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Displaying 101 - 110 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF CINCINNATI v. THE GORILLA FOUNDATION | Slip Copy, 2019 WL 414971 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2019) | In 1991, the plaintiff, Zoological Society of Cincinnati, transferred a western lowland Gorilla named Ndume who had been living at the Zoo to The Gorilla Foundation (TGF) in Northern California. Ndume was sent to TGF in hopes that he and another gorilla there, named Koko, would mate and produce offspring. That never happened. In 2015, the Zoo and TGF entered into a new written agreement which expressly superseded any prior agreements. The agreement provided that upon the death of Koko, Ndume was to be placed at an institution that is accredited by the Association of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA). TGF is not an AZA accredited institution. KoKo died and the Zoo now wants to transfer Ndume back to the zoo. TGF has not made arrangements for a transfer to be carried out. The Zoo brought this suit seeking specific enforcement of the 2015 agreement and contends that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. TGF argued that the agreement was illegal and unenforceable because the transfer would harm Ndume. TGF identified a number of potential risks, particularly, that Ndume has a Balantidium Coli infection. TGF contended that stress could trigger an outbreak which could be fatal. The court was unpersuaded and stated that TGF signed the 2015 agreement less than 3 years before the present dispute arose and that all of the circumstances that TGF contends makes compliance with the agreement risky existed when the agreement was negotiated. TGF also contended that the agreement is impracticable due to unreasonable (non-monetary) costs. However, the Court again stated that TGF knew these facts and circumstances when it entered into the agreement. The Court granted the Zoo's motion for summary judgment and denied TGF's request for a continuance to permit it to take discovery. The parties were ordered to confer and attempt to reach a consensus on as many aspects of the protocol for transporting Ndume to the Zoo as possible. If within 30 days of the date of the order the parties cannot reach a consensus, they will have to file a joint statement setting out any issues on which they have reached a stalemate. | Case | ||
| WA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Chapter 16.52) | West's RCWA 16.52.010 - 360 | WA ST 16.52.010 - 360 | This section of statutes contains Washington's anti-cruelty provisions. Under the section, "animal" means any nonhuman mammal, bird, reptile, or amphibian. Sections 16.52.205 and 16.52.207 are the primary anti-cruelty provisions that categorize cruelty in either the first or second degree. A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the first degree (a class C felony) when he or she intentionally inflicts substantial pain on, causes physical injury to, or kills an animal by a means causing undue suffering, or forces a minor to inflict unnecessary pain, injury, or death on an animal. A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree (a misdemeanor) if, under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the person knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence inflicts unnecessary suffering or pain upon an animal. An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree the owner knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence fails to provide the animal with necessary food, water, shelter, rest, sanitation, ventilation, space, or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain as a result of the failure, or if he or she abandons the animal. | Statute | |
| Earl v. Piowaty | 42 A.D.3d 865 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) | 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 06212, 2007 WL 2127342 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.), 839 N.Y.S.2d 861 | Plaintiffs' son was seriously injured when he was bitten in the face by a dog that belonged to defendant Susan Piowaty. Plaintiffs brought action on behalf of their son against Piowaty and the animal shelter from which Piowaty had adopted the dog two weeks prior to the incident, alleging that they had constructive notice of the dog's vicious propensities because of a minor incident earlier that week. However, this court agreed with the denial of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because there remains a triable issue as to the defendants' notice of the dog's vicious propensities at the time of the son's injury. | Case | |
| Gill v. Brown | 695 P.2d 1276 (Idaho App., 1985) |
Plaintiffs sought to recover property damages and damage and for mental anguish sustained when Brown allegedly shot and killed a donkey owned by the Gills. By alleging that Brown's conduct was reckless and that they thereby suffered extreme mental anguish and trauma, the court held that the Gills have alleged facts that, if proven, could permit recovery under an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action. Accordingly, the court held that the district court erred by striking the Gills' claim for damages caused by mental anguish and the cause was remanded. |
Case | ||
| WI - Montello - Breed - § 117-17 Pit Bull Dogs. | MONTELLO, WI., CODE § 117-17 (1989) |
In Montello, Wisconsin, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog, provided that dogs previously registered may be kept subject to certain requirement. These requirements are keeping the dog properly confined or on a leash and muzzle, posting a "Beware of Dog” sign, keeping $50,000 liability insurance, and taking photographs for identification purposes. Sale or transfer of ownership of pit bulls is prohibited. Failure to comply may result in the seizure and impoundment of the dog, a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for up to 30 days. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Daniele v Weissenberger | 2002 WL 31813949,136 A Crim R 390 | 2002 WASCA 346 |
Court uphold conviction for failure to provide food and water for horses. Even thought not the owner, he was the responsible party. Sentence of $3,000 fine and suspended 3 month was not excessive. |
Case | |
| Reid v. Kramer | Not Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 2866091 (Mich. Ct. App. July 2, 2019) | In July of 2017, Alpena County Animal Control Officer Michelle Reid, filed a complaint against the respondents alleging that a black and tan German Shepherd named Bruiser had attacked or bit a person. The victim, Joshua Henderson, testified that as he was jogging past the respondents’ house, Bruiser ran toward him and bit his left bicep and left forearm. The Respondents stated that Bruiser had never attacked or bitten anyone before and was raised around children. The prosecutor clarified that euthanization was not being sought at the time, however, the district court found that Bruiser had caused serious injury to Henderson and noted the possibility of Bruiser injuring children in the future and ordered Bruiser to be destroyed. The Respondents appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the district court’s decision. The Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Respondents argued that the circuit court erred in determining that Bruiser was a dangerous animal and that the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser caused death or serious injury or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals concluded that Bruiser fit the definition of a dangerous animal under the statute, however, the Court agreed with the Respondents that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Bruiser caused serious injury or was likely to cause death or serious injury in the future. In order for an animal to be destroyed, it must be more than dangerous. Henderson’s injuries consisted of scrapes, puncture wounds, and three stitches. Those injuries did not rise to the level of a “serious injury” as defined under MCL 287.321(e) which defines serious injury as permanent, serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or serious impairment of bodily function. The district court did not properly interpret MCL 287.322 and based their decision solely on the fact that Bruiser had bitten someone once and concluded that because of that, the court knew that Bruiser was more likely to do so again. The circuit court erred by affirming the district court’s order because the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser had caused serious injury or death to a person or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court. | Case | ||
| Incidente de apelación en autos G. B., R. s/inf. ley 14346 | Causa Nº 17001-06-00/13 | This is an appeal of a decision in first instance where the lower court gave the custody of 68 dogs to the Center for Prevention of Animal Cruelty. The 68 dogs were found in extremely poor conditions, sick, malnourished, dehydrated under the custody of the Defendant. Various dogs had dermatitis, conjunctivitis, otitis, sparse hair and boils, lacerations, pyoderma and ulcers. The officers that executed the search also found the decomposing body of a dead dog inside the premises. The lower court determined the defendant had mental disabilities, which did not allow her to comprehend the scope of her acts, for which she was not found guilty of animal cruelty. However, the court determined that she was not suited to care for the dogs. The Defendant appealed the decision arguing that the authorities were not entitled to seize the animals. | Case | ||
| US - Assistance animals, housing - Part 8. Nondiscrimination Based on Handicap | 24 C.F.R. § 8.1 to .6 | The purpose of this part is to effectuate section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (29 U.S.C 794), to the end that no otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States shall, solely by reason of his or her handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. | Administrative | ||
| TX - Disaster - § 418.043. Other Powers and Duties (pet disaster planning) | V. T. C. A., Government Code § 418.043 | TX GOVT § 418.043 | The Texas Division of Emergency Management is directed to assist political subdivisions in developing plans for the humane evacuation, transport, and temporary sheltering of service animals and household pets in a disaster. | Statute |