Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NY - Exotic - Chapter 43-B. Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's E. C. L. § 11-0917 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 11-0917 | This New York laws begin by stating that wild game and other wildlife may only be possessed if lawfully taken in compliance with the Fish and Wildlife Law and the accompanying regulations. Skunk, bobcat, mink, raccoon and muskrat may be bought and sold alive during their respective open seasons. No live wolf, coyote, coydog, fox, skunk, venomous reptile or raccoon shall be possessed or transported, except under a license or permit issued by the department. Every such license or permit shall contain a prominent notice warning the licensee or permittee of his or her duty to exercise due care in safeguarding the public from attack; failure to do so is a crime under section three hundred seventy of the agriculture and markets law. | Statute | |
| MI - Hunting - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M. C. L. A. 324.41701 - 41712 | MI ST 324.41701 - 41712 | These sections set out the guidelines for private shooting preserves, including the species of wild animals and birds permitted to be hunted. | Statute | |
| State v. Dye | 309 P.3d 1192 (Wash.,2013) |
The Defendant appealed his conviction for residential burglary. The victim in the case was an adult man with significant developmental disabilities. At trial, the State obtained permission to allow a dog named "Ellie" to sit at the victim's feet during testimony. On appeal of the Court of Appeal's decision, the Supreme Court held that defendant failed to establish that his rights to a fair trial were violated (283 P.3d 1130 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2012)). Further, any prejudice that resulted from Ellie's presence was minor and largely mitigated by the limiting instruction that the trial court gave. The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed. |
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| Hammer v. American Kennel Club | 304 A.D.2d 74 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2003) | 758 N.Y.S.2d 276, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 11491 (2003) |
Plaintiff Jon Hammer is the owner of a pure-bred Brittany Spaniel which has a natural, undocked tail approximately ten (10) inches long. He contends that tail docking is a form of animal cruelty, and that the practical effect of defendant American Kennel Club's tail standards for Brittany Spaniels is to effectively exclude his dog from meaningfully competing shows unless he complies with what he perceives as an unfair and discriminatory practice. Specifically, his amended complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the complained-of standard (1) unlawfully discriminates against plaintiff by effectively precluding him from entering his dog in breed competitions, (2) is arbitrary and capricious, (3) violates Agriculture and Markets Law § 353, and (4) is null and void as in derogation of law; he further seeks an injunction prohibiting defendants from applying, enforcing or utilizing the standard. The court held that plaintiff lacked standing to obtain any of the civil remedies he sought for the alleged violation of Agriculture and Markets Law Section 353. The Legislature's inclusion of a complete scheme for enforcement of its provisions precludes the possibility that it intended enforcement by private individuals as well. The dissent disagreed with the majority's standing analysis, finding that plaintiff's object is not to privately enforce § 353, insofar as seeking to have the defendants' prosecuted for cruelty. Rather, plaintiff was seeking a declaration that the AKC's standard for judging the Brittany Spaniel deprives him of a benefit of membership on the basis of his unwillingness to violate a state law and, thus, he wanted to enjoin defendants from enforcing that standard against him. The dissent found that whether tail docking for purely cosmetic reasons violates § 353 is solely a question of law and entirely appropriate for a declaratory judgment. Cosmetic docking of tails was wholly unjustifiable under the law in the dissent's eyes. While plaintiff pointed out that docking may serve some purposes for hunting dogs, it is not a justification for docking the tails of non-hunting dogs, such as plaintiff's, for purposes of AKC competitions. |
Case | |
| US - Critical Habitat Listing for the Arroyo Toad | CFR Part 17, RIN 1018-AT42 | This rule designates 11,695 acres of critical habitat for the arroyo toad in Santa Barbara , Ventura , Los Angeles , San Bernardino and Riverside counties in California . FWS had to designate critical habitat for the arroyo toad as a result of a settlement agreement in Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service . The critical habitat was designated in accordance with the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and its amendments. This specific critical habitat is a revision of the final rule on arroyo toad critical habitat designation of 2/1/01 ( 69 FR 9414 ), which was deemed deficient and was overruled. | Administrative | ||
| Scotland - Animal Welfare - Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Act 2006 | 2006 asp 11 | An Act establishing penalties for engaging in certain activities that are considered detrimental to animal welfare in Scotland. Part 1 of the Act contains detailed provisions concerning animal health and preventing the spread of disease. Activities that constitute offenses under Part 2 of the Act include: causing an animal unnecessary suffering, mutilating an animal’s body, docking a dog’s tail (with certain limited exceptions), administering a poisonous or injurious substance to an animal, and engaging in or attending animal fighting. Nothing in the Act applies to anything lawfully done under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 or to anything which occurs in the normal course of fishing. | Statute | ||
| WI - Research animals - 36.40. Use of animals for research purposes | W.S.A. 36.40 | WI ST 36.40 | This Wisconsin law states that the board of higher education for the University of Wisconsin System shall adopt criteria for researchers to follow regarding humane treatment of animals for scientific research purposes. | Statute | |
| ND - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 12.1-21.1. Animal Research Facility Damage | NDCC 12.1-21.1-01 to 05 | ND ST 12.1-21.1-01 to 05 | This chapter concerns unlawful interference with animal facilities. Under the section, a person may not intentionally damage or destroy an animal facility or the property or animals located therein; exercise control over the animals or property; enter an animal facility not open to the public with the intent on committing prohibited acts; enter a facility and remain concealed to commit prohibited acts; or intentionally release an animal at a facility. Violation is a class B felony if damage is $10,000 or more, a class C felony if the damage is at least $500 to under $10,000, and a class A misdemeanor if damage is less than $500. Entering an animal facility and using or attempting to use a camera, video recorder, or any other video or audio recording equipment is a class B misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| KS - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | K. S. A. § 47-645 - 646a; 47-835; 47-1701 - 1737; 79-1301; 32-954; 29-409 | KS ST § 47-645 - 646a; 47-835; 47-1701 - 1737; 79-1301; 32-954; 29-409 | These Kansas statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing of dogs, specific laws that outline the care of dogs in kennel situations, and laws pertaining to dogs who endanger livestock. | Statute | |
| Hulsizer v. Labor Day Committee, Inc. | 734 A.2d 848 (Pa.,1999) | 557 Pa. 467 (Pa.,1999) |
This Pennsylvania case involves an appeal by allowance from orders of Superior Court which affirmed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County and imposed counsel fees and costs upon the appellants, Clayton Hulsizer and the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (PSPCA). Hulsizer, an agent of the PSPCA, filed this action in equity seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the appellee, Labor Day Committee, Inc., for their role in conducting an annual pigeon shoot. Hulsizer sought to have appellee enjoined from holding the shoot, alleging that it violates the cruelty to animals statute. At issue is whether Hulsizer has standing to bring an enforcement action in Schuylkill County. This court found no inconsistency in reading Section 501 and the HSPOEA (Humane Society Police Officer Enforcement Act) together as statutes that are in pari materia. Since the HSPOEA does not limit the jurisdiction of humane society police officers by requiring them to apply separately to the courts of common pleas in every county in Pennsylvania, the officer had standing to bring an enforcement action. The lower court's orders were reversed.
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