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Displaying 91 - 100 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MO - Breeder - Chapter 9 - Animal Care Facilities. 30-9.010 - 9.030 | 2 MO ADC 30-9.010 - 9.030 | 2 Mo. Code of State Regulations 30-9.010 - 9.030 | This rule sets forth the standards and requirements for the licensing and operation of animal care facilities in Missouri. For the minimum age to sell or ship a dog or cat, see 30-9020 section (13), subsection (E): "Minimum Age Requirements. No dog or cat shall be delivered by any person to any carrier or intermediate handler for transportation, in commerce, or shall be transported in commerce by any person, except to a registered research facility, unless that dog or cat is at least eight (8) weeks of age and has been weaned." | Administrative | |
| AZ - Initiatives - Proposition 201 (cockfighting) | Proposition 201 (1998) | Proposition 201 would amend state law to create the crime of cockfighting. Cockfighting would be classified as a class 5 felony, generally punishable by a possible fine of up to $150,000 and a possible prison term ranging from nine months to two years. Presence at a cockfight would be classified as a class 1 misdemeanor, generally punishable by a possible fine of up to $2,500 and a possible jail term of up to six months. This proposition would extend existing state law animal cruelty exemptions and defenses that apply to lawful hunting, ranching, farming, rodeos and related activities to also apply to cockfighting. The measure passed in 1998 with 68.1% of the vote. | Statute | ||
| WI - Trust - 701.0408 Trust care for an animal | W.S.A. 701.1110; 701.0402; 701.0408 | WI ST 701.1110; 701.0402; 701.0408 | This statute represents Wisconsin's pet trust law. The former law was not a specific pet trust law, but the new law is. The new provisions allows for a trust to be created for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. | Statute | |
| Siegel v. State | 635 S.W.3d 313 (Ark., 2021), reh'g denied (Jan. 13, 2022) | 2021 Ark. 228 (2021) | Defendant Karen Siegel was convicted of 31 misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty based on 31 breeding dogs that were seized from her home. At issue here on appeal by defendant is whether the underlying statutes that allows seizure of the animals, Arkansas Code Annotated sections 5-62-106 and 5-62-111, are constitutional. In addition, defendant argues that by not ordering return of the seized dogs to defendant and compensating defendant for her loss of property was error. The first circuit court criminal case was dismissed on speedy-trial grounds and that ruling was upheld in later appeal. The issues on the instant appeal relate to the status of the seized dogs. Siegel argues that the circuit court erred by not ordering the return of her seized property and also not assigning a value for the property that was destroyed or damaged. The court here looked at the language of the seizure statute and found that Siegel failed to post a bond to care for the dog as is contemplated by the statute. The statute provides no award of damages to a defendant and the county that seized the dog is not a party in the criminal action brought by the state. Thus, the lower court was correct in stating that Siegel's remedy was a separate civil action. As to Siegel's challenges to the constitutionality of those statutes, this court found the argument moot since review of the issue would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing controversy. The case was affirmed in part and dismissed as moot in part. | Case | |
| Vickers v. Egbert | 359 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (Fla. 2005) |
A commercial fisherman brought a claim against the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission alleging substantive due process violations. The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission instituted licensing requirements and restrictions on lobster trapping certificates in order to alleviate an overpopulation of lobster traps. The court held in favor of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, reasoning fishing was not a fundamental right. |
Case | ||
| Animal Law Index Volume 2 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 2 (1996)INTRODUCTIONANIMALS AS PROPERTY |
Policy | |||
| UT - Veterinary - Chapter 28. Veterinary Practice Act. | U.C.A. 1953 § 58-28-101 - 606 | UT ST § 58-28-101 - 606 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| CITIZENS' RAPID-TRANSIT CO. v. DEW | 45 S.W. 790 (Tenn. 1898) | 40 L.R.A. 518, 100 Tenn. 317, 16 Pickle 317, 66 Am.St.Rep. 754 (1898) |
In 1898, this court affirmed a verdict for $200 after defendant train killed plaintiff’s dog. The Court reasoned that, "Large amounts of money are now invested in dogs, and they are extensively the subjects of trade and traffic. They are the negro's associates, and often his only property, the poor man's friend, and the rich man's companion, and the protection of women and children, hearthstones and hen roosts. In the earlier law books it was said that "dog law" was as hard to define as was "dog Latin." But that day has passed, and dogs have now a distinct and well established status in the eyes of the law." |
Case | |
| Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior | 397 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) | This case centers on the Trump Administration's new interpretation of incidental takings under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA). In December 2017, the Principal Deputy Solicitor of the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) issued a memorandum that countered almost 50 years of the agency’s interpretation of “takings” and “killings” under the MBTA (the "Jorjani Opinion"). According to the DOI in that opinion, the MBTA does not prohibit incidental takes or kills because the statute applies only to activities specifically aimed at birds. Environmental interest groups and various states brought three now-consolidated actions to vacate the memorandum and subsequent guidance issued in reliance on the memorandum. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In essence, the question before the court is whether DOI’s interpretation of the MBTA must be set aside as contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or upheld as a valid exercise of agency authority. The court first observed that, from the early 1970s until 2017, the DOI interpreted the MBTA to prohibit incidental takes and kills, imposing liability for activities and hazards that led to the deaths of protected birds, irrespective of whether the activities targeted birds or were intended to take or kill birds. To conserve migratory birds and ensure compliance with the MBTA’s prohibition on “incidental take,” the DOI's Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) used a range of strategies: sending companies notice of the risks their facilities and equipment posed to migratory birds; issuing industry guidance; informally negotiating remediation efforts; and issuing permits authorizing takes. In fact, the court noted that the agency prioritized a cooperative approach with industry over enforcement actions. In 2015, the DOI formalized this approach by undergoing a rulemaking process regulating incidental take. In early 2017, the DOI's Solicitor then issued a memorandum that reaffirmed the long-standing interpretation that the MBTA prohibited incidental take that became known as the "Tomkins Opinion." Once presidential administrations changed and Tomkins departed, the new Principal Deputy Solicitor issued a new memorandum that stated any agency comments, recommendations, or actions not be based on the principle that the MBTA prohibited incidental take (the Jorjani Opinion). This triggered the instant lawsuits by conservation organizations and several states. On July 31, 2019, the lower court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated standing and denied the DOI's motion to dismiss. On appeal here, this court first noted that both parties agree with longstanding precedent that the MBTA's misdemeanor provision creates strict liability. In contrast, the Jorjani Opinion contends that the criminal penalty provisions under the MBTA is limited to only acts directed at birds and those activities whose purpose is to "render an animal subject to human control" like hunting or capturing. In reviewing the Jorjani Opinion under the lessened deference standard afforded by administrative law, this court found the DOI overstated the any conflicts in interpretation of the MBTA among circuit courts (a "dramatized representation"). In addition, the court found the Jorjani Opinion "is a recent and sudden departure from long-held agency positions backed by over forty years of consistent enforcement practices." The court found the Jorjani Opinion was an unpersuasive interpretation of the MBTA's unambiguous prohibition on the killing of birds and is contrary to the plain language of the law itself. Such an interpretation runs contrary to legislative history, decades of enforcement practices by the DOI, and caselaw. Because the agency's action was held unlawful under the APA, the court found the only appropriate remedy was vacatur. Thus, Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment were granted, and Interior’s motion was denied. | Case | ||
| Washington v. Olatoye | 173 A.D.3d 467, 103 N.Y.S.3d 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) | 2019 WL 2425735 (N.Y. App. Div. June 11, 2019) | This New York case involves an appeal by a public housing tenant after his petition to declare his dog an assistance animal was denied and he was placed on probation with instructions to his dog from the premises. The denial stems from an incident where Petitioner's English Bulldog "Onyx" allegedly bit a NYCHA employee when the employee was delivering a hotplate to petitioner's apartment when petitioner was not home. After the incident, NYCHA notified petitioner that it would seek to terminate his tenancy for non-desirability and breach of its rules and regulations. Petitioner suffered from mental illness as well as a traumatic brain injury and was in the process of trying to register Onyx as an assistance animal, which was validated by a letter from the psychiatric support center where he received services. At a hearing, the NYCHA hearing officer sustained the charges against petitioner, required him to remove the dog from his apartment immediately and placed him on probation for one year. It did not address petitioner's request for an assistance animal as a reasonable accommodation and ignored the mental health records submitted into evidence. On appeal, this court first noted that housing providers are required to allow a person who proves their burden of showing that an animal assists them with aspects of their disability to keep an assistance animal. Here, the hearing officer engaged in no such analysis and relied on the "direct threat" exemption to the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Because there was no initial record that addressed petitioner's reasonable accommodation request, the appellate court was left with an insufficient record that precluded adequate review. Thus, the petition was held in abeyance and this court remanded the proceeding to NYCHA for a determination, on the existing record, in accordance with this decision. | Case |