Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dias v. City and County of Denver | 567 F.3d 1169 (C.A.10 (Colo.),2009) | 2009 WL 1490359 (C.A.10 (Colo.)) |
The Tenth Circuit took up a challenge to Denver's breed-specific ban against pitbull dogs. The plaintiffs, former residents of Denver, contended the ban is unconstitutionally vague on its face and deprives them of substantive due process. The district court dismissed both claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) before plaintiffs presented evidence to support their claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by prematurely dismissing the case at the 12(b)(6) stage. The Tenth Circuit agreed in part, finding that while the plaintiffs lack standing to seek prospective relief for either claim because they have not shown a credible threat of future prosecution, taking the factual allegations in the complaint as true the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the pit bull ban is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. |
Case |
| U.S. v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, Inc. | 45 F.Supp.2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999) |
Defendant on appeal contends that its conduct of electrocuting migratory birds does not fall within the ambit of either the MBTA or the BGEPA because each statute is directed at the more traditional "physical" takings of migratory birds through hunting and poaching. The court disagrees, finding the plain language of the statute and legislative history demonstrate an intent to include electrocutions. The court further delineates the differences in intent under each statute, finding that while the MBTA is a strict liability crime, the BGEPA is not. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |
| ID - Lien - § 45-805. Liens for services on or caring for property | I.C. § 45-805 | ID ST § 45-805 | This Idaho law deals with liens livery or boarding or feed stable proprietors and others pasturing livestock who have a lien. If the liens are not paid within sixty days after the work is done, service rendered, or feed or pasturing supplied, the person in whose favor such special lien is created may proceed to sell the property at a licensed public livestock auction market, or if the lien is on equines, to sell the animals at a sale offered to the public, after giving ten days' notice to the owner or owners of the livestock and the state brand inspector. Requirements for proper notice are provided in the law. | Statute |
| WA - Initiatives - Initiative Measure No. 1130 (AN ACT Relating to the prevention of farm animal cruelty) | Initiative Measure No. 1130 (2011) | This measure would prohibit confining egg-laying hens, as defined, in stacked cages or cages that prevent hens from turning around freely, lying down, standing up, or fully extending their wings. It would also prohibit selling eggs produced by hens thus confined. Violations would be a gross misdemeanor. The measure would not apply to medical research, veterinary treatment, transportation, certain temporary confinements, exhibitions, or during humane slaughter. The measure would take effect on January 1, 2018. Due to changes in signature requirements announced by the Washington Secretary of State to avoid duplication or error, the initiative did not receive an adequate number of signatures to appear on the ballot. | Statute | |
| China Intro |
Animal Law in China
|
Policy | ||
| Branks v. Kern | 348 S.E.2d 815 (N.C.App.,1986) | 348 S.E.2d 815 (1986) |
In this negligence action, a cat owner brought suit against veterinarian and veterinary clinic after she was bitten by her own cat while the cat was receiving treatment by the veterinarian. At issue, is whether the veterinarian owed a duty to the cat owner to exercise reasonable care in preventing the cat from harming the owner while the cat was being treated. In review of the lower court’s grant of motion for summary judgment, the Court of Appeals held that substantial issues of material fact existed to preclude the grant of summary judgment. However, this was overturned on appeal at the Supreme Court. ( See , Branks v. Kern (On Appeal) 359 S.E.2d 780 (N.C.,1987)). |
Case |
| Liotta v. Segur | Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 728829 (Conn.Super.), 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 621 (Conn.Super.,2004) |
In this unreported Connecticut case, a dog owner sued a groomer for negligent infliction of emotional distress, alleging that the groomer negligently handled her very large dog when he removed it from her vehicle with “excessive force.” This resulted in a leg fracture, that, after lengthy and expensive care, ultimately resulted in the dog's euthanization. The court held that plaintiff failed to adequately plead a case for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but said in dicta that the results might be different for a pet owner who proves intentional infliction of emotional distress. Motion for summary judgment as against plaintiff's count two is granted. |
Case | |
| State v. Avella | --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 2552529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2019) | The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge. | Case | |
| CO - Louisville - § Sec. 6.12.160 Pit bulls prohibited. | Louisville, Colorado Municipal Code, Title 6, § 6.12.160 | This code prohibits ownership of pit bulls within the city and provides certain exceptions. | Local Ordinance | |
| WA - Dangerous Dog - 16.08.090. Dangerous dogs--Requirements for restraint | West's RCWA 16.08.090 | WA ST 16.08.090 | This Washington statute outlines the state and local provisions related to dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. It first provides that it is unlawful for an owner of a dangerous dog to permit the dog to be outside the proper enclosure unless the dog is muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and under physical restraint of a responsible person. Potentially dangerous dogs shall be regulated only by local, municipal, and county ordinances and nothing in this section limits restrictions local jurisdictions may place on owners of potentially dangerous dogs. | Statute |