Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State v. Claiborne | State v. Claiborne, 505 P.2d 732 (Kan. 1973) |
Animals -- Cruelty to Animals -- Cockfighting -- Gamecocks Not Animals -- No Statutory Prohibition Against Cockfights -- Statute Not Vague. In an action filed pursuant to K. S. A. 60-1701 in which the state seeks a construction of K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 21-4310 (cruelty to animals) making its provisions applicable to cockfighting, the record is examined and for reasons appearing in the opinion it is held: (1) Gamecocks are not animals within the meaning or contemplation of the statute. (2) There is no clear legislative intent that gamecocks be included within the category of animals protected by the statute. (3) The statute does not apply to or prohibit the conducting of cockfights. (4) As construed, the statute is not so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to violate the requirements of due process. |
Case | ||
| People v. Jornov | 65 A.D.3d 363, 881 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2009) | 2009 WL 1887134 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.), 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 05430 |
This New York case stems from an attack on Philip Mueller and his dog by Defendant-Appellant Jornov's "two pit bull-terrier mixed breed dogs.” During proceedings in City Court, the court determined that defendant's dogs were dangerous dogs and directed that they be euthanized. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the finding that the dogs were dangerous under Agriculture and Markets Law § 121 and Agriculture and Markets Law § 350[5] because there was clear and convincing evidence that the dogs attacked a companion animal and behaved in a manner that a reasonable person would believe posed a serious and imminent threat of serious physical injury or death. However, under the amended version of the statute, a judge or justice may not automatically direct humane euthanasia or permanent confinement of a dangerous dog where none of the aggravating circumstances are present. |
Case | |
| Howle v. Aqua Illinois, Inc. | 2012 IL App (4th) 120207 (Ill.App. 4 Dist.) | 2012 IL App (4th) 120207 | As the result of a dog bite on the defendant’s rental property, the plaintiff suffered a torn cheek and irreparable damage to her ear. The plaintiff therefore attempted to recover damages from the defendant on the common law theory of negligence and through Illinois’ Animal Control Act. The trial court, however, dismissed the Animal Control Act claim and, later, granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim. Upon appeal, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision, though it stated a motion for summary judgment was more appropriate then the motion to dismiss for the Animal Control Act claim. | Case | |
| CA - Historical - 1872: Cruelty to Animals | Enacted February 14, 1872 (almost identical with Field's Draft, Section 699), and then read: "Every person who maliciously kills, maims, or wounds an animal, the property of another, or who maliciously and cruelly beats, tortures, or injures any animal, whether belonging to himself or another, is guilty of a misdemeanor." | Historical | |||
| TN - Equine Activity Liability - Chapter 20. Equine Activities--Liability | T. C. A. § 44-20-101 to 105 | TN ST § 44-20-101 to 105 | This act stipulates that an equine sponsor or equine professional, or any other person, including corporations and partnerships, are immune from liability for the death or injury of a participant, which resulted from the inherent risks of equine activities. However, there are exceptions to this rule: a person, corporation, or partnership will be held liable for injuries of an equine activity participant if he or she displays a willful and wanton or intentional disregard for the safety of the participant and if he or she fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts in ensuring the safety of the participant. In addition, a person will be held liable for the injury of an equine activity participant if he or she is injured on the land or at a facility due to a dangerous latent condition of which was known to the equine sponsor, professional or other person. | Statute | |
| US - Wolf - Final Rule To Identify the Northern Rocky Mountain Population of Gray Wolf as a Distinct Population Segment and To R | FWSR6ES20080008; 922201113 0000; ABC Code: C6 |
The FWS identifies the gray wolf in the Northern Rocky Mountains as a Distinct Population Segment (DPS) and removes this DPS from the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, except in Wyoming. The wolf population in this area is about 5 times higher than the minimum population recovery goal and 3 times higher than the minimum breeding pair recovery goal. The gray wolf is not removed from the list in Wyoming because of inadequate regulatory mechanisms |
Administrative | ||
| NH - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 3:25; § 4:13-s; § 466:1 - 466:54; 47:17; 207:11 - 207:13b; 210:18; 264:31; 436:99 - 436:109; 437:1 - 437:22; 437-A:1 - 9; 508:18-a; § 644:8-f | NH ST § 3:25; § 4:13-s; § 466:1 - 466:54; 47:17; 207:11 - 207:13b; 210:18; 264:31; 436:99 - 436:109; 437:1 - 437:22; 437-A:1 - 9; 508:18-a; § 644:8-f | These New Hampshire statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, dangerous dog laws, and the rabies control code. | Statute | |
| Mouton v. State | 2008 WL 4709232 (Tex.App.-Texarkana) |
Defendant was convicted of cruelty to an animal, and sentenced to one year in jail, based upon witness testimony and photographs depicting several dogs in varying states of distress. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana, found that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions for a directed verdict or for a new trial to the extent that both motions challenged evidentiary sufficiency, and that ineffective assistance of counsel had not been shown, because the Court could imagine strategic reasons on Defendant’s counsel’s part for not calling a particular witness to testify on Defendant’s behalf, and for allowing Defendant to testify in narrative form during the punishment phase. |
Case | ||
| Molenaar v. United Cattle Co. | 553 N.W.2d 424 (Minn.App., 1996) |
Plaintiff livestock owner sued defendant livestock owner for conversion after defendant knowingly took both its heifers and plaintiff's heifers from a livestock holding facility that defendant was suing for breach of contract. The District Court entered judgment after a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff but granted judgment notwithstanding verdict (JNOV) to defendant on punitive damages. The Court of Appeals held that punitive damages could be awarded even though defendant did not suffer personal injury and the evidence was sufficient to find defendant liable for conversion. This case established that a litigant may recover punitive damages for conversion of property if the conversion is in deliberate disregard of the rights or safety of others. |
Case | ||
| Winingham v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. | 859 F.Supp. 1019 (1994) |
Ostrich owners sued to recover actual and exemplary damages, attorney fees, costs and interests for gross negligence after an airship flew over their property at low altitude, which frightened interfered with the ostriches’ breeding. The District Court held that: (1) allegations of fright and temporary loss of libido failed to allege compensable injury absent proof of physical injury; and (2) owners were not entitled to recover speculative value of unborn offspring; and (3) absent actual damages, exemplary damages could not be awarded. |
Case |