Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Horse tack - § 597k. Bristle bur, tack bur, etc.; use on animals | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597k | CA PENAL § 597k | This section makes it a misdemeanor to use a bristle bur, tack bur, or similar device, to be used on a horse or any other animal. A violation is punishable with imprisonment and/or imprisonment. | Statute | |
| Commonwealth v. Epifania | 951 N.E.2d 723 (Mass.App.Ct.,2011) | 80 Mass.App.Ct. 71 (2011), 2011 WL 3435385 |
Defendant appealed his conviction of arson for setting fire to a dwelling house, and wilfully and maliciously killing the animal of another person. The Appeals Court held that testimony that the cat belonged to the victim was sufficient to support a conviction of wilfully and maliciously killing the animal of another person. |
Case | |
| SAMUEL ZIMMERMAN v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE | 57 Agric. Dec. 869 (1998) | 1998 WL 1806372 (U.S.D.A.) | Agency's choice of sanction is not to be overturned unless it is unwarranted by law, unjustified by facts, or represents abuse of discretion; sanction is not rendered invalid in particular case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases. | Case | |
| OR - Hunting, Internet - 635-065-0740. Hunting Prohibited | OR ADC 635-065-0740 | OAR 635-065-0740 | It is unlawful in Oregon to engage in computer-assisted hunting (Internet hunting) or provide or operate facilities for computer-assisted hunting in Oregon. As used in this act, “computer-assisted hunting” (Internet hunting) means the use of a computer or any other device, equipment, or software to remotely control the aiming and discharge of a firearm, bow, or any other weapon to hunt any game bird, wildlife, game mammal, or other mammal, and “facilities for computer-assisted remote hunting” means real property and improvements on the property associated with hunting, including hunting blinds, offices and rooms equipped to facilitate computer-assisted remote hunting. Nothing in subsection (8) of this section prohibits the use of computer-assisted hunting by employees or agents of county, state or federal agencies while acting in their official capacities. | Administrative | |
| US - Lacey Act - Chapter 53. Control of Illegally Taken Fish and Wildlife. | 16 USC 3371 - 3378 | The Lacey Act provides that it is unlawful for any person to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of the United States or in violation of any Indian tribal law whether in interstate or foreign commerce. All plants or animals taken in violation of the Act are subject to forfeiture as well as all vessels, vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment used in the process. | Statute | ||
| AL - Leash - When dogs permitted in areas; liability of owners of dogs at large in areas (wildlife management areas) | Ala. Code 1975 § 9-11-305 - 307 | AL ST § 9-11-305 to 307 | This Alabama statute provides that no dog shall be permitted except on leash within any wildlife management area except in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources. The owner of any dog at large within any wildlife management area shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| State v. Mita | 245 P.3d 458 (Hawai', 2010) | 2010 WL 5483427 (Hawai', 2010), 124 Hawai'i 385 (2010) |
Defendant, an owner of two dogs, both boxers, was charged with animal nuisance in violation of Revised Ordinances of Honolulu section 7-2.3. Mita’s counsel objected to the oral charge at trial, arguing "that the arraignment is [not] specific enough to put the defendant specifically on notice of what part of the . . . ordinance she’s being charged with." The district court denied Mita’s motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced her to pay a $50 fine. Mita appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the district court. On certiorari, the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals and remanded the case, finding that the definition of animal nuisance in section 7-2.2 does not create an additional essential element of the offense; and, second, the definition of "animal nuisance" is consistent with its commonly understood meaning. |
Case | |
| Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard | 325 F.3d 412 (C.A.3 (Pa.),2003) | 175 Ed. Law Rep. 93 |
Public school student circulated a petition during class and recess that opposed a school field trip to the circus. School officials prevented her from circulating the petition, and she complained of a violation of her First Amendment right to free speech. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the school, holding that the student's rights had not been violated because a school may regulate the times and circumstances a petition may be circulated when it interferes with educational goals or the rights of other students. |
Case | |
| ND - Rabies - 48.1-13-01-01. Importation requirements - Certificate of veterinary inspection | ND ADC 48.1-13-01-01 | N.D. Admin. Code § 48.1-13-01-01 | This North Dakota regulation states that any dog, cat, or ferret over three months of age imported into the state must have a certification of a current rabies vaccination. It also provides other requirements for dog, cat, and ferret importation into the state. | Administrative | |
| Ivory Education Institute v. Department of Fish and Wildlife | 28 Cal. App. 5th 975 (Ct. App. 2018), as modified (Nov. 5, 2018), review denied (Jan. 16, 2019) | 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606 (Ct. App. 2018) | The Legislature passed Assembly Bill 96 which took effect July 1, 2016 as Fish & Game Code section 2022. The bill imposed new restrictions on the sale and importation of ivory and rhinoceros horn. The Ivory Education (the Institute) sued the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (the Department) in order to block implementation of the law. The institute alleged that the statute was unconstitutional on multiple grounds including vagueness, federal preemption, the takings clause, and the commerce clause. The trial court entered judgment for the Department and the intervenor defendants (the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Center for Biological Diversity, the Humane Society of the United States, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, and the Wildlife Conservation Society). The Institute appealed and abandoned all other issues raised and limited its challenge to the void-for-vagueness doctrine. "The Institute contend[ed] that section 2022 [was] unconstitutionally vague for two reasons: 1) while it allows for the sale or import of ivory insofar as it is allowed by federal law, differences in what federal law allows make it nearly impossible to tell what would qualify for the exemption provided by section 2022(c)(c); and 2) there are no guidelines by which to determine the permissible volume of ivory in either musical instruments or antiques." The Court of Appeals stated that a statute is not vague if its meaning can be determined by looking at other sources of information. Those who wish to comply with section 2022 have a duty to locate and examine statutes or whatever else necessary to determine the scope of the exemption provision. "Section 2022 has a single purpose—to prevent the sale or importation of ivory and rhinoceros horn. Both of those terms are defined. The Institute has 'not demonstrated that attempts to give substance and meaning' to the three disputed exceptions 'would be fruitless.'" As for the Institute's second contention, the Court of Appeals stated that because musical instruments and antiques are tangible objects that occupy a verifiable amount of three-dimensional space, the percentage of any such object that has ivory in it can be readily determined. The Court of Appeals held that the statute was not vague. The Court affirmed the holding of the trial court. | Case |