Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MI - Constitutional Provisions - Protection of Natural Resources | M. C. L. A. Const. Art. 4, § 52 | MI CONST Art. 4, § 52 | This section declares the protection, conservation, and development of the state's natural resources to be of paramount public concern and the legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction. | Statute | |
| People v. Arroyo | 777 N.Y.S.2d 836 (N.Y. 2004) | 3 Misc.3d 668, 2004 N.Y.Slip Op. 24067 |
This case presents the court with a novel question: Does a pet owner commit an act of cruelty, for which he or she could be prosecuted criminally, by not providing an ill pet (in this case, terminally ill) with medical care? Defendant charged with violation of New York's anticruelty statute and moved for dismissal. In engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court held that: (1) provision prohibiting the deprivation of "necessary sustenance" was vague when applied to defendant, and (2) that the provision prohibiting "unjustifiably" causing pain to an animal was also vague when applied to defendant. Motion granted. |
Case | |
| Benningfield v. Zinsmeister | 367 S.W.3d 561 (Ky.,2012) | 2012 WL 2361778 |
An 8-year-old boy and his sister were walking down a street when they were approached by a Rottweiler. Scared, the boy ran and was attacked by the dog, which caused the boy to suffer serious injuries. As a result, the mother of the child sued the owner of the dog and the landlord of the house where the dog resided under a Kentucky dog bite statute. The landlord won at both the trial and the appellate court level. Upon granting discretionary review for the case, the Kentucky Supreme Court investigated whether or not a landlord could be held strictly liable under the dog bite statute. The Court ruled that a landlord could, but only if the landlord permitted the dog to stay on or about the premises. Since the attack did not occur on or about the premises, the landlord was not found liable under the dog bite statute. |
Case | |
| US - AWA - Subpart D. Specifications/Standards for Nonhuman Primates | 9 C.F.R. § 3.75 to .92 | This portion of the AWA regulations contains the humane care provisions for non-human primates. Included are requirements for housing facilities, primary enclosures, provisions for psychological well-being, feeding, watering, sanitization, employee requirements, and transportation standards. | Administrative | ||
| State Holding Period Laws for Impounded Companion Animals |
Holding period laws are state requirements that determine how long an impounded animal must be “held” by a government entity (or contracted agent) before it can be released or euthanized. |
State map | |||
| MD - Liens - § 16-401. Lien for care or custody | Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 16-401 | MD Code, Commercial Law, § 16-401 | Under Maryland law, any person who owns or operates a livery stable or other establishment who gives care or custody to livestock will have a lien on the livestock for any reasonable charge relating to: board and custody, training, veterinarian and blacksmith service, and other maintenance expenses. If the lien is not paid within 30 days after payment is due, the owner of the livery stable is entitled to sell the livestock. | Statute | |
| NE - Dangerous - ARTICLE 6. DOGS AND CATS. (B) DANGEROUS DOGS. | Neb. Rev. St. § 54-617 to 54-624 | NE ST § 54-617 to 54-624 | These Nebraska statutes outline the state's dangerous dog laws. Among the provisions include a requirement that the dog must be restrained when not in a secure enclosure on the owner's property. There is also a requirement that owners must post warning signs on the property notifying people that a dangerous dog is present. If a dangerous dog bites a person, the owner can be found guilty of a Class IV misdemeanor and the dog will be destroyed. | Statute | |
| KY - Exotic Animals - Chapter 65. General Provisions Applicable to Counties, Cities | KRS § 65.877 | KY ST § 65.877 | This Kentucky statue authorizes counties and cities to regulate or prohibit the holding of inherently dangerous wildlife. For example, the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources has identified some of the following animals as being dangerous: African buffalo, Hippopotamus, Hyenas, Old world badger, Lions, jaguars, leopards, or tigers, Clouded leopard, Cheetah, Elephants, Rhinoceroses, Gorillas, Baboons, drills, or mandrills, Crocodiles, Alligators or caimans, certain snakes, Gila monsters or beaded lizards, Komodo dragon, Wolverine, Bears, Wolf, mountain lion. | Statute | |
| Kitchin ex rel. Kitchin v. Halifax County | 665 S.E.2d 760 (N.C.App.,2008) |
In this North Carolina case, defendant dog owners appealed from a decision of the County Board of Health that ruled their dog could not be returned home because of the dog's potential exposure to rabies as result of attacking a raccoon (the dog was scheduled for euthanization). After the Board denied the owners' appeal, they filed a complaint against county which contained motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent dog's quarantine and for class certification. The Court of Appeals held that the owners' appeal of Board's decision to quarantine dog was moot because dog had already been returned home. The action against the animal control officers was dismissed because the officers were shielded by governmental immunity. |
Case | ||
| Caribbean Conservation Corp., Inc. v. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Com'n | 838 So.2d 492(Fla. 2003) | 28 Fla. L. Weekly S46, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S134 |
The petitioners' challenge is whether the Legislature can require the newly created Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) to comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), when adopting rules or regulations in respect to those species of marine life that are defined as endangered, threatened, or species of special concern. The petitioners are not-for-profit groups and individuals who allege several statutory sections unconstitutionally usurp the constitutional authority of the FWCC to regulate marine life. The FWCC and the Attorney General (respondents) disagree and argue that the Legislature can require the application of the APA and that the statutes that delineate power to the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) are constitutional. The issue was whether the creation of the FWCC also gave it power to regulate endangered, threatened, and species of special concern or whether that power remained with the DEP. The court found that such power remained with the DEP regarding endangered and threatened species of marine life. However, it could discern no statutory basis in effect on March 1, 1998, for the DEP having regulatory or executive power in respect to a category of marine species designated "of special concern" so that portion of the challenged statutes was held unconstitutional. |
Case |