Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Endangered Species - CHAPTER 1.5. ENDANGERED SPECIES | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 2050 - 2115.5 | CA FISH & G § 2050 - 2115.5 | The California Fish and Game Code considers that endangered and threatened species are of ecological, educational, historical, recreational, esthetic, economic, and scientific value to the people of the State of California. The State of California has legislation that allows the state to protect endangered and threatened species by acquiring land for these species to protect, restore and enhance the habitat of these species. Section 2080 prohibits the importing, taking, exporting, possessing, purchasing, or selling, any species, or any part or product thereof that is endangered or threatened. | Statute |
| Viva! v. Adidas | 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 (Cal., 2007) | 2007 WL 2080000 (Cal. 2007), 41 Cal.4th 929 | Viva, an animal protective organization, filed action against Adidas shoe retailer alleging that it was violating a state statute banning the import of products made from Australian kangaroo hide into California. On cross motions for summary judgment, the original court sided with Adidas, on the ground that state statute was preempted by federal Endangered Species Act of 1973. The appeals court affirmed, however the California Superior Court reversed, holding that the state statute was not preempted by federal law. | Case |
| IN - Cruelty - Section 429 Indian Penal Code 1860 | 45 of 1860 | Killing, poisoning, maiming, or 'rendering useless' cattle, including elephants, or any other animal worth over fifty rupees, is a criminal offence. | Statute | |
| IPPL v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc. | 799 F.2d 934 (1986) |
Private individuals and organizations brought action seeking to be named guardians of medical research animals seized from organization whose chief was convicted of state animal cruelty statute violations. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, John R. Hargrove, J., dismissed action, and individuals and organizations appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkinson, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) individuals and organizations lacked standing to bring action, and (2) Animal Welfare Act did not confer private cause of action. Case discussed in topic: US Animal Welfare Act. |
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| Moore v. Knower | 214 So.3d 165 (La.App. 4 Cir., 2017) | 2016-0776 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/23/17) | Bruce Moore and Amy Knower were in a relationship and decided to adopt a dog together. Bruce alleged that they both jointly adopted Abby, a Boston Terrier in 2010. The couple jointly shared expenses for the care and management of the dog. After the parties broke up, they agreed to an arrangement in which each party alternated possession of Abby every week. The parties continued this arrangement even during their brief reconciliation up until July of 2015 when Amy Knower refused to exchange the dog with Bruce Moore. Moore filed suit and the trial court found for him and awarded him the use and management of Abby. Knower alleged that she was the sole owner of Abby. Knower appealed, alleging five assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in finding that she failed to support her claim of full ownership; (2) the trial court erred in finding that she co-owned Abby with Moore; (3) the trial court erred in failing to accept the testimony of Sheila Ford of the Mississippi Boston Terrier Rescue; (4) the trial court erred by stating that there was no basis in law for her to decide the custody of a dog and then doing just that; (5) the trial court erred by exercising jurisdiction over the matter. The Court determined that the trial court did in fact have jurisdiction over the matter. The Court did not find any errors in the trial court’s findings. It concluded that Abby was indeed co-owned by Moore and Knower and ultimately held that Knower had no right to unilaterally end the arrangement. Knower did not supply sufficient proof to support her claim of full ownership. Moore was awarded Abby and the right to solely determine use and management of the dog. | Case |
| State ex rel. Zobel v. Burrell | 2005 WL 957908 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005) |
A trial court granted a local humane society permission to humanely dispose of horses placed in their custody by the Sheriff. A man filed petition for a writ of mandamus against the the trial judge and humane society to challenge the judge's order. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court holding the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Humane Society of Missouri. Opinion transferred to State ex rel. Zobel v. Burrell , 167 S.W.3d 688 (Mo., 2005). |
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| Mackley v. State | 481 P.3d 639 (Wyo. 2021) | 2021 WY 33 (Wyo., 2021) | The Wyoming Supreme Court considers whether the jury was properly instructed on the charge of aggravated animal cruelty. The case stems from an incident where a dog escaped his owner and attacked the defendant's dogs at his front door. A local teenager grabbed the offending dog ("Rocky") and dragged him into the street as the dog fight carried on. The defendant responded by grabbing his gun and shooting Rocky as he was held by the teenager. A jury convicted defendant of both aggravated animal cruelty and reckless endangering. At the trial, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on both charges, arguing that the Wyoming Legislature has established that humanely destroying an animal is not animal cruelty and that the State did not provide evidence that he intentionally pointed a firearm at anyone, which defendant contends is necessary for the reckless endangering charge. On appeal here, the court first observed that defendant's challenge to a confusing or misleading jury instruction was waived because he negotiated with the prosecution to draft it. Further, the Supreme Court did not find an abuse of discretion where the district court refused defendant's additional instructions on the humane destruction of an animal in the jury instructions on the elements for the aggravated cruelty to animals charge. While defendant argued that the instructions should include subsection m from the statute, he only now on appeal contends that the subsection should have been given as a theory of defense. Thus, reviewing this argument for plain error, the Court found that defendant's theory that his killing was "humane" and thus excluded from the crime of aggravated cruelty was not supported by the language of the statute. In fact, such an interpretation not only goes against the plain language, but "then any animal could be killed, under any circumstances, as long as it is killed quickly." Defendant presented no evidence that the dog he shot was suffering or distressed and needed euthanasia. The trial court did not commit error when it declined to instruct the jury on subsection m. As to the reckless endangering conviction, the court also affirmed this charge as defendant showed a conscious disregard for the substantial risk he placed the teenager in regardless of whether he pointed the gun at the victim. Affirmed. | Case |
| Webb v. Amtower | 2008 WL 713728 (KS,2008 (not reported)) | 178 P.3d 80 (KS,2008 (table only)) |
The court applied the forum's traditional lex loci conflict-of-laws rule to determine what jurisdiction's law governed for both damages and recovery of possession. The "place of injury" for the tort/damages issue was Kansas since that's where the contract was signed. The court remanded the case to determine the law of the place where the dog was found to determine the right-to-possession since that was a personal property issue. |
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| Stanton v. State | 395 S.W.3d 676 (Tenn. 2013) | 2013 WL 239099 (Tenn.2013) |
The defendant, a self-employed oil distributor, was charged with 16 counts of animal cruelty for intentionally or knowingly failing to provide food and care for his horses. After being denied a petition for pretrial division and a petition for a writ of certiorari, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, who granted the defendant permission to appeal, but affirmed the lower court's decision that the assistant district attorney general did not abuse his discretion and that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. |
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| Joy Road Area Forest and Watershed Association v. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection | 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 (2006) | 142 Cal.App.4th 656 (2006) |
The California Department of Forestry approved a developer's Timber Harvest Plan of cutting trees down to build a housing development. The court found that The California Department of Forestry abused its discretion by approving the Timber Harvest Plan because it had not given the public sufficient information about the plan, including the impact on the Northern Spotted Owl before approving it, and because the Timber Harvest Plan did not adequately address the issue of how the plan would affect water quality in the area. |
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