Results
Displaying 101 - 110 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Futch v. State | 314 Ga.App. 294 (2012) | 2012 WL 603655 (2012) |
Defendant appealed conviction of cruelty to animals for shooting and killing a neighbor's dog. The Court of Appeals held that the restitution award of $3,000 was warranted even though the owner only paid $750 for the dog. The dog had been trained to hunt and retrieve, and an expert testified that such a dog had a fair market value between $3,000 and $5,000. |
Case | |
| Wales - Dogs - The Microchipping of Dogs (Wales) Regulations 2015 | 2015 No. 1990 (W. 300) | Regulations providing for the compulsory microchipping of dogs and the recording of each dog’s identity and its keeper’s contact details on a database. | Statute | ||
| US - AWA - Animal Welfare; Inspection, Licensing, and Procurement of Animals | 2004 WL 1561072 (F.R.) | Docket No. 97-121-3 |
Several changes and updates have been made to the licensing requirements, the procedures for licenses renewals, and restrictions upon acquisitions of dogs, cats, and other animals. Although there have been several minor changes, with little affect to the regulation, there have been some more significant changes as well. The new regulation seems to tighten restrictions, and provides specific guidelines for license applicants. |
Administrative | |
| IA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws | I. C. A. § 717B.1 - 717E3 | IA ST § 717B.1 - 717E.3 | Under Title XVI of Iowa's criminal code, there are several chapters that outlaw forms of animal cruelty and animal fighting. The main animal cruelty provisions are contained in chapter 717B (Injuries to Animals other than Livestock). This chapter defines "animal" as any nonhuman vertebrate. However, it excludes livestock, game, fur-bearing animal, fish, reptile, or amphibian unless a person owns, confines, or controls the game, fur-bearing animal, fish, reptile, or amphibian, and any nongame considered a "nuisance." There are separate prohibitions against animal abuse, animal neglect, animal torture, abandonment of a cat or dog, and injury to a police service dog. Under both the animal abuse and animal torture sections, a first offense results in an aggravated misdemeanor. However, animal torture requires a mandatory psychological evaluation and graduates subsequent convictions to felony status. Exclusions under the various sections include veterinary care, hunting, animal husbandry, and scientific research, among others. Other criminal chapters include chapters 717C.1 (Bestiality), 717D (Animal Contest Events), and 717E (Pets as Prizes). | Statute | |
| CA - Abandonment - § 597s. Abandonment of animals | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597s | CA PENAL § 597s | This statute makes it a misdemeanor to willfully abandon an animal, but does not apply to the release or rehabilitation and release of native California wildlife pursuant to statute or regulations of the California Department of Fish and Game. | Statute | |
| American Horse Protection Assoc. v. Andrus | 608 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1979) |
The court stated that the Secretary’s decision to remove 3,500 to 7,000 wild horses in order to maintain the horse population at a permanent level might qualify as “major” federal action and thus require an EIS before removal could occur. While the secretary has wide discretion under the WFRHBA, he has no discretion regarding compliance with NEPA. The court also held that the exercise of jurisdiction by two courts over public lands created no threat of conflicting decisions on range utilization, because the courts only determined whether the land use decision was an informed one. |
Case | ||
| State v. Hammond | 569 S.W.3d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018) | Defendant Hammond appeals his conviction for misdemeanor animal abuse in violation of § 578.012. The facts underlying the conviction stem from defendant’s conduct with a horse. In 2016, police were dispatched to a horse that was "down" on a road. The officer observed multiple injuries on the horse's hooves, fetlocks, and lower legs. Its hooves were severely abraded, which was confirmed by subsequent veterinary examination. Another officer observed markings on the road indicative of a "blood trail" from defendant's residence to the location of the horse. According to this officer, defendant told him that he had been "doing farrier stuff to his horses and this particular horse had broke away from them five times and broke a couple of lead lines, burned some people’s hands, and that he was going to teach the horse a lesson." Ultimately, the officers were able to get the horse to stand and loaded into a trailer. It later died at the animal clinic to where it was taken. Defendant was charged with felony animal abuse and a jury trial was held. The jury convicted defendant of the lesser-included misdemeanor animal abuse. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow his counsel to read Missouri's right-to-farm amendment when it instructed the jury on the amendment. The court noted that, similar to a prior case evoking the right-to-farm amendment, the amendment itself was not intended to nullify or curtail longstanding laws. The prohibition against animal cruelty existed in some form in the Missouri code for 145 years. Further, the court disagreed with defendant's contention that his prosecution criminalized a legitimate farming practice. The jury convicted defendant based on a finding that, when he pulled the horse behind his truck, his conscious object was to cause injury or suffering to the horse. While defendant contends that his was employing a legitimate, established farming technique to "train" the horse, the jury rejected his claim. Defendant's claim on appeal that the animal abuse law could then be used to prosecute farmers for other legitimate farming activities (i.e., branding, castration, use of whips, etc.) was also rejected. The court found that the conscious object of such activities is not to inflect pain or suffering, but to achieve another goal. The pain is "incidental to the farmer's legitimate objectives." The jury found this not to be the case with defendant. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Hammond to read the right-to-farm amendment to the jury, and when it refused to instruct the jury on the amendment’s terms. Affirmed. | Case | ||
| Anti-cruelty laws that restrain future ownership of animals | This map surveys state laws that allow sentencing courts to restrict future ownership or possession of animals by those convicted of animal cruelty, commonly called "Possession Bans." To date (2024), it appears that 39 states have such laws. Generally, these laws apply only to felony convictions except for a couple states. With some state laws like Indiana, Missouri, and Texas, the possession ban covers only the animals who were subject to the cruelty and any other animals possessed by defendant at the time of the offense. Kansas' law makes those convicted of dogfighting who own dogs within five years of conviction a separate crime. Uniquely, Kentucky's laws restrain ownership if the crime involved sexual assault of an animal or if the animal at issue was an equine. The law does not prevent ownership of future animals. Most laws do address the issue of future animals, though. The most common number of years under which ownership of animals is enjoined by the court is five (5) years. However, California allows ten (10) years for a felony conviction and Delaware expands this to fifteen (15) years. Several states including Maine, Michigan, and Washington enable courts to impose permanent relinquishment of the ability to own or possess animals. The majority of states allow the sentencing court to affix a “reasonable” term of restricted ownership. Some states describe this as a term the judge feels “necessary” or “appropriate.” A few states even limit the ability of the defendant to work with animals in current or future jobs for certain convictions. These laws are distinguished from pre-conviction forfeiture laws that authorize law enforcement or humane officers to impound animals subject to suspected cruel treatment during the pendency of the proceedings. | State map | |||
| US - MMPA - Legislative History of 1972 | U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 1971 WL 11285 (Leg.Hist.) |
This document contains most of the legislative history surrounding the 1972 adoption of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. |
Statute | ||
| AR - Exotic Pets - Subchapter 4. Ownership and Breeding of Wolves and Wolf-Dog Hybrids | A.C.A. § 20-19-401 - 408 | AR ST § 20-19-401 to 408 | This chapter of Arkansas laws concerns the regulation of wolves and wolf-dog hybrids kept as companion animals. Under the law, a "wolf-dog hybrid” means any animal which is publicly acknowledged by its owner as being the offspring of a wolf and domestic dog; however, no animal may be judged to be a wolf or wolf-dog hybrid based strictly on its appearance. The specific rabies vaccination requirements for wolf-dog hybrids are detailed as well as confinement requirements (i.e, specific fence dimensions). If a wolf or wolf-dog hybrid bites a person or injures or destroys another animal while out of its confined area, the person responsible for the adequate confinement of the animal upon conviction shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. | Statute |