Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Huff v. Dyer | 297 Ga.App. 761, 678 S.E.2d 206 (Ga.App.,2009) | 2009 WL 1299046 (Ga.App.), 09 FCDR 1707 |
In this Georgia case, the plaintiff was injured from being bitten by defendants' dog who was chained to the bed of their pickup truck while the defendants were inside an adjacent restaurant. The plaintiff sued defendants, claiming that they failed to warn her of their dog's dangerous propensities and that they committed negligence per se by violating the state's strict liability statute (OCGA § 51-2-7) and the Hall County Animal Control Ordinance. A jury found in favor of the defendants. The court found that the evidence was therefore more than sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that defendants' dog was “under restraint” for purposes of the ordinance. Further, there was no evidence that the owners had knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity. Affirmed. |
Case |
| Hill v. Coggins | 867 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1003 (2018) | 2017 WL 3471259 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2017) | In 2013, Plaintiffs visited Defendants' zoo, the Cherokee Bear Zoo, in North Carolina where they observed four bears advertised as grizzly bears in what appeared to Plaintiffs as substandard conditions. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a citizen suit in federal district court alleging the Zoo's practice of keeping the bears was a taking of a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). In essence, Plaintiffs contend the Zoo's conduct was a form of harassment under the ESA, and so they sought injunctive relief. After denying the Zoo's motions for summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial where the court ruled against Plaintiffs on the issue of the Zoo's liability under the ESA. The manner in which the bears were kept did not constitute a taking for purposes of the ESA. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, this Court first found Plaintiffs established Article III standing for an aesthetic injury. Second, the Court agreed with the district court that evidence showed these bears were grizzly bears. While the Defendant-Zoo's veterinarian testified at trial that they are European brown bears, the collective evidence including expert testimony, veterinary records, USDA reports, and the Zoo's own advertising justified the lower court's conclusion that the bears are threatened grizzly bears. As to the unlawful taking under the ESA, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's holding and remanded the case to district court. The legal analysis used by the court was incorrect because the court did not first determine whether the Zoo's practices were "generally accepted" before it applied the exclusion from the definition of harassment. The lower court based its conclusion on the fact that the Zoo met applicable minimum standards under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and did not explore whether these standards were "generally accepted." Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded. | Case |
| ME - Exotic Pets - Chapter 723. Facility Licenses. | 7 M. R. S. A. § 3931-B (§ 3931-B. Repealed. Laws 2011, c. 100, § 13, eff. May 19, 2011) | REPEALED: This Maine statute outlines the requirements that apply to wolf hybrid kennels. A person who operates a wolf hybrid kennel must register with the department. The offspring of a wolf hybrid must be permanently identified prior to transferring ownership or care of the animal. Failure to comply with the provisions of this section results in a civil violation with a forfeiture not to exceed $1,000. (For other exotic pet laws in Maine, see Chapter 730-A. Breeding, Sale and Transportation of Small Mammals). | Statute | |
| FL - Cruelty, Humane Slaughter - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes/Humane Slaughter Laws | West's F. S. A. § 828.01 - 828.43; West's F. S. A. § 768.139 | FL ST 828.01 - 828.43; FL ST § 768.139; FL ST § 843.19 | This section comprises the Florida anti-cruelty laws. Under this section, the word "animal" includes every living dumb creature. The misdemeanor violation of animal cruelty (section 828.12) occurs when a person unnecessarily overloads, overdrives, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance or shelter, or unnecessarily mutilates, or kills any animal, or carries in or upon any vehicle, any animal in a cruel or inhumane manner. A person who intentionally commits an act to any animal, or a person who owns or has the custody or control of any animal and fails to act, which results in the cruel death, or excessive or repeated infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering is guilty of a felony of the third degree. Psychiatric or psychological counseling are also mandatory for convicted offenders. The section also criminalizes animal abandonment and neglect as well as animal fighting. | Statute |
| Com. v. Erickson | 905 N.E.2d 127 (Mass.App.Ct.,2009) | 74 Mass.App.Ct. 172 (Mass.App.Ct.,2009) |
In this Massachusetts case, the defendant was found guilty of six counts of animal cruelty involving one dog and five cats after a bench trial. On appeal, defendant challenged the warrantless entry into her apartment and argued that the judge erred when he failed to grant her motion to suppress the evidence gathered in the search. The Court of Appeals found no error where the search was justified under the "emergency exception" to the warrant requirement. The court found that the officer was justified to enter where the smell emanating from the apartment led him to believe that someone might be dead inside. The court was not persuaded by defendant's argument that, once the officer saw the dog feces covering the apartment that was the source of the smell, it was then objectively unreasonable for him to conclude the smell was caused by a dead body. "The argument ignores the reality that there were in fact dead bodies in the apartment, not merely dog feces, to say nothing of the additional odor caused by the blood, cat urine, and cat feces that were also found." |
Case |
| Secretary of State for The Home Office v. BUAV and the Information Commissioner | [2008] EWHC 892 (QB | Appeal concerning the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and experiments involving animals. The BUAV had made an information request in respect of five research project licenses issued under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. The Home Office released limited summary information, relying on exemptions under FOIA to reason this; namely under section 24(1) which would prohibit information from being disclosed that had been given “in confidence.” The Court of Appeal upheld the decision that the Home Office was entitled to refuse BUAV’s information request. | Case | |
| Shively v. Dye Creek Cattle Co. | 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 (Cal.App.3.Dist.) | 29 Cal.App.4th 1620 (Cal.App.3.Dist.) |
This California case concerned a personal injury action arising from a collision between the plaintiff's car and defendant's black Angus bull, which was lying on the highway at night. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In reversing this decision, the Court of Appeal held that the open range law does not itself define the duty owners of cattle owe nor does it exempt them from the duty of ordinary care. |
Case |
| IN - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | I.C. 15-17-6-1 - 14; 25-38.1-4-8 ; 15-20-2-1 - 7; 15-17-21-1; 6-9-39-1 - 9; 35-46-3-15; 15-20-3-1 - 4; 14-22-11-1; 14-8-2-89 | IN ST 15-17-6-1 - 14; 25-38.1-4-8 ; 15-20-2-1 - 7; 6-9-39-1 - 9; 35-46-3-15; 15-20-3-1 - 4 ; 14-22-11-1; 14-8-2-89; 15-17-21-1 | These Indiana statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Included are provisions on rabies, liability of owners for dog bites or damage to livestock, and taxation and registration laws, among others. | Statute |
| CO - Dangerous Dog- Article 9. Offenses Against Public Peace, Order, and Decency. | C. R. S. A. § 18-9-204.5; C. R. S. A. § 35-42-115 | CO ST § 18-9-204.5; CO ST § 35-42-115 | This Colorado statute defines a "dangerous dog" as one that has inflicted bodily or serious bodily injury upon or has caused the death of a person or domestic animal; or has demonstrated tendencies that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the dog may inflict injury upon or cause the death of any person or domestic animal; or has engaged in or been trained for animal fighting as described by statute. Owners found guilty under the provisions will be subject to misdemeanor penalties if their dogs cause bodily injury or felonies if their dogs cause the death of a person. Section 35-42-115 mandates that the bureau create a a statewide dangerous dog registry consisting of a database of information concerning microchip types and placement by veterinarians and licensed shelters in dangerous dogs. | Statute |
| Hawaii v. Kaneakua | 597 P.2d 590 (Haw. 1979) |
Defendants stipulated that they were involved in cockfights and were prosecuted for numerous violations of § 1109(1)(d), part of Hawaii's cruelty to animals statute. The reviewing court found that the statute was not vague, and was sufficiently definite to satisfy due process with regard to the charge against defendants; nor was the statute overly broad as applied to defendants. |
Case |