Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Daniels v. City of Ann Arbor (2015) | The attached document is the Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief in the case of Daniels v. City of Ann Arbor, Michigan for the protection of natural resources. Plaintiff Sally Daniels challenged the City of Ann Arbor's current "deer cull" of 100 deer from public parks and nature areas in the City by marksmen from APHIS. Plaintiff contends that this cull of deer, a natural resource held in the public trust, violates state law (the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) and the DNR's Wildlife Conservation Order (WCO)). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that there has been no showing under NREPA that the deer have caused damage to horticultural or agricultural crops under either act contrary to state law. Plaintiff also states that the methods used - firearms with silencers, deer baiting, and the shooting of deer from vehicles - also violate the NREPA and/or WCO. | Pleading | |||
| US - Endangered Species - 50 CFR Part 17. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Mariana Fruit Bat (Pteropus mariannus m | 50 CFR Part 17, RIN 1018-AH55 |
This final rule downgrades the Mariana fruit bat from endangered to threatened throughout its range in the Mariana archipelago, which is subject to US jurisdiction. The reason for the down grade is the FWS initially made a mistake in the taxonomy of the Mariana fruit bat. When the FWS listed the bat as endangered on Guam in 1984, it believed that the bat was a species only endemic to Guam. Since that time, the FWS has discovered that the bat is endemic to the entire Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and the Territory of Guam, thus there is actually a larger number of bats with a wider distribution. Yet, threats to the Mariana fruit bat still remain, so its listing as threatened is still warranted. Additionally, it is more convenient for the FWS to update the listing of the Mariana fruit bat to threatened in the entire Mariana archipelago, than to keep the species in the Guam as endangered and hold the remainder of the archipelago as threatened. |
Administrative | ||
| KS - Pet Trusts - Chapter 58A. Kansas Uniform Trust Code. | K. S. A. 58a-408 | KS ST 58a-408 | This Kansas statute provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime (note that it does not state "domestic" or "pet" animal). The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its intended use, except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount required for the intended use. | Statute | |
| CO - Pet Shop - Article 80. Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act | C. R. S. A. § 35-80-101 - 117 | CO ST § 35-80-101 to 117 | This Colorado Act regulates pet animal facilities (i.e., shelters, large kennels, and breeders). The Act covers licensing of the facilities and those activities deemed unlawful, such as selling a kitten or puppy under the age of 8 weeks and refusing a lawful inspection. | Statute | |
| U.S. v. Mitchell | 985 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1993) |
Defendant, a zoologist working for the Department of Interior, was charged in nine count indictment taking and transporting animals in violation of foreign law under the Lacey Act among other violations. Defendant filed motion to dismiss and government filed motion to determine foreign law. The government alleged in Count 8 that in September of 1987, Mitchell transported the hides and horns of a Punjab urial (wild sheep) and a Chinkara gazelle out of Pakistan and into the United States knowing that the animals had been taken, possessed or transported in violation of Pakistani law; the Pakistani Imports and Exports (Control) Act of 1950 and the Punjab Wildlife Act of 1974. The court rejected defendant's reading of the imports and exports law and found it unnecessary to determine the constitutionality of the Punjab Wildlife Act as the Lacey Act impinges on whether defendant violated the portions of the law prohibiting possession of the animals without a permit. |
Case | ||
| HABITANTES DE LA OROYA VS. PERÚ - Do not publiss yet | Comunidad de La Oroya Vs. Perú | Comunidad de La Oroya Vs. Perú | Case | ||
| Conservancy v. USFWS | 677 F.3d 1073 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) | 2012 WL 1319857 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) |
In this case, many environmental advocacy groups petitioned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate critical habitat for a species, the Florida panther, which was listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1967. The petition was denied. Claiming the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, the groups filed a citizens suit under the ESA in district court. At district, the group's complaints were dismissed and the groups subsequently lost on appeal. |
Case | |
| Tutela caso Clifor | 2020-0047 | This is the case of Clifor, a beloved family dog that suffered from epilepsy. Clifor's family used to purchase the medicine he needed from the Tolima Governorate, the only authorized place to sell this prescription medicine. When the petitioner tried to buy more medicine in June 2020, she was informed that they could not sell the drug to her because they were closed to the public. The petitioner filed a "Tutela" before the 1st Criminal Circuit Court in Ibague, Tolima, arguing the government had violated her due process rights and asked the court to order the defendants to provide the medicine within 48 hours. The judge held that governmental entities had ignored that animals were sentient beings subject to protection. It further stated that by not providing the medicine needed to treat Clifor's illness, the governmental entities had violated the petitioner's fundamental right of protection to the family unit, as Clifor's life had been put at risk and he was a member of the petitioner's family. The judge found that the petitioner had proven the family’s emotional attachment to their dog, making it a multispecies family. The judge also held that the government action had also violated Clifor's right to access medicine prescribed by his veterinarian, putting at risk his health and life. In explaining her decision, the judge stated that "the Constitutional Court had previously stated that the right to have a pet was part of the fundamental rights of free development of freedom and the right to family intimacy. Therefore, the government was obliged to provide the necessary means to facilitate their protection and care. Since the government has the pharmaceutical monopoly, it has to guarantee the access and availability of drugs." | Case | ||
| Article 70 of CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley | 49 Misc. 3d 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 4612340 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2015) | Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 and under the common law for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees in the custody of respondent State University of New York at Stony Brook. It sought an order directing respondents to demonstrate the basis for detaining Hercules and Leo, and an order directing their release and transfer to a sanctuary in Florida. Respondents opposed the petition and cross moved to change venue. While the Supreme Court of New York County found that neither CPLR 7002(b)(3) nor CPLR 7004(c) required a change of venue to Suffolk County; that the petitioner had standing to bring the case; and that prior proceedings did not bar this case from being heard, the substance of the petition required a finding as to whether a chimpanzee was a legal person entitled to bring a writ of habeas corpus. Since the Court found it was bound by the Third Department in People ex rel Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, which ruled that chimpanzees were not “legal persons” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by a writ of habeas corpus, it denied the habeas corpus petition and dismissed the proceeding. | Case | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell | 2014 WL 4714847 (D.D.C. 2014) (unpublished) | 2014 WL 4714847 (D.D.C. 2014) | In 2012, a rule transferred management of the gray wolf in Wyoming from federal control to state control. In the present case, plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, Fund for Animals, Humane Society of the United States, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Sierra Club, challenged the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to remove the gray wolf from the endangered species list in Wyoming. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and maintained that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because Wyoming's regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to protect the species, the level of genetic exchange shown in the record did not warrant delisting, and the gray wolf was endangered within a significant portion of its range. Given the level of genetic exchange reflected in the record, the Court decided not to disturb the finding that the species had recovered, and it would not overturn the agency's determination that the species was not endangered or threatened within a significant portion of its range. However, the Court concluded that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Service to rely on the state's nonbinding promises to maintain a particular number of wolves when the availability of that specific numerical buffer was such a critical aspect of the delisting decision. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, denied it in part, and remanded the matter back to the agency. | Case |