Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Humane Society of the United States v. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service | 2019 WL 2342949 (D.D.C. June 3, 2019) | The Humane Society submitted two Freedom of Information Act requests to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. One was for site-inspection reports and the other was for inspection records for specific animal dealers and exhibitors. The Service released nine pages of inspection records in full but redacted information from the other 127 pages citing FOIA exemptions 6 and 7 that deal with privacy concerns. The Humane Society alleged that the redactions were improper and both parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. The Court found that the bulk of the Service’s redactions were improper under exemption 6 because the information did not implicate a licensee’s personal privacy interests. Exemption 6 was meant to protect individuals from public disclosure of intimate details of their lives. Details about a business’ compliance with regulations and statutes does not relate to intimate personal details. It only relates to business activities. Information about business judgments and relationships do not qualify for redaction. However, a substantial privacy interest is anything greater than a de minimus privacy interest and the licensees and third-parties had more than a de minimus privacy interest in their names, addresses, and contact information. The licensees were also homestead businesses meaning that the location of their business also served as their residence. The Court weighed the privacy interest in non-disclosure against the public interest in the release of the records and ultimately found that although the licensees and third parties had a substantial privacy interest in their names, addresses, and contact information, they only had a de minimus privacy interest in the other information that they withheld from the reports. If no significant privacy interest is implicated, FOIA demands disclosure. The service was required to disclose all reasonably segregable portions of the records that do not include identifying information. The Court found the Humane Society’s argument unpersuasive that releasing the addresses of the licensees would serve the public interest. The Service properly withheld the licensees’ addresses and names of third-party veterinarians. Exemption 7 allows for agencies to withhold information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of those law enforcement records could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Humane Society argued that inspection reports are not compiled for law enforcement purposes because the existence of such a report does not, on its face, reveal that there is any particular enforcement or investigatory action occurring. The Court found that the inspection records relate to the Service’s responsibility to enforce the AWA and ensure that licensees are in compliance, therefore, there was a nexus between the reports and the Service’s law enforcement duties. The Court also conducted the same balancing test that they did with exemption 6 and held that the Service releasing information other than the licensees’ addresses and third parties’ names could not reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Service properly withheld the licensees’ addresses and contact information and despite the Service’s improper withholding of dates, inspection narratives, animal inventories, etc., the Court found that they had otherwise met their burden of releasing all reasonably segregable information. Both the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment were granted in part and denied in part. | Case | |
| WY - Dangerous - Article 1. In General. (Dangerous Dog Provisions) | W. S. 1977 § 11-31-105 to 108 | WY ST § 11-31-105 to 108 | This Wyoming statute provides that every person, firm, copartnership, corporation or company owning any dog, which to his knowledge has killed sheep or other livestock, shall exterminate and destroy the dog. In addition, the owner of any dog is liable for all damages that accrue to any person, firm or corporation by reason of the dog killing, wounding, worrying or chasing any sheep or other domestic animals belonging to the person, firm or corporation. | Statute |
| SC - Ordinances - § 47-3-20. Local animal care and control ordinances authorized. | Code 1976 § 47-3-20 | SC ST § 47-3-20 | This South Carolina statute provides that the governing body of each county or municipality in this State may enact ordinances and promulgate regulations for the care and control of dogs, cats, and other animals and to prescribe penalties for violations. | Statute |
| People v. Baniqued | 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 (Cal.App.3 Dist.,2000). |
Defendant appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, California, ordering their conviction for cockfighting in violations of animal cruelty statutes. The court held that roosters and other birds fall within the statutory definition of "every dumb creature" and thus qualify as an "animal" for purposes of the animal cruelty statutes. |
Case | |
| Saenz v. DOI (vacated by U.S. v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001)) | (no West citation. Docket No. 00-2166) |
(This case was vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199(10th Cir. 2001). Appellant was descended from the Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians, and, although originally recognized as a tribe, it is not presently recognized. The court affirmed the vacating of defendant's conviction for possessing eagle parts, holding that the present test under RFRA with regard to whether a tribe has been formally recognized bears no relationship whatsoever to whether one sincerely practices Indian religions and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts. For discussion of Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion . |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Clucas | 50 F.Supp. 609 (D.C. Va. 1943) |
Defendant and several individuals went on a duck hunt in and were charged with exceeding the limit for migratory birds under Virginia law. The game wardens testified that the defendant, Clucas, admitted in the presence of the other parties that they had killed more than the 'bag', meaning thereby that they had killed more than ten ducks allowed for each person. The government held the position that the other individuals were hired for the reason of taking or killing the ducks. The court held that in view of the fact that January 6, 1943, was not the first day of the season the possession of twenty-six ducks by the two defendants did not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Virginia regulation. The possession being legal, the burden of proof did not shift to the defendants. |
Case | |
| Frank v. Animal Haven, Inc. | 107 A.D.3d 574 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2013.) | 967 N.Y.S.2d 370, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 04711 |
Plaintiff was bitten by the dog that she adopted from Animal Haven, Inc. and sued that entity for personal injuries stemming from the bite. In affirming the decision to dismiss the complaint, this court noted that the adopting parties signed a contract a the time of adoption where they undertook a "lifetime commitment" for the responsible care of the dog. While the contract stipulated that Animal Haven had the right to have the dog returned if the plaintiff breached the contract, this did not reserve a right of ownership of the dog. Further, the contract also explicitly relieved Animal Haven of liability once the dog was in the possession of the adoptive parties. |
Case |
| VA - Rabies - § 3.2-6522. Rabid animals | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6522 | VA ST § 3.2-6522 | This Virginia statute provides that, when there is sufficient reason to believe that a rabid animal is at large, the governing body of any county, city or town shall have the power to pass an emergency ordinance that shall become effective immediately upon passage, requiring owners of all dogs and cats therein to keep the same confined. It further outlines the steps that must be undertaken pursuant to such an ordinance, including proof of vaccination from pet owners, procedures for impounding and euthanizing suspected infected animals, and procedures relating to an animal biting a person. | Statute |
| OH - Cemeteries, Pet - Chapter 961. Pet Cemeteries | R.C. § 961.01 - 99 | OH ST § 961.01 - 99 | This Ohio chapter concerns the establishment of "pet cemeteries." The owner of land used for a pet cemetery must file a declaration in the county recorder's office that the land is to be used only for such purposes. Unless the deed restriction is removed, no person shall use land restricted as provided in this section for any purpose other than for pet cemetery purposes. The pet cemetery must be at least three acres in size and the owner must comply with deposit requirements described under the "endowment care fund." Violation of the provisions relating to& the land use restriction (961.02), the size of the pet cemetery (961.03), or the endowment care fund requirement (961.04) results in a fine of up to $5,000 or imprisonment for up to one year, or both. | Statute |
| Griffith v. State | Griffith v. State, 43 S.E. 251 (G.A. 1903). |
Defendant was indicted under Ga. Penal Code § 703, which prohibited one from instigating, engaging in, or doing anything furtherance of the an act or cruelty to a domestic animal. Ga. Penal Code § 705 defined cruelty as every willful act, omission or neglect, whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that the law provided that a domestic animal, such as a horse, should be sheltered and cared for by his owner. The jury was authorized to find that the defendant willfully abandoned the horse by turning the horse out to the elements, and failing to feed, shelter, or care for the animal. Such conduct was "willful." The court affirmed the judgment of the superior court on the jury's conviction of defendant for cruelty to animals. |
Case |