Results
| Title | Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| PA - Cruelty - De protección a los animales domésticos | 2011 De protección a los animales domésticos |
This document provides a link to De protección a los animales domésticos (.pdf). |
Statute |
| Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises, Plaintiffs, by their Next Friends, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc | In this case of first impression, five wild-captured orcas named Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka, and Ulises (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), seek a declaration that they are held by the Defendants in violation of Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs were forcibly taken from their families and natural habitats, are held captive at SeaWorld San Diego and SeaWorld Orlando, denied everything that is natural to them, subjected to artificial insemination or sperm collection to breed performers for Defendants’ shows, and forced to perform, all for Defendants’ profit. As such, Plaintiffs are held in slavery and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction freeing them from Defendants’ bondage and placing them in a habitat suited to their individual needs and best interests. | Pleading | |
| U.S. v. Braddock | Slip Copy, 2011 WL 327416 (C.A.4 (S.C.),2011) |
Defendant-appellants appealed their convictions following guilty pleas to offenses relating to illegal cockfighting and gambling activities. On appeal, they challenged the denial of their motion to dismiss for selective prosecution or, in the alternative, for discovery in support of their selective prosecution claim. In particular, appellants contend that district court should have dismissed the indictment or granted leave to obtain discovery because they, as Caucasians, were prosecuted federally, while two Hispanic co-conspirators and thirty-six Hispanic people arrested in connection with another cockfighting ring in Hampton County, South Carolina, faced only state charges. The Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, found that appellants failed to show that they were similarly situated to the Hispanic defendants who were not prosecuted on federal charges. |
Case |
| Williams v. Hill | 658 So.2d 381 (Ala.,1995) |
In this Alabama case, a motorcyclist and passenger were injured when they collided with defendant's dog while traveling on public roadway and brought an action for damages. The Circuit Court, Elmore County granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and the motorcyclist and passenger appealed. The Court held that there is no recover at common law, as no negligence was shown. The Court would not accept the proposal that all owners should be charged with the knowledge that dogs will chase cars. “We hold that the owner of a dog may not be charged with the general knowledge that all dogs chase motor vehicles, and therefore that the law will not impute such general knowledge to dog owners in actions for injuries incurred. We, therefore, affirm the defendant's summary judgment.” |
Case |
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Vaught | 8 F.4th 714 (8th Cir. 2021) | Several animal advocacy organizations filed a complaint against the Vaughts and Peco Foods, Inc. seeking an order that would prevent defendants from bringing a civil suit under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-113 (colloquially known as Arkansas' "ag gag" law). The statute at issue provides a civil cause of action for unauthorized access to protected properties described under the law. Plaintiffs claim that the statute violates their right to free speech under the First Amendment by chilling them from engaging in activities protected under the First Amendment. In particular, the plaintiffs have "specific and definite plans" to investigate the defendants' chicken slaughterhouses and pig farms by sending undercover investigators to seek employment with defendants and collect information in an effort to support their mission to "reform[] animal agriculture." The district court found that plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing to sue, finding that the injury at hand was too speculative. On appeal here, the court noted found that plaintiffs established the three primary elements of standing from the Lujan case ("(1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress the injury."). First, but for the statute, plaintiffs allege that they would engage in the protected constitutional conduct. Second, the plaintiffs adequately outlined their intention to engage in a course of conduct that is proscribed by the statute. Finally, the court found a credible threat of enforcement that was objectively reasonable. This is bolstered by the fact plaintiffs have successfully engaged in the conduct at other facilities in the past. While defendants contend that there is no credible threat that they would enforce the statute because these organizations would not find entry to their facilities worthwhile. However, plaintiffs presented allegations that indeed they would be interested in documenting the plaintiffs' operations because of the conditions of pigs in "nearly immovable quarters" and the use of controversial methods of slaughter. The court was equally unpersuaded by defendants' claims that there is no injury in fact since plaintiffs are not poised to publish any information gathered from their facilities. Additionally, plaintiffs sent letters to defendants asking them to waive their rights to sue and neither defendant responded. Thus, the complaint sufficiently established a case or controversy. The lower court judgment was reversed and the case was remanded. | Case |
| AU - Wildlife Protection- Queensland Nature Conservation Act 1992 | The object of this Act is the conservation of nature.The conservation of nature is to be achieved by an integrated and comprehensive conservation strategy for the whole of Queensland that involves, among other things, the following— (a) Gathering of information and community education; (b) Dedication and declaration of protected areas; (c) Management of protected areas;(d) Protection of native wildlife and its habitat; (e) Use of protected wildlife and areas to be ecologically sustainable; (f) Recognition of interest of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in nature and their cooperative involvement in its conservation; and (g) Cooperative involvement of land-holders.This Act is to be administered, as far as practicable, in consultation with, and having regard to the views and interests of, land-holders and interested groups and persons, including Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. | Statute | |
| Vermont Laws: Act 34: 1846 | 1846 Vt. Acts & Resolves 34 | Act 34 from 1846 concerns the amendment of the statute entitled "Offences against private property." Specifically, the act concerns the statutes that covers cruelty to animals and larceny of animals. | Statute |
| DE - Newark - Chapter 5: Animals (Article II: Horses) | The Code of the City of Newark, 1970 §§ 6.12.010 - 6.12.100 5-19 to 5-21 |
In Newark, Delaware, a person is prohibited from riding, driving, or leading a horse on the city's sidewalks, but may ride a horse on a city street's bicycle path. Additionally, a person is prohibited from riding, driving, or leading a horse in a reckless, disorderly, or careless manner through or over any of the streets or private property in the city. Penalties for violating these provisions are provided. |
Local Ordinance |
| In re: MARJORIE WALKER, d/b/a LINN CREEK KENNEL | 2006 WL 2439003 (U.S.D.A.) |
Judicial Officer affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision that Marjorie Walker, d/b/a Linn Creek Kennel, violated the regulations of the Animal Welfare Act. The Judicial Officer stated that the Animal Welfare Act provides factors that must be considered when deciding the amount of civil penalty, and that the ability to pay the penalty is not a factor. Respondent was ordered to cease and desist from violating the regulations and standards, pay a $14,300 civil penalty, and the license was revoked . |
Case |
| Friends of Animals v. Bernhardt | 961 F.3d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2020) | Appellants consisting of conversation organizations and a safari guide challenged a series of actions of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) governing imports of sport-hunted animal trophies from Africa. The Appellants challenged certain findings that the Service made allowing animal trophies to be imported. The Court had reviewed a similar set of findings in another case and concluded that they were legislative rules illegally issued without notice and comment. FWS subsequently withdrew all its findings that were issued without notice and comment including the ones that were challenged by the Appellants in a subsequent memorandum. The Appellants still desired to contest the withdrawn findings. The Appellants alleged that it was illegal for the FWS to abandon its prior findings without engaging in APA informal rulemaking and that it was illegal for the FWS to announce its intent to the make the necessary findings through informal adjudications in the future. The Appellant’s claims fell into three categories: (1) challenges to the 2017 Zimbabwe findings that sport-hunting of elephants would enhance the survival of the species; (2) challenges to the memorandum by the FWS withdrawing their prior findings; and (3) challenges to the memorandum’s announcement that the FWS intends to making findings on a case-by-case basis when considering individual permit applications. The Court found that since the FWS had withdrew the 2017 findings, they no longer caused the appellants any injury which made any challenges to them moot. The Appellants attempted to argue that the flaws in the 2017 Zimbabwe elephant finding were capable of repetition yet would evade review. The Court rejected this argument. As for the second challenges regarding the memorandum’s withdrawal of its prior findings, the Court found that the withdrawal caused no injury to the Appellants. The Court rejected the challenges to the memorandum’s announcement that the FWS intended to make findings on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. | Case |