Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crow Indian Tribe v. United States | 965 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2020) | Several Indian tribes, environmental organizations, and animal-welfare groups filed suits claiming that Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) violated Endangered Species Act (ESA) and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing final rule “delisting” or removing grizzly bear population in Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem from threatened species list. The distinct population segment of the Yellowstone grizzly bear population has been so successful under the ESA that the FWS has been trying to delist it for almost 15 years, according to the court. This specific case was triggered by a 2017 D.C. Circuit case (Humane Society v. Zinke) that requires the FWS to address the impact that removing a DPS from protection under the ESA would have on the remaining listed species. At the time that ruling was issued, the FWS had already published a 2017 Rule that sought to delist the grizzly bear Yellowstone DPS. This then resulted in cross motions for summary judgment in district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and vacated the 2017 rule, remanding it to the FWS. This remand resulted in a second delisting rule by FWS that was again vacated and remanded by the district court, demanding consideration of several discrete issues by FWS. The FWS now appeals that remand for consideration that require the study of the effect of the delisting on the remaining, still listed, grizzly population in the coterminous 48 states, as well as further consideration of the threat of delisting to long term genetic diversity of the Yellowstone grizzly. In addition, states in the region of the DPS (Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming) as well as some private hunting and farming organizations have intervened on the government's behalf. On appeal, the Court of Appeals first found that it had authority to review the district court order and that the intervenors had standing to pursue an appeal. As to the order by the district court that the FWS needs to conduct a "comprehensive review" of the impact of delisting on the remnant grizzly population, the appellate court vacated that portion of the order using the phrase "comprehensive review." Instead, it remanded to the lower court to order a "further examination" on the delisting's effects. The court also agreed with the district court that FWS' 2017 Rule was arbitrary and capricious where it had no concrete, enforceable mechanism to ensure the long-term genetic viability of the Yellowstone DPS. Finally, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court order to mandate a commitment to recalibration (changes in methodology to measure the Yellowstone grizzly bear population) in the rule since that is required by the ESA. The Court affirmed the district court’s remand order, with the exception of the order requiring the FWS to conduct a “comprehensive review” of the remnant grizzly population. | Case | ||
| MS - Facility, courtroom dog - § 99-43-101. Child witness standards of protection | Miss. Code Ann. § 99-43-101 | MS ST § 99-43-101 | Under Mississippi law, in any proceeding in which a child testifies, a child shall have the right to be enforced by the court on its own motion by an attorney in the proceeding to permit a properly trained facility animal or comfort item or both to be present inside the courtroom or hearing room. | Statute | |
| People v. Parker (Unpublished) | 1999 WL 33435342 (Unpublished Mich. 1999) |
Defendants-appellees, who were bound over on the charge of knowingly attending an animal fight and of knowingly organizing, promoting, or collecting money for the fighting of an animal, filed a motion to suppress evidence and motions to quash the information. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed and the appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact, and that evidence that had been obtained in violation of defendant Parker's Fourth Amendment rights was admissible against all defendants except Parker. Finally, as to the defendants' challenge that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the court declared that it had already determined that the language was neither vague nor overbroad. Reversed and remanded for trial. |
Case | ||
| WV - Scientific research - § 20-2-50. Permit to hunt, kill, etc., wildlife for scientific or propagation purposes | W. Va. Code, § 20-2-50 | WV ST § 20-2-50 | Under this West Virginia law, the director may issue a permit to a person to hunt, kill, take, capture or maintain in captivity wildlife exclusively for scientific purposes, but not for any commercial purposes. | Statute | |
| NY - Rehabilitators, wildlife - Part 184. Wildlife Rehabilitators. | 6 NY ADC 184.1 - 7 | 6 NYCRR 184.1 - 7 | These New York regulations concern the qualifications for appointment as a state wildlife rehabilitator. Section 184.1 first states that, "The purpose of this Part is to establish a specially trained group of individuals, collectively called wildlife rehabilitators, to provide for the care of injured and debilitated wildlife so that such wildlife may be returned to the wild." Under the chapter, "wildlife rehabilitation" means the practice of providing care for injured or debilitated wildlife, including their capture, housing, feeding, emergency treatment and release to the wild. | Administrative | |
| Iris Lewis v. Al DiDonna, Pharmacist; James DiDonna, Pharmacist; Eckerd Drug Store of Stone Ridge, New York; Eckerd Corporation |
In this case, the plaintiff brought her dog of nine years to a veterinarian and was given a prescription for an anti-inflammatory drug called Feldene to treat the dog’s condition. After the dog died of renal failure complications, plaintiff discovered that the Feldene prescription was mislabeled by the pharmacist. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division for the Third Judicial Department held that the allegations in plaintiff’s verified complaint sufficiently allege defendant’s wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights to survive a motion to dismiss. Further, the court noted that while plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of her cause of action for loss of companionship, the court made it clear that loss of companionship is not cognizable cause of action in the state of New York. |
Pleading | |||
| Taylor v. RSPCA | [2001] EWHC Admin 103 | [2001] 2 Cr App R 24; (2001) 165 JP 567; [2001] Crim LR 388; (2001) 165 JPN 625 |
Two women, who had been disqualified from keeping horses by a court, transferred ownership of the horses to their niece, but had continued to make arrangements for the accommodation of the horses and to provide food and water for them. The women were convicted in the Magistrates' Court of the offence of "having custody" of the horses in breach of the disqualification order, and appealed. Dismissing the appeal, the Divisional Court held that, what amounted to "custody" was primarily a matter of fact for the lower court to decide, and that the local justices had been entitled to conclude that, notwithstanding the transfer of ownership, the two women had continued to be in control, or have the power to control, the horses. |
Case | |
| IN - Domestic Violence - 31-9-2-42 “Domestic or family violence” | I.C. 31-9-2-42 | IN ST 31-9-2-42 | This section of the Family Law Code defines "domestic or family violence" as "[a]busing (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), torturing (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), mutilating (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), or killing a vertebrate animal without justification with the intent to threaten, intimidate, coerce, harass, or terrorize a family or household member." | Statute | |
| CO - Emergency - § 25-3.5-203. Emergency medical service providers--certification | C. R. S. A. § 25-3.5-203 | CO ST § 25-3.5-203 | This law concerns emergency medical service providers. An emergency medical service provider may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats to the extent the provider has received commensurate training and is authorized by the employer to provide the care. Requirements governing the circumstances under which emergency medical service providers may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats may be specified in the employer's policies governing the provision of care. “Preveterinary emergency care” means the immediate medical stabilization of a dog or cat by an emergency medical service provider, in an emergency to which the emergency medical service provider is responding, through means including oxygen, fluids, medications, or bandaging, with the intent of enabling the dog or cat to be treated by a veterinarian. “Preveterinary emergency care” does not include care provided in response to an emergency call made solely for the purpose of tending to an injured dog or cat, unless a person's life could be in danger attempting to save the life of a dog or cat. | Statute | |
| Christensen v. Lundsten | 863 N.Y.S.2d 886, 2008 WL 4118071 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.) | 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 28320 |
In this New York case, the parent of child injured by a dog brought an action seeking to have the dog declared a “dangerous dog” under the relevant law. The Court conducted a trial of the “dangerous dog” petition filed and rendered an oral decision that declared the respondents' Chesapeake Bay Retriever “Nellie” to be a dangerous dog under New York Agricultural and Markets Law § 121. The parties contested the appropriateness of a finding of “negligence” and “strict liability” and the entry of judgment. The District Court held that the court would not resolve issue of negligence because the issue was not properly joined for disposition; however, the owners were strictly liable for child's unreimbursed medical expenses. |
Case |