Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OH - Zanesville - Exotic - CHAPTER 505. Animals and Fowl | Ordinances 505.01 - 99 |
These Ohio ordinances cover a diversity of legal areas pertaining to animals, including the following: animals running at large, registration of dogs, abandoning, killing, or injuring animals, barking dogs, and dangerous animals. |
Local Ordinance | ||||||||
| Strong v. United States | 5 F.3d 905 (1993) |
The appeal in this case does not contest the denial of a permit to conduct dolphin feedings cruises. The position of the plaintiffs-appellees is that the Secretary of Commerce has no authority to consider feeding to be a form of harassment or to regulate it. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs-appellees and found it clearly reasonable to restrict or prohibit the feeding of dolphins as a potential hazard to them. |
Case | ||||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 10 Núm 1 |
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Policy | |||||||||
| GA - Restaurant, animals - 511-6-1-.07. Physical Facilities. | GA ADC 511-6-1-.07 | Ga Comp. R. & Regs. 511-6-1-.07 | This Georgia regulation has an exception for dogs in outdoor dining areas in the subsection of the regulation that prohibits animals in food service establishments. Subsection (5)(o)(vi) states that pet dogs may be allowed in outside dining areas of a food establishment provided patrons access the area from the outdoors and several other conditions are met. Pet dogs must not come into contact with any serving dishes, utensils, or tableware nor are they allowed on chairs, tables, or other furnishings. Employees and consumers must not provide food to pet dogs. The pet dogs must be kept on a leash and under control of the consumer at all times. At no time is the pet dog allowed to travel through the interior portion of the food service establishment. The establishment must also establish processes for training employees not to handle or pet the dogs and a procedure and equipment for the clean up of pet waste. | Administrative | |||||||
| TN - Veterinary - Chapter 12. Veterinarians. | T. C. A. § 63-12-101 - 146; T. C. A. § 63-12-201 - 204 | TN ST § 63-12-101 - 146; TN ST § 63-12-201 - 204 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |||||||
| Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law Information |
Journal of Animal and Natural Resource LawStudents of Michigan State University College of Law |
Policy | |||||||||
| Jefferson v. Mirando | 719 N.E.2d 1074 (Ohio Co.,1999) | 101 Ohio Misc.2d 1 (1999) |
In this Ohio case, the defendant was charged with violating ordinance setting maximum number of dogs or cats that a person could "harbor" per family dwelling unit. The court first observed that the village of Jefferson's ordinance benefits from a strong presumption of constitutionality, and defendant Mirando bears the burden of demonstrating unconstitutionality of this ordinance beyond any remaining fair debate on the issue. The court held that ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague and did not conflict with state statutes regulating kennels. |
Case | |||||||
| Western Watersheds Project v. Michael | 353 F.Supp.3d 1176 (D. Wyo. 2018) | Wyoming enacted statutes that imposed civil and criminal penalties for data collection on private land or when private land was crossed to reach public land without landowner permission. The pair of statutes (one criminal and one civil) prohibited individuals from entering “open land for the purpose of collecting resource data” without permission from the owner. The criminal statute imposed penalties that were stricter than Wyoming’s general trespass provision. The Plaintiffs, who were advocacy organizations, filed suit to challenge the statutes alleging that the statutes violated the Free Speech and Petition Clauses of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the statutes were preempted by federal law. The District Court found for the Plaintiffs on the free speech, petition, and equal protection claims, but did not feel that the Plaintiffs stated a preemption claim. Wyoming then amended the statutes and the Plaintiffs amended their complaint re-alleging free speech and equal protection claims. The district court found for the defendants on a motion to dismiss. The Plaintiffs then appealed. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants had filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Court granted the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Defendants’’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court ultimately found that the Wyoming statutes were facially unconstitutional and in violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution. The State of Wyoming was permanently enjoined from enforcing the statutes. | Case | ||||||||
| Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law, Vol. 14 |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of Law Journal of Animal & Natural Resource LawVol. |
Policy | |||||||||
| WA - Equine Activity Liability - Chapter 4.24. Special Rights of Action and Special Immunities. | West's RCWA 4.24.530 - 540 | WA ST 4.24.530 - 540 | This Washington section provides that an equine activity sponsor or an equine professional shall not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant engaged in an equine activity, nor may he or she maintain an action against or recover from an equine activity sponsor or an equine professional for an injury to or the death while engaged in an equine activity. Liability is not limited by this statute where the equine professional knowingly provided faulty tack or equipment, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity, owns or otherwise is in lawful possession of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a known, dangerous latent condition, or if he or she commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant or intentionally injures the participant. | Statute |