Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| VA - Ordinances - § 3.2-6543. Governing body of any locality may adopt certain ordinances | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6543 | VA ST § 3.2-6543 | This Virginia statute provides that the governing bodies of counties, cities, and towns of the Commonwealth are hereby authorized to adopt, in their discretion, ordinances which parallel statutory sections dealing with licensing of dogs, taxation, impoundment, and regulation of dangerous dogs. It also provides that nothing in this section shall be construed so as to prevent or restrict any local governing body from adopting local animal control ordinances which are more stringent than the relevant state statutory sections. It further outlines how ordinances may impose civil penalties for violations of the above. | Statute | |
| OH - Horse slaughter - Chapter 919. Horse Meat | R.C. § 919.01 - 919.99 | OH ST § 919.01 - 919.99 | These Ohio statutes deal with horse slaughter and horse meat. Any person who has any establishment that processes and sells horse meat for human food must be licensed by the department of agriculture. The statutes also stipulate certain labeling, signage, and record-keeping requirements. A violation is a first degree misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| R. v. Senior | [1899] 1 QB 283 |
Held: The word "wilfully", when used in the context of an offence prohibiting cruelty to children, "means that the act is done deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or inadvertence, but so that the mind of the person who does the act goes with it" ( per Lord Russell of Killowen C.J.). Note: the word "wilfully" is occasionally an element of animal welfare offences, such as that of wilfully, without any reasonable cause or excuse, administering a poisonous drug or substance to an animal (Protection of Animals Act 1911, s 1(1)(d)). |
Case | ||
| US - Eagle - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Reopening of Comment Period | 1995 WL 121178 (F.R.) |
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) is reopening the comment period on the bald eagle reclassification proposal for thirty days. On July 12, 1994, the Service proposed reclassifying the bald eagles of the lower 48 States as threatened, except those already listed as threatened and those of the Southwestern Recovery Region and Mexico. The bald eagles of the Southwestern Recovery Region were proposed to remain listed as endangered. The Service also proposed classifying bald eagles in Mexico as endangered; they are not currently listed as endangered or threatened. Specific public comment was solicited on the status of bald eagles in the Southwest and Mexico and the distinctness of those eagles as a separate population. New information indicates that the Southwestern and Mexican bald eagles may not warrant a classification as endangered. The Service is making available for public review and comment information recently received about bald eagles of the Southwestern Recovery Region. |
Administrative | ||
| SD - Fur - Chapter 40-35. Domesticated Fur-Bearing Animals. | S D C L § 40-35-1 to 6 | SD ST § 40-35-1 to 6 | These South Dakota statutes pertain to domesticated fur-bearing animals. These animals are subject to private ownership, and documentation is required to possess live fur-bearing animals. Products made from domestic furbearers are considered to be agricultural products and breeding such animals, or marketing the products, is an agricultural pursuit subject to the Department of Agriculture. | Statute | |
| NH - Exotic Pets, Wildlife - Chapter 207. Import, Possession, or Release of Wildlife. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 207:14 - 207:15-a | NH ST § 207:14 - 207:15-a | This New Hampshire section states that no person shall import, possess, sell, exhibit, or release any live marine species or wildlife, or the eggs or progeny thereof, without first obtaining a permit from the executive director except as otherwise permitted. The executive director has the authority to determine the time period and any other conditions governing the issuance of such permit. Any wildlife release or imported contrary to these provisions are subject to seizure. | Statute | |
| American Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, Inc. | 659 F.3d 13 (C.A.D.C., 2011) | 2011 WL 5108581 (C.A.D.C.) |
The Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, affirmed the lower court's finding that plaintiffs lack standing to sue Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus for violation of the Endangered Species Act. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the use of two training methods for controlling elephants, bullhooks and chaining, constitute a "taking" under the Act. Here, the court found no clear error by the district court as to former employee Tom Rider's standing to sue where Rider's testimony did not prove an injury-in-fact. As to API's standing, the court held that API did not meet either informational standing or standing under a Havens test. |
Case | |
| KY - Louisville/Jefferson County - Title IX: General Regulations (Chapter 91: Animals) | Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government Code of Ordinances § 91.098 MUTILATION OF ANIMALS |
In Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky, no person shall crop a dog’s ears or tail, except a veterinarian. Additionally, no person shall mutilate any animal whether dead or alive; however, this provision does not apply to accepted livestock practices concerning humane slaughter at licensed stockyards, slaughterhouses and meat packing establishments or on the premises of agricultural uses. Penalties are also included for violating these provisions. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Rosche v. Wayne Feed Div. Continental Grain Co. | 447 N.W.2d 94 (1989) | 152 Wis.2d 78 (1989) |
Pig breeder sought damages from feed manufacturer after pigs got sick, died, or became sterile after eating feed. The Court of Appeals held that jury should have been instructed that basic measure of damages for dead and injured livestock was based on market value of affected animals and did not include separate award for unborn litters. Failure to give proper instruction was prejudicial error that required a new trial on the issue of damages. |
Case | |
| State v. Archer | --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6579053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018) | This appeal concerns the lower court's granting of a motion to suppress evidence in an animal cruelty case. In April of 2017, a Ponce Inlet Police Department officer responded to defendant's residence after receiving a call about possible animal abuse. The caller described hearing sounds of a dog yelping and being beaten. Upon arrival, Officer Bines heard dog commands and the sounds of "striking flesh." He then knocked on defendant Archer's front door and began speaking with him on the front porch. Officer Bines told Archer that he was there to investigate a complaint of possible animal abuse to which Archer acknowledged that his dog bit him after he disciplined the dog for making a mess, so he "hit him a couple times." The officer then told Archer he had "probable cause" to enter the house or he could seek a warrant. Ultimately, Bines followed Archer to the backyard where Archer pointed to a dog in the corner that had its tongue out and was bloodied. Shortly thereafter, Bines determined the dog was dead. Archer was then cuffed and advised of his Miranda rights. After placing Archer in the police vehicle, Bines and other officers re-entered the home and yard to take pictures of the crime scene and to secure the canine's remains. After being charged with violating the cruelty to animals law (Section 828.12), Archer moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry of his home. The trial court granted and denied the motion in part, finding that while there were exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry, the exigency was over once it was determined that the dog was dead. The State of Florida appeals here. The appellate court first noted that while warrantless searches of homes are presumed illegal, an officer may enter when there are exigent circumstances including medical emergencies related to animals. Despite Archer's attempts to distinguish the instant facts from previous cases because there were no signs of blood or smells to indicate an emergency, the totality of the facts showed police received a call of animal cruelty in progress and the Officer Bines heard sounds of striking flesh. In addition, Archer advised Bines that he had struck the dog. Thus, the court found the officer "had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an urgent and immediate need to check on the safety and well-being of the dog and to connect the feared emergency to the house that they entered." As to suppression of the evidence found in plain view after entry onto the property, the appellate court also found the lower court erred in its decision. Under existing case law, once entry is allowed based on exigent circumstances, items found in plain view may be lawfully seized. The officer saw the dog in the corner before he knew the dog was dead, and thus, the exigency still existed. With respect to the photographs taken and the bodycam footage, the court held that re-entry into the home after Archer was in the patrol car did not require a warrant. Once an exigency that justified a warrantless search is over, law enforcement cannot go back and conduct further searches. However, in this case, the re-entry into Archer's house was a continuation of photographing evidence that was already found in plain view while the exigency existed (e.g., before the officers knew the dog was dead). The motion to suppress was affirmed in part and reversed in part. | Case |