Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium | 879 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2018) | 85 ERC 2299, 27 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 517, 2018 WL 385682 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2018) | PETA, an animal rights organization, brought this action in July 2015 to enjoin the Miami Seaquarium. The injunction would force the marine park to relinquish possession of a killer whale, Lolita, by releasing her to a sea pen. The grounds for this injunction is an alleged violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act by the marine park when they confined the killer whale in such conditions that the confinement amounted to a taking of the endangered species of animal. PETA specifically alleged that the marine park took Lolita by harming and harassing her, citing thirteen different injuries that were directly caused by her confinement quarters. When Lolita’s species was recognized as an endangered species by the Act, it specifically excluded captive members of the species. Just two months prior to filing suit, PETA had successfully lobbied to have that exclusion removed from the listing, enabling the suit itself. The district court held for summary judgment in favor of the marine park, saying that to have taken an animal would require a grave threat or potential for a grave threat to the animal’s survival, and PETA did not provide evidence of conduct that met that standard. In this appeal, the court affirms the district court’s summary judgment, but disagrees with their standard for a taking of an animal. After lengthy analysis of the statutory language, this court lowers the standard to posing a threat of serious harm to the animal, rather than death of the animal. However, this court also holds that PETA did not prove that the Seaquarium’s confinement of Lolita met this standard either. Affirmed. | Case | |
| IN - Veterinary - Article 38.1. Veterinarians. | I.C. 25-38.1-1-1 to 25-38.1-5-5 | IN ST 25-38.1-1-1 to 25-38.1-5-5 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| CO - Impound - Article 4. Disease Control | C. R. S. A. § 25-4-610 | CO ST § 25-4-610 | This Colorado statute provides that it is unlawful for any owner of any dog, cat, other pet animal, or other mammal which has not been inoculated as required by the order of the county board of health or board of health of a health department to allow it to run at large. The health department or health officer may capture and impound any such dog, cat, other pet animal. | Statute | |
| US - Critical Habitat - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the California tiger | 2004 WL 2671444 (F.R.) | 50 CFR Part 17, RIN 1018-AT44 |
The FWS through this rule has designated a critical habitat in Santa Barbara County, California for the California Tiger Salamander (Ambystoma califoniese) (CTS) pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of 1973. This rule fulfills the final requirements of the settlement agreement reached in Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The reason for the designation of critical habitat for the CTS is the net loss in CTS grazing land over a 10 – 12 year period due to extensive farming, regardless of the efforts made to increase the amount of suitable grazing land. |
Administrative | |
| U.S. v. Smith | 29 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1994) |
Defendant was convicted of possessing Bald Eagle feathers in violation of Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) after receiving the feathers in the mail from a friend to complete a craft project. On appeal, defendant challenged her conviction, alleging that she did not possess the requisite knowledge and that the act itself was vague as to the level of intent, or scienter . The court affirmed defendant's conviction finding that the evidence established that defendant knowingly possessed eagle feathers in violation of MBTA, the conviction did not amount to punishment of wholly passive conduct contrary to defendant's suggestion, and that MBTA was not vague nor overbroad with regard to intent. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion of the Eagle Act . |
Case | ||
| State v. Hershey | 401 P.3d 256 ( Or. Ct. App.,2017) | 286 Or.App. 824 , 2017 WL 3045807 | In this Oregon case, defendant appeals his conviction of first-degree animal neglect. Specifically, defendant argues the denial of his motion to suppress evidence was erroneous. The evidence was obtained when the local sheriff (Glerup) entered defendant's property to administer emergency aid to defendant's cattle. During testimony in the motion to suppress, Glerup testified that he first received a call from defendant's neighbors who reported that the cattle appeared to be "starving." That neighbor even called defendant, who assured her that the cattle "were okay" and being cared for by a hired person. Sheriff Glerup called that individual who stated he had not been hired and defendant had been gone a week. The sheriff subsequently received a call that the cattle were in need of immediate aid and in poor condition. These conditions prompted the warrantless search. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress where the state failed to establish that the warrantless entry was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. In doing so, defendant contends that the case establishing that the emergency aid doctrine applies to animals (Fessenden) was wrongly decided. This argument was dispensed by the court because it was not properly preserved at trial. Alternatively, defendant argues that the state failed to satisfy the requirements for the emergency aid exception. In reviewing defendant's claim, the court noted that in Fessenden, the emergency aid doctrine justifies warrantless activity, “when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals . . ." In this case, the court found that the officer's belief that immediate aid was necessary where the cattle appeared to be "near death" was reasonable. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress; defendant's conviction was affirmed. | Case | |
| State Map of Interference with Assistance Animal Laws | As of 2022, 47 states have laws that protect assistance animals from criminal interference, theft, and assault. Only Alaska, Iowa, and Montana do not. | State map | |||
| GA - Wildlife rehabilitation - Chapter 2. Licenses, Permits, and Stamps Generally | Ga. Code Ann., § 27-2-22 | GA ST § 27-2-22 | This Georgia law makes it unlawful for any person to keep sick or injured wildlife without first obtain a wildlife rehabilitation permit from the state department. | Statute | |
| CA - Wild Animal - Chapter 2. Importation, Transportation, and Sheltering of Restricted Live Wild Animals. | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 2116 - 2203 | CA FISH & G § 2116 - 2203 | The California Legislature adopted this act based on a findings that wild animals are captured for importation and resold in California and that some populations of wild animals are being depleted, that many animals die in captivity or transit, and that some keepers of wild animals lack sufficient knowledge or facilities for the proper care of wild animals. It was the intention of the Legislature to regulate the importation, transportation, and possession of wild animals to protect the native wildlife and agricultural interests against damage from the existence at large of certain wild animals, and to protect the public health and safety in this state. The act defines "wild animal" and classifies them by species. Among other things, the act also includes inspection and permit provisions that govern the treatment of wild animals and the actions that may be taken where they are concerned. | Statute | |
| Barger v. Jimerson | 276 P.2d 744 (Colo. 1954) | 130 Colo. 459 (1954) |
In order for liability to attach in an action for damages for personal injuries resulting from a dog attack, defendants had to have notice of the vicious propensities of their dog. Even though the dog had never attacked a person before, a natural fierceness or disposition to mischief was sufficient to classify the dog as "vicious." Finally, it is permissible for the jury to consider the loss of earning capacity of plaintiff resulting from the injuries as an element of damages. |
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