that it did not comply with the statutory requirements and thus, plaintiff was responsible for defendant's loss of his puppy valued at $200 at trial. Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment on its complaint for the costs of care amounting to $309. |
Case |
| WY - Eagles - § 23-3-101. Taking eagle prohibited | W.S.1977 § 23-3-101 | WY ST § 23-3-101 | This Wyoming statutes prohibits the taking of an eagle unless the taking is authorized by federal law. Such a taking constitutes a high misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Dart v Singer | [2010] QCA 75 |
The applicants pleaded guilty to a number of charges under the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) following the seizure of 113 live dogs, one cat, 488 rats, 73 mice, 12 guinea pigs and 11 birds from their premises due to unsanitary and inappropriate living conditions. The applicants claimed that RSPCA officers were acting ultra vires and that a stay preventing the RSCPA from parting with the animals should be effected. The applicants' argument failed. |
Case | |
| SC - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal Laws | Code 1976 § 31-21-70; Code 1976 § 2-7-35; Code 1976 § 47-3-910 - 990; Code 1976 § 43-33-10 - 70; Code 1976 § 56-5-3200 - 3220; Code 1976 § 43-26-80 | SC ST § 31-21-70; SC ST § 2-7-35; SC ST § 47-3-910 - 990; SC ST § 43-33-10 - 70; SC ST § 56-5-3200 - 3220; SC ST § 43-26-80 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance/service animal laws. | Statute |
| IN - Cruelty - Section 429 Indian Penal Code 1860 | 45 of 1860 | Killing, poisoning, maiming, or 'rendering useless' cattle, including elephants, or any other animal worth over fifty rupees, is a criminal offence. | Statute | |
| Moore v. Knower | 214 So.3d 165 (La.App. 4 Cir., 2017) | 2016-0776 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/23/17) | Bruce Moore and Amy Knower were in a relationship and decided to adopt a dog together. Bruce alleged that they both jointly adopted Abby, a Boston Terrier in 2010. The couple jointly shared expenses for the care and management of the dog. After the parties broke up, they agreed to an arrangement in which each party alternated possession of Abby every week. The parties continued this arrangement even during their brief reconciliation up until July of 2015 when Amy Knower refused to exchange the dog with Bruce Moore. Moore filed suit and the trial court found for him and awarded him the use and management of Abby. Knower alleged that she was the sole owner of Abby. Knower appealed, alleging five assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in finding that she failed to support her claim of full ownership; (2) the trial court erred in finding that she co-owned Abby with Moore; (3) the trial court erred in failing to accept the testimony of Sheila Ford of the Mississippi Boston Terrier Rescue; (4) the trial court erred by stating that there was no basis in law for her to decide the custody of a dog and then doing just that; (5) the trial court erred by exercising jurisdiction over the matter. The Court determined that the trial court did in fact have jurisdiction over the matter. The Court did not find any errors in the trial court’s findings. It concluded that Abby was indeed co-owned by Moore and Knower and ultimately held that Knower had no right to unilaterally end the arrangement. Knower did not supply sufficient proof to support her claim of full ownership. Moore was awarded Abby and the right to solely determine use and management of the dog. | Case |
| Cavallini v. Pet City and Supply | 848 A.2d 1002 (Pa. 2004) | 2004 PA Super 141 |
Appellant, Pet City and Supplies, Inc. appealed from the judgment in the amount of $1,638.52 entered in favor of Appellee, Christopher A. Cavallini following a bench trial. The trial court determined that Cavallini was entitled to damages due to Pet City's violations of the Dog Purchaser Protection provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). Cavallini purchased a Yorkshire terrier puppy from Pet City that was represented as a pure bred. After several attempts, Pet City failed to supply Cavallini with the requisite registration papers. On appeal, Pet City contended that the trial court erred as a matter of law by determining a private action can be brought under the Dog provisions of the UTPCPL, and erred as a matter of law by imposing a civil penalty against Pet City under the UPTCPL. In finding that the statute does provide a private cause of action, the court looked to the purpose of the statute rather than the plain language. However, the court found the inclusion of a civil penalty in the part that allows a private action was inconsistent with the statute. |
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