Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jackson v. Georgalos | 133 A.D.3d 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) | 2015 WL 7269769 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 18, 2015) | Plaintiff appealed an order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The personal injury action arises from an incident where defendants' dog, who was barking at the time, jumped on the screen door causing the door to open, whereupon the dog ran out of the house. When the plaintiff turned to get away from the dog, her ankle twisted, causing her to fall on the steps and become injured. To recover in New York on such an action, a plaintiff must prove that the dog had vicious propensities and that the owner of the dog, or a person in control of the premises where the dog was, knew or should have known of such propensities. The court held that plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant was aware of the dog's alleged propensity to run out of the house and chase after people. Defendants' motion summary judgment and dismissal was affirmed. | Case | ||
| City of Sausalito v. O'Neill | 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004) | 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004) |
A City sought to prevent the National Park Service from implementing a development plan in a nearby recreational area claiming the Park service had violated various environmental statutes. The trial court held the City did not have standing to assert most of its claims and lost on the merits of the remaining claims. The Court of Appeals held the City did have standing to assert all of its claims, but lost on the merits of all its claims except those under the Coastal Zone Management Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. |
Case | ||
| Silver v. United States | 726 A.2d 191 (D.C. App. 1999) |
Appellants were each convicted of cruelty to animals, in violation of D.C. Code Ann. § 22-801 (1996), and of engaging in animal fighting, in violation of § 22-810. On appeal, both appellants contended that the evidence was insufficient to support convictions of animal cruelty, and of animal fighting. The appellate court found that the proof was sufficient. Each appellant also contended that his convictions merged because animal cruelty was a lesser-included offense of animal fighting. The appellate court found that each crime required proof of an element that the other did not. Appellants' convictions did not merge. |
Case | |||
| CA - Vehicle - § 23117. Transportation of animals; enclosure or restraint requirements | West's Ann.Cal.Vehicle Code § 23117 | CA VEHICLE § 23117 | This California law prohibits any person from transporting any animal in the open back of a vehicle on a highway unless the vehicle has sides that extend 46" vertically, or the animal is secured in a cage and cross-tethered to prevent it from jumping out of the vehicle. The law targets the transporting of dogs in the back of pickup trucks. Exclusions include the transportation of livestock and farm dogs. | Statute | ||
| Derecho Animal Volume 4 Núm 4 |
|
Policy | ||||
| JP - Cruelty - LAW CONCERNING THE PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF ANIMALS | Law No. 105, October 1, 1973 |
Article 1 states that, "The purpose of this Law is to prescribe matters relating to the prevention of cruelty to animals, the appropriate treatment of animals and other matters relating to the protection of animals, and to engender a feeling of love for animals among the people, thereby contributing to the development of respect for life and sentiments of amity and peace; and to prescribe matters relating to the control of animals, thereby preventing harm being done by animals to human life, body and property." |
Statute | |||
| MA - Initiatives - Question 3, Minimum Size Requirements for Farm Animal Containment (2016) | Question 3 | Massachusetts Question 3 is a law proposed by initiative petition and appears on the 2016 ballot. This proposed law would prohibit any farm owner or operator from knowingly confining any breeding pig, calf raised for veal, or egg-laying hen in a way that prevents the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. The Secretary of the Commonwealth's official summary states: "This proposed law would prohibit any farm owner or operator from knowingly confining any breeding pig, calf raised for veal, or egg-laying hen in a way that prevents the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. The proposed law would also prohibit any business owner or operator in Massachusetts from selling whole eggs intended for human consumption or any uncooked cut of veal or pork if the business owner or operator knows or should know that the hen, breeding pig, or veal calf that produced these products was confined in a manner prohibited by the proposed law. The proposed law would exempt sales of food products that combine veal or pork with other products, including soups, sandwiches, pizzas, hotdogs, or similar processed or prepared food items." A "yes" vote would prohibit any confinement of pigs, calves, and hens that prevents them from lying down, standing up, fully extending their limbs, or turning around freely. A "no" vote would make no change in current laws relative to the keeping of farm animals. | Statute | |||
| Animal Welfare Institute v. Martin | 623 F.3d 19 (C.A.1 (Me.), 2010). | 2010 WL 4104633 (C.A.1 (Me.)). |
Animal welfare organizations sued the State of Maine under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to stop the authorization of trapping activity that affected Canada lynx. The Court of Appeals held that such organizations had standing to sue, but that the District Court did not err in its refusal to grant a permanent injunction banning foothold traps or other relief. |
Case | ||
| Fitch v. Eiseman | 2000 WL 34545801 (Alaska 2000) (unpublished opinion) | The trial court approved a divorcing couple’s agreement for dogs to be with their children (and so travel to the husband's and wife’s houses as part of a shared custody agreement of their children). The wife did not abide by the agreement, so the Supreme Court remanded back to the trial court to determine sole ownership of the dog. | Case | |||
| US - Endangered Species - Subpart I - Interagency Cooperation | 50 C.F.R. § 17.94 | This section of the ESA regulations provides that all federal agencies must insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by them is not likely to result in the destruction or adverse modification of the constituent elements essential to the conservation of the listed species within these defined Critical Habitats. It also gives greater definition of what constitutes "Critical Habitat" and how agencies and interested parties can locate the boundaries of specified critical habitats. | Administrative |