Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Davison v. Berg | 243 So.3d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018) | 44 Fla. L. Weekly D641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018); 2018 WL 1415485 | Deborah Davison volunteered at her local Humane Society to help take care of a dog park. Three years later, Rebecca Berg’s dog who was chasing other dogs collided with Davison. Davison suffered a broken leg that required extensive medical care. Davison then filed an action against Berg under a Florida statute that “imposes liability on dog owners for damage their dogs cause to other persons and animals.” The trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of Berg for two reasons. The first reason was that the signs outside of the park sufficiently warned Davison of the risks of injury inside. The second reason was that Davison essentially consented to the risk of potential injuries by being a volunteer for the dog park. On appeal, this court stated that the Florida statute was a strict liability statute that makes an owner the insurer of their dog’s conduct. The only defense to the statute is for an owner to display in a prominent place on his or her premises a sign that includes the words “Bad Dog.” Berg presented evidence that the park had two signs prominently displayed at the entrance to the park with the title “Dog Park Rules.” The two signs listed rules for entrance to the dog park. One of these rules stated that park use is at the dog owner’s risk. Another rule stated that rough play and chasing were not allowed if any dogs or owners were uncomfortable with that behavior. The last rule stated that visitors enter at their own risk. Even though Davison entered the park at her own risk, the purpose of the sign requirement in the statute was to give notice that a bad dog is on the premises. The Court found that the trial court erred in finding that the signs at the dog park were sufficiently equivalent to “Bad Dog” signs to preclude liability under the Florida statute. The trial court also found that by virtue of Davison volunteering at the dog park, she was aware that she could be injured during the course of her work and that she signed a volunteer application form that acknowledged that she could be exposed to “bites, scratches, and other injuries.” Davison had also witnessed a prior collision between a dog and an individual that resulted in a broken leg. After witnessing that, Davison began to warn others at the Humane Society about the dangers of being inside the dog park with dogs chasing each other. The Court held that even though there may be evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Davison consented to the risk of injury, “an actual consent or assumption of the risk defense cannot bar liability.” The Court reversed the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment in favor of Berg. | Case | |
| Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal Volume 13 |
SUMÁRIOEDITORIAL Heron José de Santana Gordilho DOUTRINA INTERNACIONAL/INTERNATIONAL ARTICLES1. PORQUE É CRIME ESMAGAR UM PEIXINHO DOURADO?: DANO, VÍTIMA E A ESTRUTURA DOS CRIMES ANTI-CRUELDADE |
Policy | |||
| City of Water Valley v. Trusty | 343 So.2d 471 (Miss. 1977) | Appellants filed b ill of complaint seeking to enjoin enforcement of city's dog leash ordinance. The court summarily held that Mississippi Code Annotated s 21-19-9 (1972) authorizes municipalities to regulate the running at large of animals of all kinds. The ordinance here was enacted pursuant to that authority, it meets the constitutional requirements, and the demurrer should have been sustained on that question. | Case | ||
| Animal Rights Front, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Com'n of Town of Glastonbury | 2002 WL 31761999 (Conn.Super.) |
The plaintiff, Animal Rights Front, Inc., an environmental intervenor, appeals from a final decision of the defendant that gave subdivision and special permit approval to an application by defendant Rejean Jacques d/b/a Rejean Realty, Inc. The basic issue of the plaintiff's appeal relates to preservation of the Eastern Timber Rattlesnake, an endangered species common to the Diamond Lake section of Glastonbury, and its migration across the development project, which would inherently lead to mortality. On appeal, defendants questioned plaintiff's standing because they contended that rattlesnakes do not fall under the category of "natural resources." Relying on a companion case, the court noted that endangered species are inherently deemed natural resources. However in dismissing plaintiff's appeal, the court found that the defendant made changes that provided for the protection of the rattlesnake and the commission reasonably relied upon these assertions by the defendant to support its conclusions so it was not required to consider alternatives to the proposed development. |
Case | ||
| Colombia, Resolución 002341, 2007 | Resolution 002341 de 2007 sets parameters and requirements with the goal of guaranteeing the efficiency of the different processes that are part of the system of production of cattle for slaughter, while taking into account the livestock’s health and safety. Some of the topics that this resolution regulates include registration of production farms, requirements of the farming facilities, animal health and biosafety, veterinary medicines good practices, animal feeding good practices, farm and livestock transportation personnel, animal welfare and animal transportation. | Administrative | |||
| WA - Buckely - Breed - Chapter 9.10 (Pit Bull Ordinance) | BUCKELY, WA., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 9.10.020, 9.10.260 - 9.10.300 (2008) |
In Buckely, Washington, pit bulls are defined to be “dangerous dogs." Such dogs are considered to be a public nuisance and shall be humanely destroyed or removed from the city. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Perpetual Trustees Tasmania Ltd v State of Tasmania | [2000] TASSC 68 |
A testatrix bequeathed a part of her estate to be used in support of 'animal welfare'. It was held that this constituted a charitable trust as the purpose was so predominantly charitable that the intention was to be assumed and that even if that portion of the estate could be used for non-charitable purposes, this was in a manner allowed under the Wills Act 1992 (Tas). |
Case | ||
| Ladnier v. Norwood | 781 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1986). |
Plaintiff horse owner sought review of a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which found in favor of defendants, veterinarian and insurer, in an action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's horse. The court affirmed the judgment that found defendants, veterinarian and insurer, not negligent in the death of a horse belonging to plaintiff horse owner because they met the statutorily required standard of care. Defendants did not breach a duty to warn because the risk of a fatal reaction to the drug they gave to the horse was common and was considered by equine specialists to be insubstantial. |
Case | ||
| US - AWA - Subpart J. Importation of Live Dogs | 9 C.F.R. § 2.150 - 2.153 | This subsection covers the importation of dogs into the United States. No person shall import a live dog from any part of the world into the continental United States or Hawaii for purposes of resale, research, or veterinary treatment unless the dog is accompanied by an import permit issued by APHIS and is imported into the continental United States or Hawaii within 30 days after the proposed date of arrival stated in the import permit. Health and rabies certificates are required as provided. | Administrative | ||
| TX - Dangerous - Subchapter B: Dogs That Are A Danger to Animals | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 822.011 - 013 | TX HEALTH & S § 822.011 - 013 | Subchapter B prohibits dogs from running at large and enumerates the criminal penalty for such violation. | Statute |